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What explains the proletarization (the increasing embrace by the blue-collar 
constituencies) of the radical right vote in the countries of post-Communist Europe? I 
argue that the centrist shift of the ex-Communist left parties along the economic policy 
dimension drives the electoral success of radical right parties in the region. I show that 
the programmatic shift of the ex-Communist left parties (as instrumented by the 
implementation of austerity reforms) opened up their traditional blue-collar 
constituencies to the redistributive appeals of the radical right parties. I test my argument 
using several different approaches. First, I examine the relationship between the support 
for the radical right parties and the ex-Communist left parties’ policy positions using a 
quantitative cross-country analysis. Second, I provide an overview of the experiences of 
the four Visegrád Group countries and trace the blue-collar constituencies’ shift away 
from the ex-Communist left parties to the populist and radical right parties over time, as 
the left parties became more economically centrist. I then test my argument using 
constituency-level and individual-level experimental survey data within Hungary. Both 
methods help establish that the centrist shift of the ex-Communist left parties along the 
economic policy dimension boosted support for the radical right party. My argument 
contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of political systems and the rise of the 
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The recent rise of populist and radical right politicians across Europe made many 
observers wonder: why are right-wing parties and candidates gaining popularity and 
attracting voters frustrated with the economic impact of globalization? Why are the left 
parties less successful in mobilizing voters on similar appeals? What is the origin of the 
current rightward drift in politics, particularly in the post-Communist world?  
Moreover, as right-wing parties and politicians increasingly gain success in 
Europe, observers are noticing a puzzling variation in the electoral fortunes of the radical 
right. While radical and populist right parties succeed in some countries, they fail in 
others. Most Central European countries have recently witnessed multiplying parties and 
politicians that combined right-wing attitudes on public and private morality with left-
wing attitudes on economic issues. These parties have called for price regulations, 
increased taxation for the wealthy, the renationalization of privatized property, and 
protection of their countries against job loss. In the United States, Donald Trump won the 
2016 election on an openly populist platform, portraying himself as an opponent of global 
financial elites. For example, he promised to reintroduce the Glass-Steagall regulations, 
increase trade protection, and withdraw from NAFTA. This arguably brought Trump the 
support of the traditional Democratic bastions of the Rust Belt. As an acting President, 
Trump continues to emphasize the need for job creation and his successes in bringing 
American jobs back to the country, a strategy that plays directly into the working class’s 
acute sense of economic loss (Gest, 2016).  
Interestingly, this mixture of socialist and conservative attitudes in the electoral 
platforms of these parties and politicians does not fit the usual left-right divide. For 
example, while the Slovak National Party, Jobbik in Hungary, or Law and Justice in 
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Poland are often referred to as “radical right” parties, their economic programs are as 
leftwing as those of many old left parties. What explains this dynamic? 
My research attempts to explain this empirical puzzle. I focus on the supply-side 
of the story, modeling the success of radical right actors in terms of the timing of the 
implementation of market reforms and the subsequent emergence of a socioeconomic 
cleavage in a particular country. In countries where the left parties moved to the center of 
the economic policy (as exemplified by the implementation of austerity packages), the 
radical right is more likely to be electorally successful. This is because in such countries, 
their blue-collar constituencies of the ex-Communist left felt abandoned by the left parties 
and were increasingly incorporated into the populist right parties. In other words, the left 
party’s economic policy switch (often made under the pressure coming from the IMF) 
opened up a space on the political right to challenge the left by using the anti-austerity 
agenda. In such countries, this move has created the conditions for a party realignment 
process.  
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist system, the ex-Communist 
parties had two possible strategies in context of the market transition. These strategies 
were 1) to preserve the ideological orthodoxy and the redistributionist economic platform, 
or 2) to shift to the center of the ideological spectrum (by implementing austerity policies, 
curtailing government spending, controlling the public debt etc.). Tavits and Letki (2009: 
555) explain that implementing pro-market reforms was particularly electorally 
advantageous for the ex-Communist left, since it allowed these parties to demonstrate 
their disassociation from socialism and their ability to operate in a democracy and market 
economy. I show that such choices during the transition period largely shaped the 
consequential electoral fortunes of the populist right parties in such countries.  
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In my dissertation, I show that in the countries where successor left parties chose 
to move to the center of the political spectrum and enact austerity policies while in power 
(Tavits and Letki, 2009), they eventually discredited themselves in the eyes of their core 
constituencies (blue-collar workers, lower middle class, and broadly defined 
“globalization losers”1). The blue-collar workers who suffered the most from the erosion 
of many traditional factory-based jobs as a result of the market transformation were 
particularly damaged. The accumulated frustration with the ex-Communist left created a 
political opening for the radical right parties, which targeted the frustrated groups using 
populist and redistributionist appeals (Varga, 2014). As result, blue-collar voters are now 
disproportionately represented within the radical right electorate (Mudde, 2016), 
explaining the observed phenomenon of the so-called “proletarization” of the right vote 
(Ignazi 2003; Arzheimer 2013). Therefore, according to my theory, the radical right 
parties can be understood as competitors to the center left parties along the economic 
policy dimension for the social groups broadly defined as “working class.” As I show in 
the case-study section, the populist challengers of the reform parties tended to arise 
following the implementation of austerity packages.  
This argument explains why populist and radical right parties are particularly 
electorally successful in countries like Hungary or Poland. By contrast, in countries where 
the ex-Communist party preserved its more traditional leftist agenda (e.g., rejection of 
socioeconomic inequality, strong support for equal opportunities and income 
redistribution), like in the Czech Republic or Slovakia, they were able to retain a 
significant shares of their traditional working-class voters, typically resulting in weaker 
                                                          
1 Yotam Margalit defines “the losers” as a broader group of individuals that perceive themselves to be 
adversely affected by the process of global market integration. (Margalit, 2008: 6) Tucker et al. (2002) 
define “losers” as people who have been hurt by the unprecedented economic transition across the former 




radical right parties (since they fail to attract significant shares of the working population) 
while traditional party alignments have been more stable. 
The findings in this dissertation go beyond purely theoretical inquiry. The rise of 
the extremist and radical right parties in contemporary European politics threatens to 
undermine the stability of its political systems. The radical right parties are notorious for 
their use of extreme nationalist rhetoric and may represent a threat to survival of the 
European democracies. 
For example, Hungary’s radical Right party, Jobbik, which is the main focus of 
this dissertation, has been notorious for its use of extremely xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
rhetoric. For instance, a 2014 Jobbik election manifesto offered two ways to solve the 
“Gypsy question.” They wrote: “The first one is based on peaceful consent, the second on 
radical exclusion … Our party wishes to offer one last chance to the destructive minority 
that lives here, so first it will consider peaceful consent. If that agreement fails, then and 
only then the radical solution can follow” (Rorke 2014). Moreover, in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s, Jobbik organized a series of paramilitary anti-Roma marches where even 
harsher statements were made. Some participants went so far as to suggest that “all the 
trash must be swept out of the country,” and that “the Gypsy is genetically-coded for 
criminality” (Cain 2012). In addition, the extremist language is contagious; for instance, 
while Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party has by and large not adopted Jobbik’s harsh anti-
Roma rhetoric, it has at times also tapped into anti-Roma sentiment in subtler ways 
(Snegovaya 2018). 
Therefore, the importance of understanding the factors underlying the success of 
the radical right parties goes beyond purely academic interest. It is also driven by the 
necessity to outline policy recommendations in order to limit the growth of the populist 
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Why the Post-Communist Countries? 
While the above argument is applicable to the Western Europe and the U.S. as well 
(see, for example, Berman 2016b), in this dissertation I limit the analysis to the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe with a special focus on Visegrád Group countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). Such an approach provides several 
specific advantages and allows me to draw a clearer line between different explanatory 
variables.  
Several factors drive the regional focus. First, traditional explanations for the 
success of the radical right parties focus on the anti-immigration sentiment of their 
supporters (Yılmaz 2012; Rydgren 2008; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Lubbers et al. 
2002; Norris 2005). Yet in the post-Communist countries, the influx of immigrants was 
generally smaller and these countries suffered less from the 2014 Syrian immigration 
crisis. Few migrants were particularly interested in settling in Eastern Europe and 
preferred instead to head to Germany or Scandinavia where they had higher social welfare 
benefits, greater employment opportunities and established immigrant communities 
(Lyman 2015). Hence, historically Central and Eastern Europe supplied, rather than 
received, EU migrants (Allen 2015: 8–10; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Rovny 2014). 
In these countries, immigration became a hot issue only from May 2015 following the 
European Commission’s distribution scheme (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 125). 
The above observation explains why Eastern European radical right parties rarely 
used anti-immigration platform prior to 2014. For example, Allen (2015) shows that the 
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linkage between the anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support has been stronger 
in Western Europe than Eastern Europe. Bustikova (2017) argues that until 2015, Eastern 
European radical right never effectively mobilized against the new minorities arriving 
from the non-European countries. However, in many such countries the radical right 
parties became quite strong and electorally successful despite the absence of a huge 
refugee influx. This suggests that other factors, such as the role of party realignment, 
might have been at play. Therefore, in contrast with the countries of Western Europe, the 
traditional explanations of the rise of the radical right (anti-immigration sentiment) do not 
fit the Central and Eastern European cases.  
Once the immigration crisis hit, the right-wing politicians in countries that only 
tangentially experienced an influx of immigration tried to capitalize on the anti-refugee 
rhetoric. For example, Viktor Orban insisted that Hungary is under no obligation to 
endanger its traditional Christian values by accepting large numbers of Muslims during 
the peak of the crisis. Hungary’s radical right Jobbik party consistently advocated a total 
ban on immigration. Poland’s President, Andrzej Duda, complained about “dictates” from 
the European Union to accept migrants flowing into the Continent from the Middle East 
and Africa (Lyman 2015). Yet the electoral success of these radical and populist right 
parties predated the crisis by several years. Hungary’s radical right Jobbik and populist 
right Fidesz made it into the parliament before the refugee crisis. Jobbik received 14.77% 
of votes in the 2009 European Parliament election and 16.67% of votes in the 2010 
Hungary’s Parliamentary election respectively; Fidesz has won several elections prior to 
the refuge crisis as well. Similarly, the right populist Law and Justice party, which won 
the 2015 election in Poland, was also successful before the immigration crisis — it won 
the Polish Parliamentary election back in 2005. 
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Second, the timing of the formation of the socioeconomic cleavages, which is 
crucial for my argument, is much easier to study in post-Communist countries. Here, the 
socioeconomic cleavage refers to the economic division between the “winners” and 
“losers” of the transition, which in the CEE context were shaped primarily during the 
market reforms that split those societies across reform-winners and losers. The parties 
that implemented the reforms were usually supported by transition winners. Parties 
opposing the reforms appealed to transition losers. Because the reforms were 
implemented around the same period in most of the CEE countries, the starting point for 
my argument is much easier to identify in this particular regional context. Since the 
market transition took place in post-Communist countries during a relatively short span 
of the 1990s, the effects of this transition are clearer and easier to compare across different 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
One possible reservation about focusing on the post-Communist region is the fact 
that Communist regimes tended to be perceived as “classless societies” (Kovacs 2013). 
Hence, as this objection goes, my research question would not be applicable to them as 
such since a class-based voting was not a factor prior to the transition. However, as I show 
below, at least in the early years of the post-Communist transition, the working-class 
groups tended to be overrepresented amongst the supporters for the traditional left parties 
in many countries of the region. I also show that the realignment processes and the 
workers shift to the radical right parties tended to occur faster in the countries where the 
left chose to implement the pro-market policies. 
Ultimately, despite the similarities in the historical fortunes of the Eastern and 
Central European countries, they show a substantive variation in the electoral fortunes of 
the radical right parties (Figure 1). Radical and populist right parties in Hungary and 
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Poland steadily attracted some voter support since the early 1990s, yet in Czech Republic 





Figure 1. Variation in the Electoral Shares in the National Parliamentary Elections of the Populist and Radical Parties 
in selected Central and Eastern European countries, 2002-2014. Orange Line – Populist Right, Red Line – Radical 
Right. Countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia. Source: Chapel Hill Database 
 
 
The question is then, which factors account for such variation in the popularity of 
the radical right parties across the region? My research attempts to explain this puzzle. 
My particular focus in this dissertation is Hungary’s radical right Jobbik party. 
Hungary’s Jobbik party (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) is a radical right party (see 
chapter 3 for a definition), which has been consistently electorally successful in the 









































Hungarian case, I show that the radical right parties became one of the key beneficiaries 
of the working-class voters’ large-scale swing away from the Hungarian center left. 
 
 
Contributions of the Dissertation 
In the past few years, the rise and spread of the radical right parties across Europe 
has become a defining feature of our current political moment. The extremist nature of 
such parties represents a potential threat to the continued successful functioning of 
European democracies. In this dissertation, I develop an argument that provides a better 
account for the factors contributing to the success of the radical right parties. 
Understanding these factors should allow to make policy recommendations regarding 
ways to limit the electoral prospects of the radical right parties, help policymakers 
everywhere to address the grievances of the radical right voters, and prevent further 
political radicalization in their countries. 
The theoretical argument developed in this dissertation explains how the economic 
policy shift of the ex-Communist left parties launched a process of party realignment in 
these countries by creating a political opportunity for the radical right parties to appeal to 
former left constituencies on the protectionist economic agenda. This helped the radical 
right parties to gain subsequent electoral success and explains the variation in the electoral 
shares of the radical right parties across the region. I instrument the economic policy 
switch of the ex-Communist left parties by whether or not they implemented austerity 
policy packages in the 1990s and 2000s when in power. Typically, the implementation of 
austerity reforms was a condition imposed by the IMF loans, a consideration that helps 
me address the endogeneity problem. The examples of such countries are Hungary and 
Poland. In the countries where the left switch did not occur, the alignments of the political 
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groups and parties continued more along the traditional lines. Examples of such countries 
are the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Hence, I expect in such countries the working-class 
constituencies to be more likely to support the left parties and the radical right generally 
to be weaker. 
Several important implications follow the findings of this dissertation. First, I 
show that party competition along the economic policy dimension plays an important role 
in the support for the radical right parties along with the competition along the cultural 
dimension (see chapter 2). Second, I demonstrate that rather than being the function of 
structural factors (economic crisis, unemployment etc.) alone, the electoral success of the 
radical right parties also is a result of particular political choices made by other parties, 
specifically the center-left parties. This finding allows one to make important policy 
recommendations, such as altering the center-left parties’ policy positions in order to 
reduce the political opportunities available for mobilization by the radical right political 
actors (see the conclusion chapter). Ultimately, I show the congruence of political 
processes in both Eastern and Western Europe, which places the post-Communist region 
in a broader political context. 
My argument complements previous scholarly accounts on the topic by merging 
different stream of literature in a coherent explanation of the radical right success. 
First, my dissertation engages the bulk of literature on definitions of radical and 
populist right parties. I review the available approaches to defining the radical right parties 
such as the anti-system parties (Capoccia 2002) and the anti-establishment parties 
(Schedler 1996; Kubát 2007) and discuss their benefits and pitfalls. I also introduce the 
definitions that focus on the cultural dimension in approaching the radical right parties, 
by comparing those that engage a single cultural policy issue (typically, the immigration) 
(Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000; Fennema 1997; Brug and Fennema 2003) with those that 
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introduce several cultural policy issues (Mudde 1995; Mudde 2000; Mudde 2002). I 
conclude that the latter approach allows best to distinguish the radical right parties from 
other parties (Pop-Eleches 2010; Bustikova 2014). 
Second, I engage the literature on populism, by defining it primarily as a political 
strategy (rather than discourse or ideology) used by parties under specific circumstances 
(Canovan 1999; Weyland 1999; Mudde 2000). I define populism as a political strategy 
that involves the appeals to “the people” against both the established structure of power 
and the dominant ideas and values” (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2000). Hence, populism is 
not reduced to the radical-right politics but may be combined with other constituent 
elements of the radical right politics as ethno-nationalism (Mudde 2007; Bonikowski 
2017). This conceptual separation allows me to distinguish between the radical right 
parties and the populist parties more broadly.  
I then show how radical right parties are likely to use populist strategy under 
specific circumstances. In particular, populist strategy becomes more attractive under 
conditions when large social groups are frustrated with the policies of the establishment 
(Betz 1994; Canovan 1999; Betz 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Zakaria 2016; 
Ishkanian and Marlies 2017). I demonstrate that periods of crisis and the implementation 
of austerity packages give challenger parties incentives to use populist appeals in order to 
attack the elites. Existing empirical evidence suggests that austerity policies tend to 
decrease support for the incumbent parties and boost support for populist parties 
(Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; Bailey et al. 2018; Barber and Hope, 2015; Lupu 2014; 2015; 
Nyman 2016a; 2016b; Thomas 2016). I complement this finding by showing that the 
implementation of the austerity policies by the ex-Communist left parties impacted the 
subsequent success of the populist right parties in the region. As I show in chapter 4, the 
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success of the populist radical right Jobbik in Hungary followed the fiscal adjustment 
package imposed by the center left MSZP party in 2008. 
Third, my argument builds on the scholarship that finds a consistent association 
between the economic policy convergence of mainstream parties and the electoral success 
of radical right parties. Mainstream parties’ ideological proximity can foster the electoral 
success of the radical right parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Carter 2005; Nissan and 
Carter 2005; Brug and Fennema 2005), whether it is the ideological convergence between 
the mainstream left and right parties (Nissan and Carter 2005) or a grand coalition 
government prior to the elections (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). The relationship holds in 
Central and Eastern European (Pop-Eleches 2010), Western European (Berman 2010, 
2016a, 2016b) and Latin American (Lupu 2014, 2015) cases. In line with the above 
literature, my argument focuses on the centrist shift along the economic policy scale of 
the ex-Communist left parties as being explanatory of the radical right fortunes in the 
post-Communist context. 
Fourth, the above assumption also engages the scholarship that looks at the policy 
choices made by the ex-Communist parties. In the post-Communist context, Communist 
successor parties that stayed in power after the Communist times often had the advantage 
of choosing their policy stances in the aftermath of the transition. Most of these parties in 
the region chose to transform themselves into full-fledged social democratic parties 
(Hanley 2001; Grzymala-Busse 2002; March and Mudde 2005), as did the Hungarian 
Socialist Party and Poland’s Democratic Left Alliance that became proponents of pro-
market economic policy. Programmatic transformations allowed the communist successor 
parties to sway the democratic electorate frustrated with the Communist legacies of these 
parties, stay in power (Grzymala-Busse 2002) and implement the reforms (Tavits and 
Letki 2009). I show that while these policy choices benefited the ex-Communist parties 
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in the short term, they ended up damaging these parties in the long term because of the 
voters’ accumulating frustration with the programmatic inconsistency of these parties and 
the increasing outflow of these parties’ traditional constituencies (blue collar workers) to 
the right side of the political spectrum. 
Ultimately, I engage the literature that focuses on the overtime incorporation of 
the blue-collar voters by the radical right parties. The empirical studies show that the 
working-class voters became the core of the right-wing constituencies in western Europe 
(Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Gougou and Mayer, 2013). As I 
argue in my dissertation, this so-called “proletarization” of the radical right vote is not 
unique to Western Europe (Linden 2018; Ost 2018). Building on the available scholarship 
(Ignazi, 2003; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007; Arzheimer 2013), in chapter 5 I demonstrate 
that the proletarization of the radical right vote also takes place in Eastern and Central 
Europe. 
Overall, my argument brings together different streams of literature and 
demonstrates both theoretically and empirically the similarity of political processes in 
different regions. While I situate my argument in the larger bulk of scholarship, I also 
back it with the empirical evidence collected on different levels of the analysis using a 
number of qualitative and quantitative methods. Such a mixed methods approach is 
advantageous in that it allows me to control for the weaknesses of each individual method 
and to increase the breadth and depth of understanding of the phenomenon in question. 
 
 
Plan for the Dissertation 
In this subsection I provide the outline of my dissertation and address the key 
assumptions tested in each subsequent chapter. This dissertation argues that the economic 
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policy choices made by the ex-Communist left parties in the aftermath of the post-
Communist transition significantly influenced the electoral fortunes of the radical right 
parties. The remainder of this dissertation will expand on this theoretical argument by 
developing a broad theory of the center left and radical right party competition along the 
economic policy dimension for the support of blue collar constituencies.  
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 lays out the 
theoretical argument. I explain the dynamic of party competition and formation of 
socioeconomic cleavages in the post-Communist region. I then discuss the key tenets of 
my theoretical argument and introduce the key concepts (such as cleavage formation, 
austerity reforms, party competition along two-dimensional policy space etc.) used in the 
subsequent analysis. Then I discuss why the particular focus on this dissertation is on the 
party competition along the economic (rather than cultural) policy dimension. Finally, in 
chapter 1, I overview the set of strategies available to the ex-Communist left parties in the 
aftermath of the post-Communist transition, explain the consistency of such choices and 
the impact that these choices had on the blue-collar constituencies’ support for the ex-
Communist left parties.  
Chapter 2 is designed to frame my theoretical argument in terms of broader 
scholarship on the topic. To define the key concepts used in my analysis I overview 
different scholarly approaches to defining the radical right and populist parties and 
conceptual differences between these terms. I also explain the coding of the left parties. 
In addition, I overview the alternative party-level and country-level approaches that aim 
to explain substantive variation in the electoral fortunes of the radical right parties in the 
post-Communist Europe. 
Chapter 3 reviews the methodological approaches I use to test my hypotheses and 
provides a different type of plausibility test of my theory. In this dissertation, rather than 
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using a “silver bullet” test on which the main argument rises or falls, I test my theoretical 
expectations on different levels of analysis using a number of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. These methods include cross-country (regression and case study) analysis, 
constituency-level analysis of voting patterns, and individual level analysis of political 
attitudes using survey experiments. The advantage of such mixed methods approach is 
the ability to control for the weaknesses of separate approaches by combining quantitative 
and qualitative evidence. In Chapter 3, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each 
respective methodological approach, as well as how the strengths of some approaches 
allow to compensate for the weaknesses of other methods. 
Chapter 4 reviews the trajectories of Hungary’s ex-Communist left and right 
parties.  Hungary is of particular interest to my dissertation, as in this country the radical 
right party Jobbik has achieved particularly high levels of electoral success. I trace the 
economic policy choices of Hungary’s ex-Communist left MSZP in the aftermath of the 
democratic transition and show how the rightward drift of Hungary’s politics since 2009 
was the function of the austerity policies implemented by Hungary’s left party. I 
complement the analysis with quantitative evidence from individual survey that show that 
over time the blue-collar constituencies in Hungary tend to switch from supporting the 
ex-Communist left MSZP to embracing the (Fidesz and Jobbik) right parties. 
In Chapter 5, I expand the analysis to a larger set of Central and Eastern European 
countries. First, I look at the relationship between support for the radical right parties and 
the ex-Communist left policy positions on the European Social Survey data in a set of 
Eastern European countries. Second, I apply my theoretical framework to the experiences 
of the three other Visegrad Group countries —the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia—to see whether it holds in each of these country cases. 
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In Chapter 6, I run the constituency level analysis by demonstrating the existence 
of an empirical association between the districts that voted for Hungary’s ex-Communist 
left MSZP in the 2006 parliamentary election and the districts that supported the radical 
right Jobbik in the 2010 parliamentary election. This finding confirms the theoretical 
expectation that the implementation of the 2008 austerity package by the center left MSZP 
party contributed to the embrace of the radical right Jobbik party in the subsequent 2010 
parliamentary election. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, to address possible causal inference problems with my 
argument I run an experimental survey in Hungary and find a strong and significant 
increase in support for Jobbik on both a general sample and on different specifications of 
blue-collar subsamples following the treatment exposure that models the centrist 
economic policy shift of the ex-Communist left party. However, the effects are 
statistically significant only when respondents are told that the radical right Jobbik party 
adopted a protectionist (rather than anti-immigration) policy platform, which also 
confirms my assumption about the party competition on the economic policy dimension. 
The last chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing the evidence produced 




Chapter 1. Is the Radical Right the New Left? 
In the above chapter, I introduced the key tenets of my theoretical argument. I 
stressed that in the post-Communist countries where left parties moved to the center of 
the political spectrum to become more like typical western Social Democratic parties, like 
in Hungary, the left parties discredited themselves in the eyes of their traditional 
constituency (workers, lower middle class), a constituency that was ultimately 
incorporated by the radical right parties. Hence, the radical right parties are strong in such 
countries.  
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the specific hypotheses tested in this 
dissertation and to present the theoretical arguments underlying each of them. This 
chapter consists of six sections. In the first section, I formulate the key argument and the 
main concepts it relies upon. In the second section, I discuss such key theoretical concepts 
— cleavages and the realignment process. In the third section, I focus on the strategies of 
the left parties that led to the economic policy switches. I also address the potential 
endogeneity in my argument (the same factors might underlie the economic policy switch 
of the left-wing party and the rise of the radical right) by explaining that the western 
institutions (such as the IMF) were often an external factor behind the left policy choices. 
Finally, in the fourth section, I explain why the key constituency most susceptible to the 
left policy switch was the working-class groups.  
 
 
Party Competition in the Two-Dimensional Space 
In this dissertation I argue that the populist and radical right parties often enjoy 
electoral success in the countries where the ex-Communist left parties shifted to the center 
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of the economic policy scale, creating a political space for the radical right. In other words, 
the economic policy switch (such as the implementation of the market reforms) during 
the period of transition and the formation of the socioeconomic cleavages by the 
Communist successor parties launched the realignment process in which the traditional 
supporters of the left parties (blue-collar voters) shifted to embrace the populist and 
radical right. I also show that the economic policy choices of the left parties were largely 
a function of the exogenous push that came from the international institutions in the early 
and mid-1990s. 
For the purpose of my argument, it is necessary to introduce the concepts of party 
competition and describe the political space in which the parties operate. Party 
competition may be defined as strategic contest among parties as political actors to gain 
political power along policy dimensions (Franzmann and Spies 2011: 320). The strategic 
choices made by the parties may be described in terms of spatial theory that describes 
parties as contesting each other by positioning themselves on different dimensions 
(Downs 1957). This contestation depends on parties’ credibility and reputational 
advantage over each other across dimensions of competition. The “policy dimensions” or 
“cleavages” refer to a particular type of conflict in democratic systems that is created by 
the social structural transformations such as nation building, industrialization, 
marketization, and post-industrialization (Bornschier 2009). 
The introduction of the market economy (marketization) has produced several 
major cleavages in the countries of the post-Communist region: urban-rural, workers-
owners, religious-secular, traditionalists-modernists, democracy-communism, national-
multicultural, protectionist-free market, libertarian-authoritarian etc. (Kitschelt 1992; 
Berglund et al. 2004; Arvanitopoulos 2009). Contemporary literature on the European 
party systems (Kitschelt 1992, 2002; Hooghe et al. 2002; Benoit and Laver 2006; Marks 
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et al. 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009) often depicts the political space as projected 
on two main dimensions—(1) the economic axis (from state-directed redistribution to 
market allocation) and (2) the non-economic axis including socio-cultural issues such as 
national identity, immigration, religion (from socially liberal to socially conservative), 
along which parties design their electoral moves and strategically reposition 
themselves.The cultural (national-multicultural) dimension represents a conflict between 
parties that want to preserve their ‘national’ and/or ‘cultural’ distinctiveness and limit 
immigration and the parties that emphasize the importance of open border and 
multiculturalism. Parties on the cultural right tend to prioritize the preservation of the 
national identity, call for national solidarity, emphasize the defense of tradition and 
national sovereignty, support tougher immigration and integration policy and favor 
restrictions of the number of foreigners (Bornschier 2010b). Parties on the cultural left 
tend to embrace cultural diversity, international cooperation and the open borders. 
 The economic (left-right) dimension (socioeconomic cleavage) refers to parties’ 
preferences on economic policy issues, including economic regulation, welfare 
expansion, economic openness, taxation and privatization. This policy space is defined as 
a continuum that structures economic policy preferences from those most favorable to 
more regulation and less economic freedom to those that give preference to a lean state 
and economic freedom. Parties on the economic right typically favor less government 
intervention and regulation, lower taxes and the privatization of state assets. Parties on 
the economic left tend to prioritize the active role of the government in the economy, 
more regulation in order to reduce inequalities caused by the market and higher taxes and 
expansion of welfare (Elias et al. 2015; Marks et al. 2006). 
The socioeconomic cleavage reflected in the economic division between the 
“winners” and “losers” played a particularly important role in the post-Communist 
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transition (Markus 1996: 13-14; Arvanitopoulos 2009: 260). The formation of the 
socioeconomic cleavage did not take place simultaneously in all countries in the region. 
In those countries that implemented the fiscal austerity policies immediately in the early 
1990s, it took place sooner, while in the cleavage formation has been delayed in others. 
Gijsberts and Nieuwbeert (2000) show that in the years when the first general democratic 
elections occurred in Eastern European countries (around 1991-92), there were hardly any 
significant differences in voting behavior of different social strata. This suggests that at 
the beginning of the market transition, the socioeconomic cleavage in most post-
Communist countries had not yet formed. It was not until the start of the market reforms 
implementation (particularly, the fiscal austerity reforms) that such cleavage began to 
form. The socioeconomic cleavage tended to be more accentuated in more modernized 
countries with an advanced class structure and a class-based party politics, such as the 
Czech Republic (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Zajc and Boh 2004). Less modernized countries 
(such as Romania or Bulgaria) delayed the implementation of the market reforms by 
adopting the strategy of partial reforms instead, and hence the formation of the 
socioeconomic cleavage in those countries has been postponed. 
However, the implementation of the market reforms launched the formation of the 
socioeconomic cleavage, which was created by the emerging distinction between the 
winners and losers of transition. For party competition at the elite level, the severest 
divisions appeared to be related to positions on market reform and were mirrored in 
similar bases for partisanship among voters (Evans and Whitefield 1998). The most 
obvious social divisions underlying partisanship stemmed from divergent economic 
interests: in different economic sectors, such as agriculture, industry, and services; in 
different types of ownership structure - state and private ownership and a variety of 
possible intermediate property forms; in different types of employment status - between 
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the employed, unemployed, those working at home, and those on pensions; over access 
to goods and services and so on (Evans and Whitefield 2001). Hence, the economic 
liberalization launched the struggle about differences over the economy, distribution of 
resources, state versus private property, collective versus individualist strategies for 
economic advancement, the role of the state in redistributing income, merit versus need 
based conceptions of justice and so on (Evans and Whitefield 2001). Pop-Eleches and 
Tucker (2010: 2) demonstrated that post-Communist citizens are more likely to rely 
primarily on their economic attitudes when placing themselves on a left-right scale, while 
the citizens elsewhere tend to bring a combination of economic and social attitudes to 
bear on their left-right self-placement. This observation is key to my theoretical argument, 
as I show that the party realignment process to a large extend resulted from the mainstream 
parties’ economic policy choices during the market reforms implementation. 
The above division between the transition winners and losers deepened after the 
“Fourth revolution” - namely, globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2012). The 
combination of both the “Third” and the “Fourth” revolutions exacerbated the existing 
discontinuity between the reforms’ winners and losers. The literature refers to this 
phenomenon as a “cleavage leap”— a specific pattern of the post-Communist cleavage 
formation, which featured a quick switch from the unfinished industrial cleavage 
formation of Lipset-Rokkan type into a new cleavage configuration generated by 
transition and globalization (Saarts 2015: 30). Kriesi (1998: 180) pointed out “the 
emergence of yet another cleavage – the cleavage opposing the new middle-class winners 
of the transformation of Western European societies to the group of losers of the very 
same process <...> These losers are first and foremost to be found among the unqualified 
members of the working class, who are about to constitute the core of a new underclass”. 
Those winners and losers have distinctive social-structural characteristics: “Two of the 
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most important groups on the winners’ side, highly educated people and socio-cultural 
specialists, are far more supportive of opening borders than are those with lower levels of 
education and those who are unskilled workers” (Kriesi et al. 2012: 73).  
A subsequent party realignment process—the changing of parties’ electoral 
coalitions followed. The parties that implemented the reforms tended to appeal to reform-
winners (including middle class and white-collar groups), the parties that opposed the 
reforms tended to appeal to reform-losers (primarily, the retirees, the unemployed, and 
the unqualified working-class groups). Depending on whether the ex-Communist left 
parties chose to implement the market reforms (in particular, the painful austerity reforms) 
or not, they were respectively less or more likely to retain their traditional electoral 
constituencies—the working-class constituencies. In the cases, where the left parties 
implemented harsh austerity reforms, the populist and radical right parties (which 
campaigned on reactionary anti-reform agenda) were more likely to gain electoral 
advantage in next electoral rounds.  
Most scholars focus in their analysis on the impact of economic openness and 
globalization on Western European political systems. In what follows, I show that in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the dynamics were very similar if we adjust for 
higher speed of socioeconomic transformation that took place in these countries during 




My argument focuses on the party realignment process brought about by the 
market reforms in the post-Communist countries. I argue that specific economic policy 
choices of the ex-Communist left parties played a decisive role in this process. In 
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particular, in the countries where the left post-Communist countries switched to the center 
of the economic policy spectrum (Hungary, Poland), the party realignment took place 
faster. In these countries, the traditional left constituencies felt abandoned by the left 
parties (especially as the ex-Communist parties abandoned their protectionist policies), 
and eventually switched to embrace the parties on the right of the political spectrum. In 
such countries, the right parties adopted the anti-market populist agenda to challenge the 
left.  
In other words, I argue that in the countries where the ex-Communist left parties 
implemented the economic policy switch, one should observe the right parties adopting 
the redistributionist agenda, and the subsequent electoral success of the radical right 
parties. I instrument the economic policy switch by the austerity policies introduced by 
the left parties in the post-Communist countries in the 1990s and 2000s. 
In the countries where the left switch did not occur, the alignments of the political 
groups and parties stayed more along the traditional lines. Examples of such countries are 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Hence, I expect in such countries the working-class 
constituencies to be more likely to support the left parties, and the radical right generally 
to be weaker. 
The below figure provides a simplified representation of the respective trajectories 





Figure 2. European Party Systems, the Left Parties Providing a Political Opening for the Radical Right. 
Source: modified Arzheimer (2013), Kitschelt (1995a) 
 
To sum up the above analysis, my general theoretical arguments are: 
- The working-class constituencies are the social groups particularly vulnerable to the 
industrial misbalances, globalization, and export of low-skilled jobs outside of Europe. 
- As the left parties became more economically centrist, the blue-collar constituencies 
were increasingly shifting away from these parties to embrace the radical right parties. 











 Explanatory Variable Outcome Variable 
Theory 
Left party shits to the center of the 
economic policy (IV = austerity 
reforms implementation) 
- Traditional constituencies (lower middle class, 
blue-collar workers) abandoned 
↓ 
- Radical Right adopts redistributionist platform 
↓ 
- Radical Right targets the ex-left constituencies 
↓ 
- Radical Right is electorally successful 
Table 1. Outline of the Key Theoretical Argument 
 
What are the key elements of my theory? The case study analysis in chapter 5 
reveals that the radical right parties often emerged in response to the austerity reforms 
implementation by the mainstream parties that drew a harsh divide between economic 
policy winners and losers and launched the formation of a socioeconomic cleavages in a 
given country. Austerity (fiscal adjustment) packages refer to the painful and socially 
unpopular economic policies of a government’s budget deficit involving a combination 
of spending cuts and/or tax rises. Austerity policies tend to increase unemployment as 
result of decline in government spending and they tend to reduce consumption by cutting 
household disposable income (Grittersova et al. 2016) and they are often met with 
significant public protests (Ponticelli and Voth 2011). Lower-skilled workers are 
particularly vulnerable to such cuts, so these groups often end up being hurt by austerity 
measures particularly badly. Because austerity measures involve fundamental decisions 
about the role of the state in the economy, they tend to frame political discourse along the 




 The introduction of austerity in the post-Communist region was not limited to the 
period of market transition alone; for example, in Hungary, the center-left MSZP party 
had to repeatedly introduce socially unpopular austerity measures in 2008, when Hungary 
found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. As I show, this policy shift largely determined 
the eventual downfall of MSZP.  
Therefore, I use the implementation of austerity policies as an instrument for the 
center left parties’ economic policy shift. The introduction of the austerity measures by 
the ex-Communist left parties was inconsistent with their original programmatic 
commitments and hurt their blue-collar constituencies (traditional electoral constituencies 
of the left parties) particularly hard. This eventually pushed those groups away from such 
ex-Communist left parties and created a political opportunity for the radical right parties. 
The radical right parties filled this vacuum by appealing to those social groups on the 
protectionist economic platform traditionally associated with the left pole of the economic 
spectrum and gained electoral success. 
Some of the left parties in the analyzed country cases (Smer in Slovakia, KSČM 
and ČSSD in the Czech Republic) managed to sustain the support of traditional support 
groups. Their electoral success depended on the preservation of a consistent pro-labor and 
redistributionist economic policy because of the presence of a strong competitor on the 
left and an enduring relationship with labor unions. The programmatic consistency of the 
left parties in the latter case ensured the preservation of the traditional party alignments 
in a given political system and traditional policy positions along the economic policy scale 
by the left and right parties. 
In this dissertation, I specifically focus on the example of Hungary to explain my 
argument in more detail, which I combine with overview of similar dynamics in three 
other Visegrád countries (see Chapter 5). Hungary’s case is particularly interesting, since 
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its radical right Jobbik party emerged as one of the largest and most established radical 
right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. As I show in Chapter 4, Hungary’s ex-
Communist left party MSZP was historically associated to a more pro-market economic 
policy, which offered the Hungarian rightwing parties an opportunity to oppose it from a 
more redistributionist populist economic platform. Therefore, following the 
implementation of tough austerity policies by the MSZP (which took place around 1995-
6), the voters’ alignment along the economic policy axis started shifting in Hungary with 
those with more redistributive preferences (working class) gradually moving to the right. 
As the Communist-successor left embraced the pro-market policies, the right-wing parties 
became increasingly pro-redistribution oriented in their economic policies and capitalized 
on the reforms dissatisfaction among the Hungarian people. I demonstrate that the first 
shift of the blue-collar working constituency in Hungary away from the left MSZP 
towards the right-wing Fidesz party occurred around 1995–6. The next wave followed 
another round of the austerity measures imposed by MSZP in the 2006–10 electoral cycle. 
The blue-collar workers’ dissatisfaction with mainstream parties in Hungary over the 
years kept pushing this electoral constituency further to the right, leading to its increasing 
support for the radical right Jobbik party. 
In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation I test my hypotheses on different 
levels of analysis: cross-country observational and qualitative comparisons, the 
constituency level analysis and individual-level experimental surveys. In Chapter 3, I 
explain how my theoretical expectations may be converted into the empirically testable 
hypotheses. I approach my analytical question on different levels of analysis and various 
methods, which allow me to address the limitations of particular approaches and check 
the external validity of my argument.  
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First, I focus on cross-country level evidence using both quantitative and 
qualitative (case-studies) evidence to check whether the working-class voters do in fact 
switch from the ex-Communist left to the radical right parties following the adoption of a 
more pro-market stance by the ex-Communist left parties in the countries of the region. 
Second, I look at four selected Visegrád countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia—and run a qualitative case-study analysis on secondary data by 
tracing the timing of the emergence of the socio-economic cleavage, the policy choices 
made by the ex-Communist left parties, the party realignment process that followed those 
choices and the electoral success of the radical right parties that followed. I show that in 
the countries where the ex-Communist left parties implemented market reforms (Hungary 
and Poland), the blue-collar constituencies tended to switch to the right side of the 
political spectrum and eventually embrace the radical right parties. I back my argument 
with the individual survey data from the Comparative Study of the Electoral System and 
Median Opinion Ltd. to show that the blue-collar constituencies switched overtime from 
supporting the ex-Communist left to embracing the radical right parties. By contrast, in 
the countries where the ex-Communist left parties preserved their traditional pro-labor 
agenda (the Czech Republic and Slovakia) the success of the radical right was more short-
lived. 
Third, I use the constituency-level data in Hungary to track the voters’ support for 
the ex-Communist left MSZP and radical right Jobbik. In line with my theoretical 
argument, I find that at least part of the electoral success of Jobbik in the 2010 election 
came from the constituencies that supported MSZP in 2006 following the implementation 
of austerity reforms by the MSZP. 
Fourth, I run an experimental survey in Hungary to show that the embrace of a 
pro-market agenda by the ex-Communist left MSZP party leads to a strong and significant 
29 
 
increase in support for Jobbik on both general sample and different specifications of blue-




The Economic vs The Cultural Dimension 
As the above analysis suggests, my theoretical argument primarily focuses on the 
economic policy competition between the center left and the radical right parties. By 
contrast, a substantial bulk of the literature on Central and Eastern Europe emphasizes the 
role played by the cultural policy dimension in the success of the radical right parties, 
such that no radical right party has been “successful without mobilizing grievances over 
immigration” (Ivarsflaten 2008: 3).  Such scholarship assumes that individuals have a 
natural tendency to associate with similar individuals while perceiving their ingroup as 
superior to outgroups (Golder 2016) and stresses the role of minorities and the backlash 
against diversity and inclusiveness in the electoral success of the radical right parties 
(Bustikova 2017).  
For example, a cultural backlash approach links the success of the radical parties 
to their ability to politicize issues on the cultural dimension, which includes strong stances 
on traditional values, nationalism, law and order, and opposition to multiculturalism 
(Bornschier 2010b; Inglehart and Norris 2016). As the argument goes, the integration into 
the increase of working migration, refugees, and asylum seekers triggered the cultural 
backlash among the population in these countries, which in turn lead to an upsurge in 
popularity of the radical right parties (Fraser 2000; Mudde 2015; Inglehart and Norris 
2016; Betz 2018).  Individual level studies find a consistent association between the 
cultural grievances and anti-immigrant attitudes and the support for the radical right 
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(Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; Norris 2005; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008). While I do 
not definitively reject the importance of the cultural dimension for radical right politics, 
the argument outlined in this dissertation focuses primarily on the competition between 
the center left and radical right parties along the economic policy dimension. 
Several reasons explain my focus on competition along the economic rather the 
cultural policy dimension in this dissertation.  
First, methodologically separating the economic and cultural policy positions is 
tricky, since a decline in one’s individual well-being may drive racism and anger against 
more “privileged” cultural groups (Snegovaya 2018). The concerns about immigrants and 
immigration may have clear economic underpinnings; for example, members of the 
working class may perceive predominantly unskilled or semi-skilled immigrant workers 
as an economic threat (Arzheimer 2013). For instance, Szombati (2018) demonstrates that 
in Hungary anti-Roma prejudices led to anti-Roma mobilization only in the presence of 
the structural preconditions, the devastating impact of neoliberal globalization. Many 
studies find that both economic and cultural concerns matter for anti-immigrant attitudes 
(Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Mayda 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007). 
 In addition, defining a party as either left or right often depends on its positions 
on both the economic and cultural policy dimensions, which further complicates the 
analysis of their strategic shifts along those dimensions. To make a clear distinction 
between the two policy dimensions and to avoid conceptual confusion, I define the parties 
based on their position on the cultural dimension and then trace their strategic choices 
along the economic policy scale (see chapter 2 for party definitions). 
Second, during the post-Communist period, the left and radical right shifted their 
policy positions primarily along the axis of economic policy; their cultural (identity) 
positions remained largely unchanged during the transition. In the same period, the 
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electoral fortunes of the radical right parties fluctuated dramatically. This suggests that 
economic policy choices may provide better explanations for the radical right parties’ 
electoral success in this context. 
The key focus of my paper is Hungary, a country with one of the most established 
and electorally successful radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe - Jobbik, the 
Movement for a Better Hungary. Hungary is the only country in the region where a radical 
right party Jobbik was able to mobilize more than 10 percent of voters in three consecutive 
elections in 2010, 2014 and 2018 (Minkenberg 2017a). Founded in late 2003, Jobbik rose 
in popularity on the wave of the 2008 financial crisis, and quickly became the most 
electorally successful radical right party in Central and Eastern region. Led by Gábor 
Vona until 2018, Jobbik’s manifestos and leadership statements often displayed strong 
anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and homophobic tendencies. In its first national 2006 election, 
where Jobbik participated as part of coalition of small radical right parties, the MIÉP-
Jobbik Third Way Alliance of Parties, it received 2.2 percent of the vote and failed to 
make into the parliament. Jobbik’s first electoral success came in the 2009 European 
elections where the party received 14.8 percent of the vote. In the subsequent national 
parliamentary elections of 2010, 2014, and 2018, Jobbik received 16.7 percent, 20.2 
percent and 19.1 percent of votes respectively. 
The below figure compares Hungary’s radical right positions on issues pertaining 
to the galtan dimension from the Chapel Hill dataset in 2006-2017 (see Figure 3).  The 
galtan dimension captures the parties’ positions on sociocultural issues related to national 
identity (Hooghe et al. 2002; Rydgren 2007; Vasilopoulou 2018), where “gal” stands for 






Figure 3. Party Positioning on the Ideological Scale and Electoral Vote in Hungary’s Elections to the National 
Parliament. Source: Chapel Hill Dataset. The variable galtan (position of the party in a given year on sociocultural 
issues) takes the values 0 to 10, where 0 is associated to libertarian/postmaterialist, 10 is associated to 
traditional/authoritarian. Available at: https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys/ 
 
As Figure 3 suggests, the positions of the Hungarian radical right parties on the 
sociocultural issues tended to stay relatively constant in the years 2002-2014, if anything 
a slight decline on these issues is observed in-between the years 2014-2017. By the Chapel 
Hill data2, the earlier Hungary’s radical right party MIEP received 9.69 on the galtan 
dimension in 2002, while Jobbik received 9.41 in 2010, and 9.5 in 2014 respectively. And 
while Jobbik’s positions on sociocultural issues in 2010-2014 where slightly less radical 
than those of MIEP in 2002, in the same period, Jobbik has become a far more electorally 
successful party (from 4.4 percent for MIEP in the 2002 election, to 20.2 percent for 
Jobbik in the 2014 election). In other words, the positions of the Hungarian radical right 
parties along the cultural axis do not satisfactorily explain the dramatic variation in their 
electoral fortunes. This suggests that some other explanation may be a better fit to account 
for the variation in the success of the radical right parties.  























Third, in the post-Communist context, the anti-immigration (cultural) concerns do 
serve as good explanations for the success of the radical right parties, like they do in the 
Western European cases (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Norris 2005; Yılmaz 2012; 
Rydgren 2008). The post-Communist countries suffered less from the 2014 Syrian 
immigration crisis and historically supplied, rather than received, EU migrants (Allen 
2015; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Rovny 2014). Hence, Eastern European radical right 
parties rarely used the anti-immigration platform prior to 2014 (Allen 2015; Bustikova 
2017) and their electoral success predated the crisis by several years. As I show in chapter 
2, another popular explanation that involves the radical right parties’ positions on the 
cultural dimension (anti-Roma sentiment and shares of Roma population in a given 
country) also fail to satisfactorily account for the variation in the electoral fortunes of the 
radical right parties. 
Fourth, I test the assumption that the radical right parties primarily compete for 
their voters along the cultural dimension in chapter 7. I do not find confirmation of this 
hypothesis; when the left parties changed economic policy, the radical right parties that 
only compete along the cultural dimension do not gain additional votes.  By contrast, 
when the radical right competes against the left on the economic policy dimension, their 
support increases substantially. 
The above reasoning explains my predominant focus on the competition between 
the center left and the radical right parties in the subsequent chapter of this dissertation. 
 
 
Ex-Communist Left Parties and the Market Transition 
In this dissertation, I argue that the rightward shift of the ex-Communist parties 
following the collapse of Communism played an important role in the party realignment 
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process. Grzymala-Busse (2002) and March and Mudde (2005) find that following the 
collapse of Communism, majority of former ruling parties in Central and Eastern Europe 
transformed into full-fledged social democratic parties. Such was the choices made by the 
Hungarian Socialist Party and the Democratic Left Alliance that became proponents of 
privatization and integration into the European Union.  
What were the reasons behind the ex-Communist parties’ reinvention? In the wake 
of the collapse of the Communist system, the reinvention was aimed at regaining 
democratic access to governmental power by winning elections and entering democratic 
government (Grsymala-Busse 2017: 3). Because of the hostility towards people 
associated with the previous regime, the old party members often saw the reformed 
Communist party as the only potential protector of their interests, and therefore were 
willing to tolerate their party policy switch without abandoning it entirely (Grzymala-
Busse 2002). Programmatic transformations were thus of great importance to the 
communist successor parties, as they were the only way that these parties could now sway 
the democratic electorate without their old patronage networks and populist leaders 
(Grzymala-Busse 2002). In an effort to reject their Communist legacy, such parties often 
tended to become holier than the Pope. Tavits and Letki (2009) show that reformed ex-
Communist parties were much more likely to implement more coherent fiscal austerity 
programs, as opposed to the right-wing parties.  
By contrast, some ex-Communist parties remained loyal to their original 
programmatic commitments. Such orthodox successor parties survived in the Czech 
Republic, East Germany and in Slovakia (along with a transformed but shorter-lived 
communist successor party). For example, the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSČM) retained much of its former appeals in terms of redistribution, 
connection to labor unions, and anti-market stance (Hanley, 2001). This made KSČM 
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largely a protest party that was able to preserve a relatively orthodox stance and retain the 
loyal support of a constituency of the so-called “globalization losers”. This eliminated a 
potential political opening for the radical right parties and delayed the realignment 
processes. In Slovakian case, the original party dynamic was similar to the one in Hungary 
and Poland with the reformist left SDL party gradually losing popular support. However, 
in early 2000s a small fraction of SDL split from it, created a new left party SMER and 
was able to retain the left voters. That SMER occupies a substantive part of the distributive 
economic agenda limits the political opportunities for the radical right in Slovakia. This 
explains the substantive fluctuations in its popularity. 
Why did the left parties choose to implement the pro-market reforms?  If they 
chose the strategies of promoting austerity for the same reason that the radical right parties 
were subsequently likely to arise, then I might have an endogeneity problem. In other 
words, both the choice of the left-wing party to promote austerity and the rise of the 
radical right might be driven by the same factor.  For example, if the economic crisis was 
more severe in the cases where the left chose the austerity reforms, both the choice of the 
policies by the left parties and the emergence of the radical right parties may be spurious 
to some other third factor, such as the pre-existing economic conditions in a given country. 
To counter this important objection, I rely on the argument advanced by Stone 
(2002). He argues that the IMF was an external factor that frequently defined the choices 
of the left parties in power during the transition by pushing them into adoption of the 
austerity programs. The early post-Communist governments were indebted from the 
Communist period and were dependent on the IMF’s continuous debt restructuring and 
aid; this provided the IMF with the leverage to push the parties in power to implement the 
painful pro-market reforms. Some post-Communist governments were more pro-
reformist and hence more compliant (Poland, Hungary), and others were more traditional 
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and less compliant with the IMF conditionality (Bulgaria), but this variation had more to 
do with specific cabinet compositions rather than the structural economic shocks 
experienced by the left governments. In fact, by the start of the reforms, Poland, one of 
the pioneers of the IMF-induced adjustments, had one of the smallest budget deficits in 
the socialist bloc (Roaf et al. 2014: 10). 
Despite the general pro-market orientation of the Polish government, the strong 
impetus for neoliberal reforms still came from the IMF. While the Polish government was 
generally ideologically committed to reforms, the international institutions imposed 
specific incentives to ensure its strict adherence to the reform plan. Three times in 1991, 
1993 and 1994, the international institutions used the opportunity to restructure the Polish 
debt to push the Polish government into further implementation of the painful reforms. 
The governing coalition therefore had no choice but to swallow its policy preferences and 
to implement the reforms prescribed by the IMF-imposed constraints (Stone 2002: 114). 
In line with this argument, Bonker (2007: 119) shows that in Poland the ex-Communist 
SLD-led government, which took power in 1993, greatly benefited from the IMF’s 
insistence on fiscal constraint. The new government aimed to defy critics and demonstrate 
its respectability by not losing the support of the IMF. In addition, conflicts with the IMF 
threatened to endanger a substantive reduction of Poland’s foreign debt in 1994, as 
Poland’s 1991 agreement with the Paris Club had made the second tranche of the Polish 
debt relief conditional on the adherence to an IMF-supported reform program. The 
reliance on the IMF-imposed policy standards strengthened the Polish Finance Minister 
Borowski’s position in the negotiations on the 1994 budget and helped him to fend off the 
demands for further spending increases. Bonker (2007) stresses that the Polish post-
Communist government’s desire not to risk IMF support also became visible after 
Borowski’s resignation in February 1994. While the Minister of Finance’s position 
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remained vacant for three months, the government managed to prevent the budget 
renegotiation throughout this period. 
Hungary is quite similar to the Polish case. As I show in the next chapter, the 
relationship between Hungary’s ex-Communist left and the IMF was established in the 
late 1970s as a direct consequence of Hungary’s indebtedness after Kadar’s reforms. The 
Communist Hungarian government was pushed into becoming an IMF member in the 
mid-1980s by the threat of insolvency and the economic collapse (Csizmadia 2008: 11); 
this membership was conditional on restarting the reforms. The collaboration between the 
Hungarian reformed ex-Communist party MSZP and the IMF continued in the 1990s. The 
strong indebtedness of Hungarian economy made the left MSZP government consistently 
dependent upon the IMF support. Ziblatt (1998) illustrates Hungary’s left government’s 
adherence to the IMF-imposed constraints with the following episode. In 1995, the MSZP 
government under Bokros and Horn pursued an extensive austerity program that aimed 
to receive a special “stand-by” three-year loan from the IMF as a reward for its efforts at 
budget cuts, social state reduction and inflation control. Instead, the IMF commended the 
MSZP austerity efforts but demanded further cuts in social security and accelerated 
privatization (Szilagyi 1995: 64). This pushed Bokros and Horn into announcing an even 
deeper budget deficit reduction in January 1996, finally winning the IMF loan in February 
1996. Therefore, the pro-reformist orientation of Hungary’s left MSZP was also largely 
imposed by an external factor— dependence upon IMF loans. Similarly, in the late 2000s, 
the MSZP downfall in the 2010 parliamentary election followed another round of 
implementation of austerity measures.  These measures had been introduced in 2008 
under the IMF loan agreement (Csaba 2011; Gal 2010). See chapter 4 for more details. 
It is important to note that an economic crisis per se was not a decisive factor for 
the reform’s implementation. Countries that experienced the economic crisis prior to the 
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reforms were still overwhelmingly pushed into implementing austerity policies by the 
IMF. This case can be illustrated with the example of the Bulgarian left government, 
which was forced to implement the pro-market reforms largely as result of the IMF-
imposed prescriptions from the 1997 economic crisis. Having initially attempted to 
implement quick reforms, Bulgaria subsequently slowed down its progress due to rising 
economic and social challenges. Stone (2002: 232) shows that throughout the 1990s, the 
left-leaning Bulgarian governments were never truly committed to the reform effort, 
rather, they were pushed into these efforts by market pressures and the need for the 
international aid. Only as a result of the intense crisis in 1997, the IMF has finally been 
able to reclaim the leverage strong enough to push the left Bulgarian government into 
fully implementing the IMF program. Even then, the persistent opposition to the structural 
reforms frequently threatened to jeopardize the reform outcomes. 
The above analysis has shown that the IMF often forced the post-Communist 
successor parties to alter their preferred economic policy. This suggests that the economic 
policy choices of the left parties in the post-Communist world were exogenous to other 
political calculations of these parties (such as competition from other political actors) and 
were predominantly the result of an exogenous IMF push. Exogeneity of the choices of 
the left parties suggests that their policy choices were not imposed by or directly related 




Role of the Blue-Collar Constituencies 
The new cleavages created an opportunity for the parties to mobilize new voters 
because of the realignment process that was ongoing at the same time. Because of the 
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policy choices by the established parties during the transition, the previous links between 
the parties and their traditional constituencies weakened, and the voters who suffered most 
from the transition became vulnerable to the mobilization efforts of the new actors 
(Bornschier 2009: 4). Eventually, this created incentives for some social groups to 
abandon the parties they originally supported (Martin 2000, Lachat 2007) and gradually 
switch to embrace new political actors. 
The groups that suffered more from the transition (the transition losers) typically 
belong to one of the following social categories: the unemployed, the retirees, and the 
blue-collar workers. The particular focus of this dissertation is the working class or blue-
collar workers3 category, a constituency that proved to be the most susceptible to the party 
realignment processes and hence more likely to switch to a different party block (Fidrmuc 
2000). Due to the industrial misbalances in the post-Communist states and the 
globalization process that accelerated the export of low-skilled jobs outside of Europe, 
this segment of population suffered particularly strongly from the transition and the fiscal 
austerity reforms. Such reforms tended to weaken the worker sodalities, and dramatically 
shrink their power, prestige and opportunities in post-Communist Europe (Kalb 2009: 17). 
It hence should come as no surprise that in the countries where the left parties actively 
participated in introducing the reforms, the blue-collar workers’ support for the left parties 
has consistently declined. Instead, this constituency was switching to embrace the populist 
and radical right parties. 
                                                          
3 In this paper, I use the terms “working class”, “blue-collar worker”, “physical worker” and “manual 
worker” as interchangeable to denote a working-class person performing non-agricultural manual labor. 
Bain and Prince (1972) enumerate the characteristics pertaining to white collar as opposed to blue-collar 
work: intellectual as opposed to manual activities; differing functions (administration, design, analysis and 
planning, etc. vs. actual production) as opposed to routine; proximity to the authority etc. One problem with 
such classification has to do with the categorization of the “service workers” (cooks, domestic servants, 
janitors, waiters, barbers, firefighters, police officers etc.), since their work activity tends to include both 
manual and non-manual activities. Unless otherwise specified, in my analysis I excluded “service workers” 
from the blue-collar workers’ category. For more discussion of classification of the blue-collar workers see 
chapter 8, subsection “Categorizing the Blue-Collar Respondents.” 
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Why are blue-collar constituencies likely to switch to the radical right? 
Historically, workers (typically blue-collar, manual workers) and lower middle class more 
broadly were the primary constituency of the left. In the recent years, however, scholars 
talk about the increasing “proletarization” (Ignazi 2003) of the western radical right 
parties, i.e. the increasing affinity of the working class to the radical right parties. 
Arzheimer (2013) finds that the odds of the blue-collar workers’ radical right vote have 
risen considerably since the 1990s. Norris (2005) and Rydgren (2007) point out that the 
working-class voters are the core of the right-wing constituencies in Europe. Kalb and 
Halmai (2011) argue that globalization and neoliberal capitalism disrupted the old, 
working-class communities and rendered workers more dependent on the whims of 
capitalists. Right-wing populism offers a panacea for the insecurity of the world and the 
everyday struggle to make a decent living. The breakthrough of the radical right parties 
came in the 1990s or 2000s, and broadly coincided with the decline of left-wing workers’ 
parties. For example, workers in western Europe have become the core constituency of 
the Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian Flemish Block, the French National Front, the 
Danish People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, Law and Justice in Poland, and the 
Hungarian Civic Alliance. Similar shifts occurred in the United States with the 
presidential election of 2016 (Linden 2018: 75). 
Hence the growing “proletarization” of the radical right parties (the increasing 
representation of the blue-collar voters among these parties’ constituencies) came as a 
result of a double process of the working class abandoning the left parties and their 
realignment towards the populist and radical right (Gougou and Mayer 2013). The radical 
right parties appeal to these groups from the left side of the state-market dimension (Bale 
et al. 2010; De Lange 2007). The populist rhetoric finds fertile ground among the low-
skilled, blue-collar constituencies with low wages and lack of job protection (Betz 1994). 
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Over the last decade, as globalization has been eroding many traditional factory-based 
jobs, the median real income in Europe has stagnated or declined and the gains of the 
economic growth have gone to the higher income groups (Piketty 2014). Increasing 
automation and jobs outsourcing, rising capital mobility, the erosion of blue-collar labor 
unions, and liberal austerity policies made traditional blue-collar workers particularly 
vulnerable to the populist appeals (Bornschier 2010a; Inglehart and Norris 2016) and 
further fostered these processes.  
In the post-Communist countries, this problem is sharpened by the fact that 
workers believed that their situation would improve under capitalism and were 
disillusioned with the results. It was often difficult for these workers to articulate this 
dissatisfaction along anti-capitalist lines, so they switched to embrace the populist right 
parties instead (Linden 2018: 77). For instance, Ost (2018: 119) suggests that in Poland 
“workers were experiencing capitalism as a system of class exploitation but lacked any 
class-based ways to express their dissatisfaction. And the right began to fill that vacuum.” 
However, this explanation clearly does not fit all of the country cases discussed in this 
dissertation. In particular, in chapter 5 I show that in the Czech and Slovak case the left 
parties were able to retain workers’ support due to their economic policy choices. 
In what follows, I show that the post-Communist countries generally follow the 
dynamics described above. By focusing on the case of Hungary in particular, I trace the 
process of workers’ alienation from the left parties and their subsequent embrace of 
populist and radical right. I complement this analysis with a Case Study section in chapter 
5, where I depict the policy choices of the left parties and their subsequent electoral 





Chapter 2. The Literature 
Defining the Radical Right 
Much confusion surrounds definitions of “radical” parties. This confusion stems 
from the multiplicity of terms that describe more or less the same concept: “radical right”, 
“authoritarian”, “anti-establishment”, “anti-immigrant”, “nationalist”, “anti-system”, or 
“populist”. For the purpose of this dissertation, I use the term “radical right” to discuss 
the parties linked to the discussed phenomenon. 
Historically, the radical right has demonstrated a high degree of fluctuation in terms 
of their positioning on key issues, such as anti-systemness, immigration, and economic 
policies (Rovny 2014).  
Most of the research on the radical right (Capoccia 2002) is based on Sartori’s 
(1976) concept of anti-system party defined as “a party that would change, if it could not 
the government, but the system of government.” In other words, the anti-system party has 
a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it 
operates. This ideological anti-systemness usually describes democracy as a “system” to 
be abandoned or modified. Problem with this concept is that the anti-systemic stance of 
the radical right has not been constant over the decades. As pointed out by Kopeček (2007: 
286), the political context was different during the Cold War when Sartori labeled the 
anti-system party as a party attempting to overthrow democracy from ideological 
positions. In the post-Cold War period, some of the parties, which Sartori classified as 
anti-systemic (such as the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), stayed in 
government without any intent to overthrow democracy. Hence Mudde (2002) argues 
against using the “anti-systemic” feature to conceptualize the radical right as many such 
parties accept and actively participate in the contemporary democratic system (such as 
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Republikaner, DVU, Vlaams Blok, Centrumdemocraten, Centrumpartij’). As result, most 
contemporary radical right parties can only be defined as protest or anti-establishment 
(Schedler 1996; Kubát 2007) rather than purely anti-systemic. One way to reformulate 
the anti-systemness is to look at the radical right parties as the anti-establishment parties. 
For example, Hans-Georg Betz (1994, 2002) defines a “right-wing populist party” as a 
party that radically opposes the current cultural and socio-political system in European 
democracies without attacking the foundations of such systems while emphasizing 
cultural and/or ethnic homogeneity with a particular advantage given to “our own people” 
over “foreigners”, law and order and importance of traditional values. 
Because it proved problematic to categorize the radical right parties based on their 
economic positions (see discussion in the subsequent section), many contemporary 
authors have proposed focusing on their cultural policy stances to conceptualize the 
radical right parties (Rovny and Marks 2011) as single-policy or single-issue parties. 
Using immigration as a single-issue criterion, scholars stress the anti-immigration 
positions of the radical right using a twofold criterion: (1) vote mobilization on the basis 
of anti-immigrant sentiments, (2) stigmatization by mainstream political parties (Brug, 
Fennema, and Tillie 2000; Fennema 1997; Brug and Fennema 2003). However, there are 
several problems with such an approach. First, the predominant focus on the immigration 
may substantively bias the sample of the radical right parties since today’s mainstream 
parties also use the anti-immigration platform (especially in the aftermath of the Syrian 
crisis). Second, the popularity of the anti-immigration stance is not constant over time: by 
the late 1990s the role of the ideological voting at the expense of the anti-immigration 
protest seemed to increase among many electorally-successful radical right parties 
(Alleanza nazionale, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Dansk Folkeparti, and the Vlaams 
Blok). Third, Mudde (1999) shows that the majority of the radical right voters do not 
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unilaterally base their support on the basis of their anti-immigration attitudes. Although 
immigration is often considered the most important issue within the whole radical right 
electorate, it is still not true for the (large) majority of such parties. Hence, other cultural 
policy issues should also be included in the classification. 
Given the above considerations, most authors define the radical right as parties with 
several distinct ideological features (Mudde 1995; Mudde 2002) ranging from one to over 
ten (for example, racism, xenophobia, and nationalism (Macridis 1989); or anti-
democratic dispositions (Backes and Jesse 1993). Mudde (2000) proposed a popular 
definition, which includes four ideological foundations of the radical right parties: (1) 
nationalism, (2) xenophobia, (3) law and order and (4) welfare chauvinism (the idea of 
preferential provision of social policies to “our own people” at the expense of the 
“foreigners”).  
For the purposes of my dissertation, I define a party as radical right on three cultural 
issues: 1) radical nationalism, 2) radical socio-cultural conservatism (Pop-Eleches 2010; 
Bustikova 2014) and 3) strong anti-Roma and anti-Semitic rhetoric. If a party scores high 
on one issue and low on another (as some nationalistic ex-Communist parties do), it is not 
classified as a radical right. A high score on both cultural issues still makes distinguishing, 
say, Hungary’s radical right Jobbik from a center right Fidesz problematic since both 
parties tend to use similar language on both issues. Hence, I add a third issue: open 
rhetorical attacks on Roma and Jews (“Jewish capital”), which narrows down this 
definition to the right extremist parties only.  
On both radical nationalism and radical socio-cultural conservatism Hungary’s 
Jobbik (“The Movement for a Better Hungary”), the party of my main theoretical interest, 
gets a high score. 
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1. Jobbik is a radical nationalist party due to its strong nationalist, irredentist (or 
nativist as in Mudde, 2007) claims and pleas for cross-border ethnic self-
determination. For instance, Jobbik demanded “territorial autonomy” for Szekely 
Land in Romania and expressed desire to make Transcarpathian Ukraine an 
independent Hungarian district. Jobbik also often suggests returning to pre-Trianon 
Treaty borders. 
2. Jobbik also classifies as a radical socially conservative party due to its active 
advocacy for traditional Christian values (such as marriage, preservation of 
traditional family). In its founding statement, Jobbik described itself as a 
“principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party”, whose 
“fundamental purpose” is the protection of "Hungarian values and interests" 
(Kovacs et al. 2003: 243). 
3. Ultimately, Jobbik party members have often been openly making aggressive anti-
Roma and anti-Jewish statements, which highlighted the extremist nature of the 
party (Kovacs 2013)  
Note that this radical right party definition is based strictly on cultural policy 
dimension (as discussed in chapter 2) to avoid methodological confusion in the 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation where I focus on the strategic considerations 
underlying party choices of the economic policy positions. 
 
 
Redistributive Agenda and the Radical Right 
In this dissertation, I argue that the radical right parties are able to attract the 
traditional (blue collar) constituencies of the center left parties when and if they use the 
redistributionist economic platform.  
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The ability of the radical right to monopolize the redistributionist platform 
depends on the existence of a political opening in the system—namely, whether or not 
there is a credible competitor on the left occupies this political space. According to my 
theory, in countries where the ex-Communist parties transformed themselves into Social-
Democratic parties and shifted to the center of the economic policy dimension (as 
instrumented by their implementation of austerity packages), the left parties will be likely 
to lose their credibility among their blue-collar constituencies. This situation will create a 
political opening for the radical right parties to appeal to those groups using 
redistributionist appeals. Under such conditions, a radical right party stands a good chance 
to attract former left supporters. Hence, in countries with reformed post-Communist 
parties’ adoption of redistributive positions on economic dimension should dramatically 
improve the electoral fortunes of the radical right.  
Scholars emphasize the fluid nature of the economic policy positions of the radical 
right parties. In the 1990s, scholars tended to suggest that the radical right parties tend to 
hold classical neoliberal position on the economic dimension (Betz 1994). Kitschelt 
(1995b; Kitschelt and McGann 1997; McGann and Kitschelt 2005) suggested that in the 
1990s the radical right adopted a “‘winning formula’ of combining authoritarian and 
nationalistic appeals with extreme neo-liberalism,” ‘‘calling for the dismantling of public 
bureaucracies and the welfare state” and demanding a “strong and authoritarian, but 
small” state. Kitschelt and McGann (1997) hypothesized that while the radical right 
parties used nativist and conservative sociocultural agenda to attract blue-collar workers; 
they needed free market economic platform to draw support from small domestic 
producers. In 2007, Kitschelt argued that a “market-liberal appeal may be a necessary, 
albeit not a sufficient condition of radical right-wing electoral success” (2007: 1183). 
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However, later scholars noticed that the radical right parties changed their 
economic policy positions away from pro-market towards a more centrist stance over 
time. De Lange (2007) argued that the economic component of Kitschelt’s “winning 
formula” may have changed from fiscal conservatism to welfare chauvinism. He analyzed 
three party cases, the French FN, the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the Dutch LPF and 
concluded that established radical right parties moved their economic policy position to 
the economic center. Rovny (2014: 5) described Western European radical right economic 
positioning as erratic and theorized that these parties deliberately blurred their positions 
on economic policy and adopted “vague, contradictory or ambiguous” stances on 
economic dimension while seeking to compete on neglected, secondary issues 
(sociocultural issues) to attract broader support. Cavallaro, Flacher and Zanetti (2018) 
studied radical right parties’ voting behavior on economic matters at the European 
Parliament and discovered substantive heterogeneity in their preferred economic policies. 
In the last decade, it became clear that the radical right ended up shifting not to a 
centrist or blurred but to a protectionist economic policy platform. Mudde (2007) points 
out the rising inclinations toward more protectionist positions and more social market 
economy among the radical right parties. The evolution of the positions of the radical 
right parties on the economic dimension may be interpreted a function of their anti-
systemness. Under this logic, the radical right parties tend to choose their economic 
platforms in opposition to the existing economic policy mainstream. In the second half of 
the 20th century, the rise of radical right parties in Western Europe was associated with a 
backlash against the “excessive role of the state” in the economy, and the power of labor 
unions (Ignazi 2003). In early 21st century, when the premarket neoliberal doctrine has 
become a mainstream orthodoxy, the radical right has adopted a more redistributionist 
protectionist stance on the economic policy. However, it is more likely that the economic 
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policy shift of the radical right parties was driven by the changing nature of their 
constituencies (Derks 2006). In his framework, to capture the votes of the disenchanted 
industrial workers hurt by globalization (“globalization losers”) who face the challenges 
of the post-industrial society and the supply of cheaper immigrant labor, the radical right 
parties introduced a mix of egalitarianism and anti-welfare chauvinism in their economic 
platforms.  
Recent policy choices by the radical right parties confirm these observations.  The 
French Front National (FN), for example, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen 
underwent significant changes in its economic policies and endorsed statist redistributive 
economic policies (as demonstrated by the party’s motto “social without socialism”), 
reflecting the consolidation of a strong FN working-class constituency traditionally 
leaning towards the left. In the 2012 presidential election, no less than 68 percent of the 
FN policy pledges were located to the left on the economic axis (Ivaldi 2013). Recently 
the extra-parliamentary radical right Estonian Patriotic Movement merged with the 
agrarian People’s Union (a radical left party) to create The Conservative People's Party 
of Estonia (CPP). CPP combined cultural nationalist and economic socialism with an 
emphasis on anti-western economic nationalism, attracted support from rural voters, old 
people, the unemployed and self-employed, and made it to the Estonian parliament with 
8% of votes (Lust 2016). 
Hungary’s Jobbik is another example of such successful transformation. Unlike 
its radical right predecessor MIÉP which competed along a single cultural dimension, 
Jobbik combined cultural pledges with protectionist economic policy position, which 
proved to be a very successful combination. Jobbik is the only radical right party in the 
region to receive over 10 percent of votes in three consecutive parliamentary elections. 
Scholars stress the importance of the economic policy issues for the increase in Jobbik's 
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popularity, such as opposition to welfare retrenchment and anti-austerity campaigning 
(Jordan 2010; Waterbury 2010; Varga 2014; Kim 2016). I provide a more detailed 
description of Jobbik’s successful use of protectionist economic policy platform in 
chapter 4. 
 My argument complements the existing literature and makes it possible to explain 
variation in the economic policy stances of the radical right parties by focusing on the 
policy choices of their competitors—center left parties. I argue that the radical right 
parties espouse the protectionist economic policy stance under the presence of the 
political opening, which is provided by the ex-Communist left parties’ switch to the center 
of the economic policy dimension. 
 
 
The Populist Parties and the Austerity Packages 
The conceptual boundaries between definitions of populist right and the radical 
right are fused. Populism may be defined both as a political strategy and as a type of 
political party using this strategy. Therefore, while some scholars describe the radical right 
parties as populist (due to the use of a populist political discourse), others categorize 
populist parties as a distinct party subgroup which may or may not intersect with the 
category of the radical right parties. 
For conceptual clarity, in this dissertation, I define populism as a political strategy 
that involves the appeals to “the people” against both the established structure of power 
and the dominant ideas and values” (Canovan 1999: 2). Specifically, this strategy implies 
an emphasize on the divide distinguishing the “pure people” and “the corrupt elites” 
(Mudde 2000: 37). As a political strategy, populism is not reduced to a single element but 
may be combined with such a constitutive element of the radical-right politics as ethno-
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nationalism (Mudde 2007; Bonikowski 2017). This conceptual separation allows to 
distinguish between the populist radical right party—a party combining extreme ethno-
nationalist and populist appeals (as Hungary’s Jobbik party) from other types of populist 
parties that combine populist appeals with less extreme right positions (as Hungary’s 
Fidesz and Poland’s PiS) or left positions on the cultural dimension. In other words, while 
different types of parties may have incentives to use populist appeals, these parties’ policy 
positions on the cultural dimension categorize them as left, right or radical right 
respectively. 
To overcome the existing rigid and corrupt state structures, a populist leader has 
to appeal to the people directly. Therefore, “a personal leader appeals to a heterogeneous 
mass of followers who feel left out and are available for mobilization; the leader reaches 
his followers by a direct, quasi-personal manner that bypasses established intermediary 
organizations, especially parties; if the leader builds a new or revives an old party, it 
remains a personal vehicle with a low level of institutionalization” (Weyland 1999: 381). 
In theory, populism distinguishes the people and the elite on the basis of just one moral 
dimension, contrasting the good people versus the evil elite (Hawkins, 2009). In practice, 
however, populists tend to apply different meanings to the people using class or 
commonness in their definition of the people (Mudde 2017), which depends on specific 
groups targeted by a populist leader.  
In particular, the “people” may refer to a specific group of individuals united by a 
common nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, class or social base. Historically in Latin 
America, left-wing populists, such as the Peronists in Argentina, tended to define “people” 
as the working class as opposed to the industrialists (Deiwiks 2009). Recently, for the 
reasons explained in this dissertation, right-wing populists in Europe picked up that 
approach. For example, the French Front National (FN) is a radical right party that has 
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successfully appealed to and attracted the support of the blue-collar constituencies, the 
phenomenon termed left Lepenism (Deiwiks 2009), which made some scholars label it as 
“the party of the working class” (Chassany 2016).  
When are the challenger parties more likely to use the populist strategy? Populist 
politicians portray themselves as “true democrats voicing popular grievances and 
opinions systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties, and the media” 
(Canovan 1999: 2). In other words, populism appears primarily as a way to express and 
channel the popular frustration with or resentment toward the elites, as the demarcation 
between the “people” and the “other” suggests. Panizza (2005: 10) defines ressentiments 
as instances of popular frustration, the “unmet demands” are conducive to spread of 
populism “where people do not know how to name what they are lacking.” Ressentiments 
tend to involve blame attribution and demands for compensation, they play a particularly 
significant role during the mobilization phase of populist movements (Betz 2002) 
Hence, one should expect the populist strategy to become more attractive during 
the periods when the incumbents implement unpopular policies, which fuel popular 
grievances and provide outsider political parties with an opportunity to attack those elites 
by using the populist strategy. Betz (1994: 4) described the European populist parties as: 
“right-wing first in their rejection of individual and social equality and of political projects 
that seek to achieve it; second in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized 
groups; and third in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism and anti-Semitism. 
They are populist in their unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffused public 
sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his 
allegedly superior common sense.” 
For example, populism should become particularly attractive to challenger parties 
following the implementation of austerity packages that foster social inequality and 
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increase anxiety of disadvantaged social groups (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Zakaria 2016). 
Ishkanian and Marlies (2017) find that the critiques of the economy during the anti-
austerity protests are inextricably linked to the criticism of the current political system 
and of the shortcomings of representative democracy. Policy switches and subsequent 
blurring and erosion of party brands create the preconditions that are favorable for the 
emergence of outsiders who challenge the incumbent parties from a radicalized platform 
and attack the established order those parties symbolize (Lupu 2014; 2015). 
In this sense, one should expect populist parties on both sides of political spectrum 
gain advantage in the periods following the implementation of austerity programs by the 
incumbent parties. This expectation is confirmed by the empirical findings that show that 
austerity policies decrease support for the incumbent parties and boost support for 
populist parties (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; Bailey et al. 2018; Nyman 2016a; 2016b; 
Thomas 2016). For example, in Greece, the 2015 electoral success of the populist left 
Syriza followed the painful fiscal adjustment policies introduced by the incumbents. 
Syriza’s Alexis Tsipras blamed Greece’s “humiliation and misery” on harsh austerity 
measures and interpreted his electoral victory as the end of the vicious austerity cycle in 
Greece (Barber and Hope 2015). As I show in chapter 4, the success of the populist radical 
right Jobbik in Hungary also followed the fiscal adjustment measures imposed by the 
center left MSZP party and subsequent Jobbik’s anti-austerity campaign. I demonstrate 
that whether or not a challenger populist party emerged on the right side of the political 
spectrum was a function of the party realignment process brought about by the ex-






Coding the Left Parties 
In this dissertation, I coded the parties as reformed Communist successor parties 
if they followed the below criteria. First, I traced out the successors of the Communist 
parties following the transition. Typically, that implied identifying the descendants and 
splinter-groups from the round table negotiations. I also traced the parties where the ex-
members of the Communist parties went. Second, I analyzed whether a given party 
attempted to reject its Communist ideology and platform and reinvent itself as a pro-
democratic and a pro-market party.  
Often the above change combined with a modification of the party’s name from 
“Communist” into “Socialist”, or a rejection of using the term “Worker” in the party name. 
For example, the reformist Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) 
emerged as a reform wing of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. In Poland, after the 
collapse of the Polish United Workers’ Party, some of its former activists established the 
Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland party, which later became part of the 
Democratic Left Alliance. In Slovakia, the successor of the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party was the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), which in 1991 changed its name to 
the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) as part of the effort to adopt a more reformist 
outlook (Tucker 2006). 
By contrast, a party was coded as the radical or “Old Left” if it constituted the part 
of the unreformed Communist party that refused to break away with the Communist past 
and largely preserved its Marxist agenda. In my analysis, only one electorally successful 
party represents such a clear-cut case—the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia, the successor to the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the Czech Republic. The 
Hungarian radical left party (which was also a splinter of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party), the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSzMP), failed to attract a substantial 
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number of supporters and does not represent a substantive political force in today’s 
Hungary. Similarly, in Slovakia, some of the more hardline members refused to join the 
reformed SDL party and formed a new Communist Party of Slovakia. Another faction of 
the SDL split from this party in 1994 and established the Union of Workers of Slovakia 
(ZRS), which is headed by a known communist, Jan Luptak. None of these Slovak parties, 
however, achieved substantive electoral success in the consecutive years, so I have 
excluded them from my analysis. 
 
 
Explaining Consistency of the Left Party Choices 
While the ex-Communist left parties initially tended to preserve the allegiance of 
their constituencies (Tavits and Letki 2009), eventually the economic policy switch ended 
up damaging the left parties in the long-term. As I show in chapter 5 below, within one or 
two electoral rounds such parties tended to lose the election and face an emergence of a 
successful radical right competitor. The programmatic policy switch of the left parties and 
the resulting convergence of mainstream parties on economic policy increased the number 
of disaffected voters who served as “a natural reserve” for the extreme right parties 
(Mudde 1999) and fostered their spread across Central and Eastern Europe (Pop-Eleches 
2010).  
Ironically, the countries with less orthodox and more flexible Communist parties 
that were ready to implement this policy switch were more likely to witness such 
convergence. For example, in Hungary, MSZP partnered with liberal parties in 
implementing the austerity reforms (Bokros package), which increased the popular 
dissatisfaction with the open markets and strengthened positions of populist right parties 
that were able to politicize that resentment and convert it into substantial political support. 
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The “shifting constituency” and programmatic inconsistency of the left parties made them 
open to charges of opportunism and “fishtailing” (March and Mudde 2005), ultimately 
contributing to the growing disenchantment with the left amongst their traditional 
working-class constituencies. Eventually, the mainstream left lost their credibility as 
strong and stable governing parties. In those countries today, one can observe the growth 
of the radical and populist right parties, which capitalize on the popular resentment with 
the political mainstream and offer to compensate the market losers through protectionist 
economic programs. In Central and Eastern Europe, these processes were accelerated by 
weaker partisan identities in the region (Marinova 2015; Hanley and Sikk 2014; Pop-
Eleches 2010; Powell and Tucker 2014; Sikk 2012). Weaker partisan identities allow 
voters to switch across different parties more easily.  
Why did the left parties stick with a new position on the economic policy 
dimension instead of shifting back to their original protectionist economic policy position? 
This puzzle has two possible explanations. First, a party system change is a disruptive 
rather than an incremental process (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 18). Once a shift occurs and 
party realignment unravels, it becomes more difficult for parties to undo this process 
because the political opening (electoral constituencies) is no longer available to them 
since it is already occupied by the parties from the opposite side of the spectrum. Second, 
while the political parties are in constant motion and seek to adapt their positions to voters’ 
preferences, their efforts are constrained by the policy-commitments of the self-selected 
activists and leaders, as well as the interests and values of their new social base (Hooghe 
and Marks 2018: 18). Hence, the ex-Communist left parties that lost their working-class 
bases as result of their economic policy choices but attracted the upper- and middle-class 
voters instead were limited in their ability to go back to their original policy platform out 
of fear to lose the newly found constituencies. One exception to this rule is Slovakia, 
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where the left Smer party, which defected from the ex-Communist reformist SDL, 
managed to undo the realignment process, adopt the redistributive agenda and 




In this dissertation, I argue that the electoral success of the radical right parties in 
the Central and Eastern European countries can be explained by the centrist economic 
policy shift of the Communist successor parties, which opened up the opportunity for the 
populist and radical right parties to appeal to the traditional left constituencies using the 
redistributionist economic platform. 





Supply side explanations for the radical right parties’ success tend to focus on the 
political opportunity structure open to radical parties (Mudde 2007). While many party-
level theories explain the success of the radical right parties as a function of the electoral 
system, the actions of the mainstream parties, other theories focus on the role of smaller 
ethnic and socially liberal parties on the left. In the below section I show what alterative 
party-level theories would lead us to expect. 
A popular argument links the proportionality of the electoral system to the 
electoral fortunes of the radical right —proportionalsystems with lower thresholds may 
have a positive effect on the success of the radical right parties (Golder 2003; March and 
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Rommerskirchen 2015). In particular, an argument may be made that the 
disproportionality of the electoral system may provide an advantage to the radical right 
vote in countries like Hungary. Specifically, while more permissive electoral systems 
allow smaller parties to make it to the parliament, they may also split the protest vote. By 
contrast, the disproportional system may incentivize the voters to unite around one 
particular protest and/or radical party (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). The success of the 
Jobbik party in Hungary may be a result of this disproportionality. 
In fact, scholars often disagree as to the results of disproportionality on third 
parties’ vote. Some found that mixed electoral systems incentivize strategic voting and 
disadvantage “third parties” (Prinz 2013) rather than help them. Others (Norris 2005) 
found no effect of disproportionality at all. Overall, one can argue that the relationship 
can go either way.  
The below figure provides a visual representation of the relationship between the 
electoral system disproportionality and the radical right parties’ electoral fortunes in four 
selected countries (Figure 4). The Gallagher Index of electoral disproportionality 
compares the relationship between parties' votes to the legislative seats they are given, 
hence it is not constant over time within a given country. Higher numbers on the Gallagher 
Index suggest greater disparity between votes and seats, and higher electoral 
disproportionality. The Figure 4 below does not suggest existence of a substantive 
correlation between the electoral system disproportionality and the radical right parties’ 
electoral fortunes in most of the countries of my interest. Only in case of Hungary there 
seems to be some positive association between the radical right fortunes and the electoral 







Figure 4. The Disproportionality of the Electoral System and the Electoral Fortunes of the Radical Right Parties. 
Source: Christopher Gandrud, Disproportionality Data. Available at: 
http://christophergandrud.github.io/Disproportionality_Data/ 
 
The electoral thresholds that appear important for the fortunes of the left in post-
Communist region (Moraski and Loewenberg 1999) are the same in both Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, while the electoral fortunes of the radical right parties vary 
in these countries quite dramatically. In general, with the exception of Bulgaria and 
Slovenia, where the electoral thresholds are set at 4%, most of the post-Communist 
countries set a 5% electoral threshold. Therefore, the electoral threshold does not appear 
to explain the variation in the electoral fortunes of the populist and radical right parties of 
the region. 
Another popular stream of literature connects the convergence of the mainstream 
parties to the support for the radical right parties. There is little doubt that silencing of 
certain salient issues by the mainstream parties is likely to create the political openings 



























(1997) argue that the convergence of the mainstream left and right parties creates an 
opening on the bottom of the left-right continuum for the radical right to be successful. 
This is particularly true if the radical right discovers a “winning formula” to attract the 
right-authoritarian support from the masses, which includes a market-liberal stance on the 
economy and particularistic stance on democracy, social lifestyle and cultural issues 
(Kitschelt 1995a: 25, 275). While Kitschelt’s explanation worked well for the dynamics 
of the radical right electoral fortunes in the 1990s, it does less well in today’s CEE context 
when many radical right parties tend to have a distinctively redistributionist policy 
preferences on the economic axis (Bustikova 2017). However, scholars disagree about 
specific measurements of the mainstream parties’ convergence, and the particular types 
of convergence (specific policy issues) that are conducive to the success of the radical 
right parties.  
Many studies show that the mainstream parties’ ideological proximity (Carter 
2005; Brug and Fennema 2003) can be conducive to the electoral success of the radical 
right parties.  Kitschelt and McGann (1997) suggest that the small enough distance 
between moderate left and moderate right parties provides the political entrepreneurs with 
an opportunity to build a successful electoral coalition with a radical agenda. Carter 
(2005:7) argues that “the degree of the ideological convergence between the mainstream 
right and left parties may affect the right-wing extremist party vote.” Nissan and Carter 
(2005) find that the most important factor that predicts success of the radical right is the 
ideological convergence between the mainstream left and right parties. This factor 
explains up to 50% of the variation in the radical right parties’ electoral fortunes. 
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) discover that the support for the radical right almost doubles 
in presence of a grand coalition government prior to the elections. Lupu (2014, 2015) 
shows that party brands dilution (a consequence of the party coalitions) can lead to an 
60 
 
increased protest vote for the radical right parties. Meguid (2005) shows that controlling 
for the effects of the mainstream parties on the niche party’s new issue dimension 
eliminates any impact of the usual institutional and sociological explanations on the green 
and radical right parties vote. In other words, the mainstream parties are shaping the 
electoral fortunes of the niche parties (Meguid 2008). Using this approach, an argument 
can be made that the failures of the radical right parties the Czech Republic have to do 
with the extreme pronouncements of the “mainstream” parties on ethnic politics that left 
no gap to be filled by the radical right parties. Czech mainstream parties often use quite 
aggressive anti-immigrant rhetoric4, which might limit the political opportunities for the 
radical right. Yet the use of similarly charged rhetoric by Prime Minister Orban did not 
prevent the electoral gains of the radical right Jobbik in Hungary. 
The “convergence” approach is subject to a measurement critique: since the 
radical right parties are usually defined as the ones with high salience along the cultural 
dimension, measuring the ideological convergence of the mainstream parties in cultural 
terms may be tautological. Hence, it is much easier to measure the convergence of the 
mainstream parties along the economic scale. Kitschelt (2007) specifically emphasizes 
the role of the convergence of the mainstream parties on economic issues for the fortunes 
of the radical right parties, stressing that economics normally matter the most in the minds 
of voters. “The greater they perceive the impact of differences between the competing 
parties’ positions on economic policies and 30 incomes (“greed”), relative to the 
differences they anticipate to flow from the parties’ rival conceptions of governance 
(“grid”) or citizenship universalism (“group”), the greater will be the weight of economic 
considerations in their final vote choice.” (Kitschelt 2007, 237) Hence, the economic 
                                                          
4 For example, the Czech Social Democrat President Zeman argued that moderate Muslims could be 




convergence of the mainstream parties may facilitate the emergence of the openings 
within the political space for the radical right to occupy (Kriesi 1998).  Spies and 
Franzmann (2011) find some confirmation of the economic convergence theory, showing 
that the less distinct the mainstream parties are in their programs, the more political space 
they offer the radical right parties. Yet the theories that focus on convergence typically do 
not explain why the latter occurs and to what extent it may be beneficial for the 
mainstream parties to converge. My theoretical argument builds on the convergence 
theory by explaining how exactly it occurs and why it was specifically the left parties in 
the post-Communist region that abandoned their traditional policy positions. My approach 
also allows explaining the variation in the economic policy positions of the radical right 
parties across the region. 
While most party-level theories tend to explain the radical right’s electoral 
prospects as a function of mainstream party strategies, Bustikova (2014) pictures the 
temporal variation in the success of radical right parties as driven by the success of ethnic 
and socially liberal parties on the left. In this approach, the radical right becomes 
successful following the inclusion of ethno-liberal parties in governing coalitions, which 
polarizes party systems and increase issue salience (Bustikova 2014: 1743). Still, however, 
this approach does not explain the economic policy choices of the radical right parties. 
My theory allows filling in this gap. 
Among the alternative party-level explanations, it is possible to make the case that 
my theory challenges the Median voter theorem, since the basic premise of my argument 
is that the left and the radical right parties tend to compete along the single (economic) 
dimension. The expectation of the Median voter theorem is that shifting to the center of 
the policy spectrum is the winning position for the party, since it allows it to receive a 
majority of votes (Downs 1957). This suggests that as major parties gravitate toward the 
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center in the general election, they get more votes located near the median voter. My 
argument challenges this theoretical assumption by stating that in the long run shifting to 
the center of the political spectrum ended up eroding some of the previous support bases 
of the Communist successor parties. However, Romer and Rosenthal (1978) provided a 
theoretical explanation for this puzzle by showing that agenda-setters could exploit the 
differences between the median voter’s policy preferences and the actual status quo to 
offer a new policy that is located the closest possible to the agenda-setter’s preferences. 
The further away the status quo is located from the median voter, the more a partisan 
agenda-setter can propose an alternative that deviates from the center while still receiving 
a majority of support. “The worse the status quo, the greater this threat and, consequently, 
the greater the gain to the setter from being able to propose the alternative.” (Romer and 
Rosenthal 1978, 35-36) This argument seems to explain the drift to the populist right that 
is observed in the analyzed political systems and combine the median voter theorem with 




A number of theories also focus on the level factors in a specific country that may 
explain the variation in the electoral fortunes between the radical right parties in Hungary 
and the Czech Republic. 
One popular explanation focuses on Communist legacies as predictors of the 
success of the radical right parties in Eastern Europe. For example, Bustikova and 
Kitschelt (2009) distinguish between post–Communist countries with a legacy of national 
accommodative communism (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Estonia), which have 
cushioned those who are “losers” of reforms through their relatively generous welfare 
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states, and countries with a legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarian (Czech Republic and 
Germany) or patrimonial communism with post-communist partisan polarization 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Serbia) with high levels of inequality resulting from a 
rapid dismantling of the welfare state. The authors argue that while in the former case, the 
potential for the radical right parties remained quite limited, the latter type of countries 
provided a fertile ground for blossoming of the radical right parties that capitalized on the 
economic resentment stemming from the retrenchment of the welfare state. The 
emergence of a successful and strong radical right in Hungary, a country with 
accommodative communism, however, questions the implications of this approach. 
Another important argument that is raised in this regard is the legacy of the fascist 
movements of the interwar period that might be driving the contemporary success of the 
populist and radical right parties in Hungary. Unlike other countries in the region, 
Hungary has a history of fascist movements that largely stemmed from its defeat in the 
First World War and its frustration with the results of the Trianon Treaty, which cost the 
country large shares of its territory. This fascist movement, known as the Arrow Cross 
Party, ruled Hungary for a short period of time during the Second World War, allied 
Hungary with Nazi Germany and led to many civilians’ deaths. In post-Communist 
Hungary, the right parties in general and Jobbik in particular have capitalized on the 
memories and symbols of the interwar period. Jobbik’s predecessor, a radical right MIÉP 
party, for example, used some ideas and symbols from the Nazi ideology (Minkenberg 
2017: 78). Jobbik went even further by directly using some of the ideas of the Hungarian 
Arrow Cross Party. For example, the Hungarian Guard, a movement launched by Jobbik, 
wore uniforms and a flag modeled after the symbols of the Arrow Cross (Bayer, 2009: 
295; Minkenberg, 2017a: 78). In their rhetoric, Jobbik leaders often resorted to Holocaust 
denial and anti-Semitic comments (Goldfarb 2014). This legacy suggests that the 
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Hungarian people may indeed be voting for the radical right parties for reasons that differ 
from the choices of the electorate in other Visegrád countries, like the Czechs Republic, 
and be more innately susceptible to extreme nationalism. 
While I do acknowledge this critique, an emphasis on the fascist legacies in 
Hungary and their relationship to the radical right cannot persuasively explain the timing 
of the emergence of these parties. While extreme nationalist ideas do proliferate in 
Hungary, the examination of their historical legacy does not explain why the Hungarians 
did not immediately embrace the radical right parties during the transition period. By 
contrast, my theory explains the timeline of the emergence of the radical right and the 
importance of left parties’ choices for its electoral success. The preexisting tendency of 
the Hungarians to support the radical right parties had to be activated, and I explain how 
that process occurred in the contemporary Hungarian politics. 
Moreover, the legacy argument fails to account for the substantial variation in the 
electoral fortunes of the radical right parties in Central and Eastern European countries. 
While contemporary radical right parties exploit the legacy of the fascist regimes 
(Bustikova 2017), the existence of the legacy per se does not explain the radical right 
parties’ success. For example, during the interwar period, several Central and Eastern 
European regimes were described as fascist or strongly related to fascism: the Iron Guard 
movement in Romania (1940–1941), the Ustaše in Croatia (1941–1945), the Hlinka 
Guard in Slovakia (1939-1945), and the Arrow Cross Party in Hungary (1944–1945) 
(Bustikova 2017; Silva 2013). Given this legacy, one would expect radical right parties 
to attract substantive support at least in Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia. Yet the only case 
of a radical right party able to mobilize over 10 percent of votes in three consecutive 
elections is the Hungarian Jobbik in 2010, 2014 and 2018. Moreover, the average life 
span of a radical right party in 1990-2014 (measured as over 1 percent of the vote in at 
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least two national elections) is just ten years (Minkenberg 2017b). Ultimately, until 
recently the only party in the region to consistently gain over 3 percent in all national 
elections in 1990-2016 was the Slovak SNS. In Croatia, parties like the Croatian Party of 
Rights, which attempted to associate themselves with Ustaše, attracted support of a small 
percentage of the population (in coalition with other parties it received 6.4 and 3.5 percent 
of votes in 2003 and 2007 parliamentary election respectively, and failed to make it to the 
Croatian parliament in the subsequent elections). Hence, the legacy argument fails to 
explain the timing and the electoral success of the radical right parties. 
A popular explanation for the Jobbik party’s success in Hungary has to do with 
Jobbik’s ability to successfully mobilize the anti–Roma agenda. Bustikova (2017: 1) 
suggests that in more ethnically homogeneous countries, such as Hungary, the ethnic 
cleavage is less pronounced and the radical right politics are focused on mobilization 
against Roma. In a similar vein, Karacsony and Róna (2011), and Nagy and Róna (2013) 
argue that the anti-establishment attitude, nationalism and anti-Roma sentiments are the 
main explanatory factors behind the Jobbik vote in Hungary. The problem with this 
argument is that Hungary’s Roma population and anti-Roma attitude is not very different 
from those of other countries, like the Czech Republic, where the radical right parties 
emerged much later and were less influential. Although the Roma population in Poland is 
relatively small (30,000), in the other Visegrad countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia— it represents about 2%, 7.5%, and 9%, respectively.5 By contrast, when it 
comes to the levels of the anti-Roma sentiment, it tends to be higher in the Czech Republic 
                                                          
5 Estimates on Roma population in European countries. Support Team of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe for Roma Issues. // Capabilities of The Visegrád Group in 
Preventing Extremism - isp.policja.pl/download/12/29789/ReportV4TaskForce.pdf 
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than in Hungary (see Table 2).67 In other words, if the anti-Roma attitudes were the main 
driver behind the radical right vote, one should have seen an even more successful radical 
right party in the Czech Republic than in Hungary. However, that is not the case. 
 
 1999 2008 
Czech Republic 45.5 78.5 
Hungary 42.5 44.6 
Poland 39.2 28.4 
Table 2. Scale of Anti-Gypsy Hostility in Selected European Countries, 1999–2008. 
Source: World Value Survey 1999, Eurobarometer 2008 (Vitale and Claps, 2010) 
 
According to the Table 2, the levels of the anti-Roma sentiment vary dramatically 
both over time and across different countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. According to the World Value Survey data presented above, the Czech Republic 
manifested the highest levels of the anti-Roma sentiment back in 2008, when the Czech 
radical right parties have been quite weak. By contrast, both Poland and Hungary have 
much lower levels of the anti-Roma sentiment, which hence cannot alone explain the 
relative success of their populist and radical right parties. 
 
 
                                                          
6 www.romsintimemory.it/assets/files/discriminazione/intercultura/luoghi-
comuni/allegato%204%20Stewart_capitolo-Vitale.pdf 
7 Another popular explanation is the fact that the Czech parties have the Roma issue on their agenda while 
Hungarian parties ignored the issue until Jobbik’s successful rise in 2009. However, starting around 2014 




Overall, in the above chapter I have provided a review of the existing scholarship 
on the left parties’ choices and definitions and explanations of the success of the radical 
right parties. Specifically, I have provided the definitions of the radical right and populist 
parties and described the differences and similarities among the different approaches. I 
also provided the explanations for the coding of the left parties used in my dissertation.  
Ultimately, I have reviewed the alternative explanations for the success of the 
radical right parties. As I have shown above, none of the existing explanations can 
satisfactorily explain the electoral success of the radical right parties and the timing of 
their emergence. Specifically, I have demonstrated that a number of alternative 
explanations do not provide a satisfactory account for the electoral success of the radical 
right parties, including the theories that explain the success of the radical right parties by 
the features of countries’ electoral systems, the existence of a Communist or fascist 
legacy, and the share of the Roma population or the scale of the anti-Roma attitudes in a 
given country. By contrast, I have demonstrated that my argument builds on the 
convergence theory by explaining how exactly the policy convergence occurs and why 
specifically in the post-Communist region the ex-Communist left parties were the ones to 
move away from their traditional policy positions and launch the party realignment 
process.  
In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I demonstrate how my argument is 
able to account for the timing and the electoral success of the radical right parties in four 
selected countries of the Central and Eastern European region – the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. I build on the existing literature on the topic and engage 
the existing explanations to demonstrate that the left parties’ policy switch allows to 
satisfactorily explain the success of the radical right parties. In the below chapter I 
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overview the main methodological approaches and hypotheses used to develop my 
theoretical argument.  
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Chapter 3. Multiple Methods 
Rather than using a “silver bullet” test on which the main argument rises or falls 
in this dissertation, I use differing forms of analysis and many different forms of evidence 
to support my theoretical arguments. This chapter outlines the key methods and the 
reasoning behind each particular strategy chosen to address the research questions 
investigated in the dissertation. This approach avoids the risks of making an incorrect 
conclusion due to the weaknesses of the chosen single approach. By contrast, there are 
several advantages to using mixed methods; this approach allows us to control for the 
weaknesses of separate approaches by mixing both quantitative and qualitative data and 
research, to increase the breadth and depth of understanding of the phenomenon in 
question and to approach the phenomenon from different perspectives using different 
techniques. 
In this chapter, I review the different methods used in the dissertation, including 
the cross-country (regression and case study analysis), the constituency-level and the 
individual level (experimental survey) approaches. The key approach that allows me to 
test for the direction of the causality is the experimental survey method that I introduce in 
the chapter 7 of my dissertation. The experimental surveys allow me to establish the 
direction of the causal link in the most rigorous fashion by directly manipulating the 
subjects’ values on the independent variable and then measuring the subsequent changes 
in the dependent variable’s values. However, one of the weaknesses of the experimental 
methods is the external validity of the findings, that is the generalizability of the results 
significant within a given sample group to the population at large. In order to address this 
potential criticism, in the chapters that describe the cross-country and constituency-level 
approaches I analyze the same causal relationship through a set of different methods and 
using larger datasets. 
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The below table briefly outlines the different methods, approaches and hypotheses 
used in this dissertation. In the subsequent subchapters I discuss each of the chosen 









- Hypothesis I: There is an exodus of the working-class respondents 
from the center left parties towards the radical right parties over 
time. 
- Hypothesis II: The chosen positions of the center left parties on the 
economic policies play a significant role in this trend: the more pro-
market the left party is, the more likely it is that the working-class 








- Hypothesis I: In the countries where the ex-Communist left parties 
implemented the austerity reforms and shifted to the economic policy 
center, the working-class constituencies are more likely to support the 
right parties and the radical right parties are more electorally 
successful. 
- Hypothesis II:  In the countries where the left parties preserved their 
pro-labor stance, the alignments of the political groups remained 
closer to the traditional lines; the working-class constituencies were 
more likely to support the left parties and the radical right parties are 
weaker. 
Hungary 
- Hypothesis I:  In Hungary, after 1994 (period of the austerity reforms 
implementation) the working-class status has been decreasingly 
associated to the support for the center-left MSZP. 
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- Hypothesis II: In Hungary, the working-class status over the years has 





- Hypothesis I: The constituencies that supported MSZP in the 2006 
election were more likely to embrace the radical right Jobbik in the 





- Hypothesis I: the pro-market economic policy stance of MSZP fuels 
the support for the radical right Jobbik party. 
- Hypothesis II: the pro-market economic policy stance of MSZP fuels 
the support for the radical right Jobbik party among the economically 
disaffected groups, specifically blue-collar workers. 





First, I work with cross-country evidence using both quantitative and qualitative 
(case-studies) evidence to check whether the exodus of the working-class voters in fact 
characterizess the countries of the region following the adoption of a more pro-market 
stance by the ex-Communist left parties in the countries of the region. 
To explore my theoretical argument using the cross-country data available from 
the European Social Survey, I first test whether or not the blue-collar support for the 
radical right parties is a trend that takes place in the countries in the region over the years. 
Second, I test whether this trend is correlated with the ex-Communist left parties’ pro-
market economic policy positions. I use the available survey data on Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to address this question. 
The quantitative cross-country analysis makes it possible to test for larger trends across a 
set of different countries, and therefore extends the theoretical argument’s external 
validity.  
One of the key strengths of the cross-country approach is that it makes it possible 
to establish important sources of variation of the phenomenon on question. Typically, 
cross-country comparative studies are implemented to compare a selected number of 
countries using same concept with the purpose of generalizing or gaining a better 
understanding of the analyzed phenomenon (Hantrais and Mangen 1998) while 
controlling for the countries’ different sociocultural setting. Hantrais and Mangen (1998) 
argue that cross-country analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the most critical 
issues that are of central concern in different countries and help sharpen the focus of 
analysis by offering new perspectives. Specifically, in this dissertation, the application of 
the cross-country approach allows me to test my theory on a different set of cases, and 
hence to extend its external validity. 
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In addition, comparative analysis can provide new insights into the impact of 
wider socio-political context upon phenomenon of interest, such as the electoral fortunes 
of the radical right parties. Comparative cross-country analyses offer the possibility of 
highlighting the competing priorities operating in different contexts; making visible the 
assumptions that are taken for granted; and exposing the arbitrariness of specific concepts 
and categorizations (Salway et al. 2011). By introducing several control variables into my 
cross-country regression, I test the assumptions that the positions of the center-left parties 
on economic issues contribute to the overtime switch of the blue-collar constituencies to 
support the radical right parties. 
Using the European Social Survey data over the period of 2004–2016, I show that 
the exodus of voters from the left parties to the right characterized the selected sample of 
Central European countries over the analyzed time period, and that the chosen positions 
of the ex-Communist left parties on the economic scale played a role in this process. 
However, quantitative cross-country analysis has two important limitations. First, cross-
country analysis involves a high degree of variation in the data that is hard to control for. 
Second, the cross-country analysis creates a difficulty in maintaining a high level of 
matching (in terms of timing and outcome variables) among the analyzed countries and 
nonequivalence of the key concepts in a cross-country comparison. 
There are a number of further pitfalls for using this approach. One particular 
limitation is that it is difficult to ensure the rigorousness of the research, given the 
variability of the cross-country data and the high degree of discretion a researcher is 
allowed in (cherry-) picking the suitable explanations. Another problem is the 
nonequivalence of the key concepts in a cross-country comparison and the use of 
divergent data sources (Mangen 1999; Gharawi, Pardo, Guerrero 2009). In my case, this 
limitation, for example, applies to defining as radical right different parties in different 
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countries; scholars disagree whether to categorize a given country as radical right or not 
depending on context. To overcome this problem, I used my own definition of the radical 
right the parties (see chapter 2, “Defining the Radical Right”) and categorized as radical 
right only the parties commonly labelled as such in the literature and reputable datasets. 
Another limitation for cross-country studies is the difficulty in maintaining a high 
level of matching among the analyzed countries (Milliman and Glinow 1998). Although 
I attempted to eliminate the sources of external variation by focusing only on the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe that had strong similarities in their geography, their 
Communist experiences and the timing of market transitions (instrumental for my theory), 
there is still substantive variation in these countries’ culture and history that can impact 
the results. There is a similar concern regarding the timing of data collection, which may 
affect the comparability of the data analyzed. This issue becomes more important as the 
time gap increases. For example, since different radical right parties emerged in different 
countries in differing periods and contexts, the discrepancies may have more to do with 
unrelated divergent explanatory factors than my theory (Milliman and Glinow 1998). I 
attempt to handle this issue by limiting the time discrepancy across my country cases so 
that the data and the events analyzed are within 10–15 years of observation. Moreover, I 
specifically address the different timing of the emergence of the radical parties in my 
sample by explaining how my explanatory factors (the timing of formation of 
socioeconomic cleavages in a particular country, and the shift of the ex-Communist left 







While cross-country studies allow scholars to track the emergence of trends across 
a selected dataset and confirm the external validity of the theoretical argument, they often 
fail to eliminate substantive variation present at a high level of aggregation. For example, 
the cross-country comparative analysis fails to account for all of the variation over time 
within countries. In addition, cross-country analysis is less conducive to process tracing 
and discovering causal mechanisms. While observational studies allow me to draw 
conclusions about what happened, they are less instrumental at suggesting how it 
happened. Therefore, it is generally recommended to complement the quantitative cross-
country analysis with a case study approach. The multiple case study approach enables a 
researcher to closely examine the data within a specific context and partly account for the 
variation unique to a particular country case. 
The large-N analysis also provides for a far less nuanced description of these 
causal mechanisms than a case study may provide (Johns 2013). For example, while I am 
able to establish the relationship between center left parties adopting more pro-market 
policies and the increase in support for the radical right parties among the blue-collar 
constituencies in my cross-country analysis section, I am unable to persuasively trace the 
causal links that connect the adoption of those policies by the center left and the 
subsequent success of the radical right. By contrast, in my case study section, I show how 
the party realignment process created an opportunity for the radical right parties to appeal 
to those groups using redistributionist economic platforms. 
The case-study research method consists of selecting a small geographical area as 
the subject of study and tracing the key elements of the theoretical argument in depth. Yin 
(1984: 23) defines the case study analysis “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
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phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used.” These are analyzed using qualitative material from multiple secondary 
sources.  
The advantage of country case studies is that they provide contextual description, 
allow for the generation of hypotheses, and can confirm and inform theories (Landman 
2008). The case study method provides a deep, intensive study of a given country unit 
using limited resources. In addition, this approach gives a researcher a lot of flexibility 
while using process-tracing to uncover evidence of causal mechanisms or to explain 
outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). 
Specifically, in my case-study subsection, I look at four Visegrád countries—the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—that are more similar in terms of their 
historical experience than other Central and Eastern European countries (see the 
introduction for explanations of my regional focus). I run a qualitative case-study analysis 
on secondary data by looking at the timing of the emergence of the socio-economic 
cleavage, the policy choices made by the ex-Communist left parties, the party realignment 
process that followed those choices and the subsequent emergence of the populist and 
radical right parties in these countries. I show that in the countries where the ex-
Communist left parties implemented the market reforms, the blue-collar constituencies 
tended to switch to the right side of the political spectrum and eventually embrace the 
radical right parties. I use quantitative evidence to back these findings by using the 
available individual survey data from the Comparative Study of the Electoral System and 
Median Opinion Ltd. and comparing the differences in support of blue- and white-collar 
respondents for the ex-Communist left and populist and radical right parties. I show that 
over time the blue-collar constituencies tended to switch from supporting the ex-
Communist left to embracing the radical right parties.  
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However, the case-study analysis also includes important limitations extensively 
recorded in the social science literature. First, the amount of the available data for each 
case make it difficult to almost impossible to represent the analysis and generalize it in a 
simple way (Hodkinson and Hodkinson 2001). Landman (2008) points out that 
“inferences made from single-country studies are necessarily less secure than those made 
from the comparison of several or many countries.” Unlike with large cross-country 
regression analysis, generalizations about other units are difficult to make from a single 
or several country case studies. Hence, the case study approach is often considered 
intensive rather than extensive since it tends to offer sophisticated in-depth analysis of a 
single country at the expense of breadth analysis (Johns 2013). 
Second, choosing the case study approach instead of a large-N study increases the 
danger of scholars’ discretion. The latter can be conducive to the “selection bias” that 
occurs when a unit is chosen on its “intrinsic historical importance” or “on the 
accessibility of evidence” (George and Bennett 2005). This is further complicated by the 
fact that case study method makes it difficult for researchers to cross check the 
information (Bell 2005:11). Altogether, these problems may make the objectivity of the 
case study results questionable. One way to tackle this problem in case studies for 
researchers is to be explicit about the methodological choices they make (Meyer 2001). 
Finally, case studies tend to be more exploratory than confirmatory in their nature, 
attempting to gain new insights into a topic or unit from which new hypotheses might be 
developed. The descriptive nature of case studies limits their capacity to establish 
causation.  
To account for the subjectivity in discretion involved in the case-study analysis 
and possible challenges with establishing causality, I complement the case-study approach 




In Chapter 6, I use the constituency-level data to track how the constituencies for 
the ex-Communist left in Hungary switched to embrace the radical right Jobbik party 
between the 2006 and 2010 national parliamentary elections following the 
implementation of austerity reforms by the ex-Communist left. The constituency-level 
analysis allows me to trace the shift in electoral support from the ex-Communist left 
MSZP to the radical right Jobbik party over time. In line with my theoretical expectations, 
I show that at least part of the electoral success of Jobbik in the 2010 election came from 
the constituencies that supported MSZP in 2006. 
Such a method of analysis has several advantages over the individual-level data. 
First, it allows me to empirically test the robustness of my argument on yet another type 
of data. Second, the constituency-level data allows me to check whether the individual-
level party support translated into its electoral gains. Third, this approach allows me to 
track the shifts in party support over time, which I otherwise cannot test on the available 
data in Hungary due to the absence of the individual-level panel data and the respondents’ 
tendency to misrepresent their previous voting choices in regular surveys. 
In addition, the constituency-level approach has a great advantage over country-
level regression analysis since it allows me to hold many other potentially causal variables 
constant by focusing on within-country variation (Culpepper 2005). 
In my constituency-level chapter, I use the data from Psephos, Adam Carr's 
Election Archive, to look at the changes in constituency-level party support in Hungary’s 
2006 and 2010 national parliamentary election. I find a consistent positive association 
between the vote for MSZP in 2006 and the 2010 vote for Jobbik on constituency level.   
However, it is important to point out that this approach has a number of important 
limitations as well. First, constituency-level analysis involves the problem of the 
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ecological fallacy. Attempting to extend the inferences about the nature of individuals 
from the inferences about the group to which those individuals belong (in this case—
constituency) may be problematic (Landman 2000: 49) since there is a possibility that the 
analysis carried out at one level can overestimate the relationship at another level 
(Robinson 1950: 353). To address this weakness of the constituency-level analysis, one 
could complement it with individual-level analysis.  
Second, while studies show that researchers can reap large marginal gains in the 
quality of their sub-national opinion estimates through inclusion of relevant area-level 
predictors (Buttice and Highton 2013; Warshaw and Rodden 2012), the constituency-level 
is typically has limited data availability (usually there is much more data available on the 
national level). Because it is not possible to include all of the relevant data in the analysis, 
this limited data availability at the constituent-level imposes substantial limitations on the 
interpretations of results of the constituency-level analysis. If some important controls are 
missing, an omitted variable bias may emerge causing scholars to attribute the effects of 
the missing variable to the estimated effects of the included variables. In the latter case, 
experimental analysis can help address the omitted variable bias by controlling for 
alternative sources of variation in data (Mutz 2011:9). 
Acknowledging the limitations of this approach, I complement the constituency-





The above findings generally confirm my theoretical expectations, but they do not 
allow me to persuasively address the causality issue in a methodologically rigorous 
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fashion.  While the results of the previous analysis go in line with the theoretical 
prediction of my dissertation, the above methods make it difficult to establish causality 
since it is hard to isolate the effect of the studied cause on observational data. The omitted 
variable bias threatens most causal arguments in observational research. 
In addition, while I have argued that the socioeconomic issues played an important 
role in the respondents turning away from the center-left parties to embrace the radical 
right in the Hungarian context, I have yet to demonstrate that quantitatively. For example, 
will survey participants be more likely to support the radical right Jobbik party when 
presented the information about the pro-market MSZP policy stance than when shown 
information on redistributionist MSZP policy positions? How does Jobbik’s own policy 
platform condition these effects? 
Survey experiments provide several advantages for examining my hypotheses and 
addressing the above research questions. First, the experimental approach allows me to 
design and control the information that individuals are exposed to by manipulating the 
treatment of the information provided to respondents (and keeping all many important 
sources of variation constant) with the aim of exploring the hypothesized causal 
mechanisms. The random assignment of treatment in experiments allows establishing the 
association of interest on two comparison groups. Then, the value difference of the 
independent variable between these two groups allows me to conclude whether the 
association, in fact, exists between the independent and dependent variables. By 
conducting two experiments with different groups of subjects, I am able to estimate the 
effects of the changes in the positions of the left party on economic policy on support for 
the radical right party. 
 Second, the random assignment of information to respondents in experiments 
enables me to make causal predictions. This approach also partly alleviates the problem 
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of third variables and spurious relationships that often remain unaddressed in 
observational studies. As discussed above, most of the previous work on the link between 
the mainstream parties’ policy positions and support for the radical right parties has relied 
on cross-sectional data, which makes establishing causality very difficult. Since parties 
tend to adjust their political strategies relative to each other, radical right parties also 
influence the policy positions of mainstream parties (Han 2014). This makes establishing 
causality on observational data quite difficult. In addition, the time-lags that exist between 
changes in party policy positions, people’s perceptions of those changes and the 
measurements of those perceptions further complicates the possibility to address 
questions of interest to this dissertation on observational studies.  
Finally, unlike laboratory experiments survey experiments use larger datasets and 
representative sample of the population. Hence, survey experiments allow scholars to 
draw more accurate inferences about respondents’ opinions (Siedler and Sonnenberg 
2010).  
In March 2018 (just before Hungary’s April 2018 parliamentary election) I ran an 
experimental survey in Hungary. The results of my experimental survey analysis 
confirmed the original expectations —I found a strong and significant increase in support 
for Jobbik on both the general samples and different specifications of blue-collar 
subsamples following the treatment exposure (the pro-market as opposed to the 
redistributionist economic policy position of the ex-Communist left party), but only when 
the radical right Jobbik party adopted a protectionist (rather than anti-immigration) policy 
platform. 
However, the experimental survey methodology is not immune to potential 
criticism as well. The first potential concern is the external validity or generalizability of 
the results obtained through such an approach. One of the criticisms leveled against 
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experimental research is that its external validity is low. My experimental survey design 
allows to address concerns regarding external validity. First, I used the representative 
sample taken from a cross-section of Hungarian society. Second, the treatments in my 
experimental survey have been designed to reflect the realities of Hungary’s political 
context. I had four Hungarian native speakers discuss the specific formulations of the 
treatments in order to mirror realities of the political environment in Hungary. Finally, to 
ensure the external validity of my findings, in this dissertation I complemented the 
experimental surveys with the evidence received through different methods and on other 
levels of analysis. 
The second possible problem with experimental surveys has to do with non-
robustness of the findings to the alternative specification of the treatment. Specifically, in 
my analysis a slight change in the wording of party platforms may substantively modify 
the results of the analysis. 
The third concern regarding experimental studies conducted in their natural 
environment is that it may be difficult to control all extraneous variables. With regards to 
my analysis, this issue has to do with the fluctuations of party perceptions that occur over 
time and which may substantively shift respondents’ responses to the information about 
these parties. For example, Jobbik’s self-rebranding as a more centrist party (as opposed 
to its previous more radical stance) (Byrne 2017) may have made this party a more 
acceptable voting option for some of the respondents and hence may have me 
overestimating the effects of the treatment. 
Overall, while the experimental research remains a powerful tool for determining 
or verifying causation, it has important limitations and it is best to synthesize its usage 
with alternate methods. Hence, by combining my experimental survey approach with the 
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alternative methods—such as cross-country or case study analysis—I am able to address 




The above chapter reviews different methods used in this dissertation to address 
the theoretical argument made above. Rather than using one silver bullet test, I introduce 
a number of alternative approaches (cross-country regression, case study, and 
experimental survey analysis) to challenge my argument on different levels of the analysis 
and through qualitative and quantitative evidence.  
The mixed methods approach has a number of advantages over using separate 
methods of analysis. First, such an approach allows analyzing a more comprehensive type 
of data, combining quantitative and qualitative evidence to evaluate the argument. 
Second, combining different methods allows to overcome individual weaknesses of one 
particular approach and enhance the results’ generalizability. For example, I use the 
experimental survey methods to establish the direction of the causality, while complement 
them with cross-country regression analysis to address the concerns with the external 
validity of the experimental findings. Ultimately, the results obtained from different 
methods help validate each other, and therefore increase the breadth and depth of 
understanding of the phenomenon in question, while also providing for stronger evidence 
in support for the theoretical argument. 
In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I proceed to demonstrate the results 
of the analysis. As the evidence suggests, I find the confirmation of my theoretical 
argument on different levels and by using different types of data.  
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Chapter 4. Hungary’s Left and Radical Right Parties 
The key focus of my dissertation is Hungary, a country with one of the most 
established and electorally successful radical right parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe—Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary. Hungary is the only country in the 
region where a radical right party Jobbik was able to mobilize more than 10 percent of 
voters in three consecutive elections in 2010, 2014 and 2018 (Minkenberg 2017b). 
In this chapter, I trace the trajectory of the Hungarian parties in the aftermath of 
the post-Communist transition. Specifically, I focus on the political choices faced by the 
ex-Communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the reasons why the party 
eventually chose to implement the pro-market reforms and an austerity package. I then 
proceed to explain how its political strategies determined the success of the populist 
(Fidesz) and radical right (Jobbik) parties in the Hungarian political context. I 
complement this analysis with the individual-level data analysis on Medián Opinion and 
Market Research Ltd dataset to show that the blue-collar Hungarian constituencies have 
been switching from supporting the ex-Communist left party to embracing the populist 
and radical right over the span of 1994–2014. 
To extend the external validity of my theory, I complement this chapter with a 
quantitative cross-country analysis and an analysis of three other post-Communist 
cases—the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia (see Chapter 5). 
 
 
Historical Legacy and Transition Period 
Following the collapse of the Communist system, the ex-Communist parties had 
two strategies to choose from. The first, and overwhelmingly more popular strategy 
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among the ex-Communist parties was to embrace the market reforms and austerity, and 
shift to the center of the ideological spectrum, particularly in the economic policy scale 
(as did the ex-Communist parties in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria or Slovakia) (Grzymala-
Busse, 2002). Hungary’s left is a canonical example of the aforementioned programmatic 
shifts of the left parties.  
The economic left-right divide started shifting in Hungary prior to the transition 
and largely had to do with the reformed nature of Hungary’s Communist party. The 1956 
Hungarian Revolution launched a new period of reforms in the country. Those reforms 
were led by Janos Kadar, the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 
(Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP). In 1966, the Party’s Central Committee 
approved the “New Economic Mechanism” (NEM) aimed at boosting Hungary’s 
economy, increasing productivity and creating prosperity to ensure political stability in 
the country. Kadar increased consumer expenditures and reintroduced some market 
mechanisms into the Hungarian market and pursued a foreign policy that encouraged 
more trade with western countries. Although the reforms proved quite successful and 
transformed the country into “the happiest barrack of the Communist camp”, they also 
dramatically raised Hungary’s public debt— which later ended up delaying the country’s 
economic reform during the transition years (Csizmadia 2008). 
As a direct consequence of the NEM reforms, by the end of the 1970s, Hungary 
was one of the countries with the highest per capita debt in the world. The situation kept 
worsening so that by the 1980s the country had serious insolvency issues and was on the 
border of a financial and economic collapse (Csizmadia 2008: 11). Given the deplorable 
state of most other countries of the Communist system at the time, Hungarian government 
had to look for the funding elsewhere and launched discussions about joining the IMF 
and the World Bank, where Hungary applied in 1981. Having been granted the IMF 
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membership, Hungarian government restarted the reforms and adjusted the economic 
policy. However, a new approach led to a large-scale increase in prices and currency 
devaluations that negatively affected the Hungarian population (Bogel, Edwards, Wax 
1997: 11).8 In this sense, in the eyes of Hungarians, the Communist party was associated 
with a more pro-market economic policy prior to the start of the transition. In late 1980s, 
the right parties used this as an opportunity to challenge the ex-Communist left from an 
opposite side of the economic policy spectrum—by using a more redistributionist, 
populist agenda. 
Eventually, the limitations of reforms in a non-free economy and a worsening 
economic situation launched the democratization process in Hungary. In mid-1980s, a 
series of round-table discussions was held, where the reformist wing of the ruling 
Communist Party and Hungary’s dissidents were able to agree on a new constitution. The 
first limited multiparty elections took place in 1985.  
Following the transition, Hungary’s Socialist Party (MSZP, Magyar Szocialista 
Párt) became a reform wing of the ruling socialist Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 
which chose to split from the old Communist party and move to the ideological center. In 
the early years, the party represented a cross-class coalition of former nomenclature elites 
and blue- and white-collar workers (Evans and Whitefield 1995: 1191).  
Since 1990, the Hungarian general elections were held in a mixed, dual-ballot 
system, which created incentives for strategic voting and a moderate amount of desertion 
from the “third parties” (Prinz 2013). Hence, the newly created electoral system favored 
nation-wide parties and incentivized formation of a two-party system. Small or regional 
parties on the left side of the spectrum had difficulty gaining electoral support, and the 
New Left and the Hungarian Workers’ Party (MSzMP, a small Communist faction that 
                                                          
8 The Polish story is somewhat similar in this regard. 
87 
 
opposed the reformist orientation of the MSZP and broke away from it) were unable to 
mobilize enough support and get past the 5% electoral threshold. Instead, the reformed 
ex-Communist MSZP has taken the lead in the representation of the Hungarian “left” 
(Palonen 2009: 14). 
These developments explain why the alignment along the economic policy axis 
has been shifting in Hungary since the early years of transition. While the ex-Communist 
left tended to embrace the neoliberal reform agenda, the right-wing parties were quite 
non-rightist in their economic policies. The first post-Communist government in Hungary 
after the 1990 election—which included three right wing parties: the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF), the Independent Party of Smallholders (FKgP) and the 
Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)—was reluctant to undertake difficult 
economic reforms despite the country’s dire economic conditions. The right-wing parties 
came to power by criticizing the economic reforms implemented by the Socialists (Racz 
2000) and employed the populist rhetoric that promised to protect the common people 
from the “antisocial reforms” pursued by the MSZP (Morlang 2003). While in power, 
instead of implementing the reforms, the right government attempted “to calm public 
dissatisfaction by increasing government spending" (Morlang 2003: 70). This approach 
served as the best survival strategy for the newly emerged, fragmented and poorly 







First Wave of Realignment 
Starting in 1989, the MSZP rejected the old Communist Party image and adopted 
a pro-European program, which combined a universalist welfare state and acceptance of 
the market economy (Toth 2015). This strategy, which echoed the approach chosen by 
many western European left parties (Berman 2016b), aimed to preserve the party’s nature 
as an organization of left-leaning reformist technocrats from the middle ranks of the 
former regime (Toth 2015). Embracing the market and pursuing reforms seemed to 
provide the MSZP with the only viable long-term strategy for party development 
(Grzymala-Busse 2002; Morlang 2003). Additionally, the reformed wing of the 
Communist party already had the legacy of reform implementation and established 
relations with the international economic institutions. 
The market economic orientation was later reinforced when MSZP entered a 
coalition with the liberal and reformist Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) party in 
1994–1998 and again in 2002–2008. The coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SZDSZ) and the MSZP self-portrayal as the original initiator of liberal 
economic reforms in 1989 further reinforced the party’s liberal free market-oriented 
image (Tavits and Letki 2009: 559). MSZP also strongly emphasized European 
integration, democracy, political correctness, human rights and multiculturalism. 
Initially, the rebranding strategy worked very well. In the 1994 parliamentary 
election, MSZP won an absolute majority and entered into a coalition with the liberal 
SZDSZ. This coalition launched far-reaching economic reforms that were needed in light 
of Hungary’s dire economic conditions, and that attempted to avert the danger of a 
financial crisis and national bankruptcy due to the country’s extensive debt. The rightwing 
Magyar Democrat Forum's government that was in power in 1990–1994 before MSZP 
failed to implement those reforms (Racz 2000).  
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While the MSZP government accelerated the privatization of Hungarian state-
owned companies, the key element of the reform was the so-called Bokros Package. 
Announced in 1995, the Borkos package included a series of austerity measures, such as 
the gradual devaluation of the forint and the reduction of social benefits and real wages. 
Extensive austerity program pursued by the MSZP government under Bokros and Horn 
aimed to receive a special “stand-by” three-year loan from the IMF as a reward for its 
efforts at budget cuts, social state reduction and inflation control (Ziblatt 1998). However, 
while the IMF commended the MSZP austerity efforts it demanded further cuts in social 
security and accelerated privatization (Szilagyi 1995: 64). This pushed Bokros and Horn 
into announcing an even deeper budget deficit reduction in January 1996, finally winning 
the IMF loan in February 1996. Designed to avoid national bankruptcy, the Bokros 
package devalued the forint to counterbalance the deficit while also limiting social 
benefits and reducing real wages. In other words, the Bokros package combined the short-
term stabilization measures with economic and social restructuring. Such policies brought 
on strong criticism from right wing and labor union forces that argued for more gradual 
stabilizing policies (Köves 1995, Boros-Kazai 2005). At the forefront of the opposition 
was right-wing Fidesz party that deemed the package catastrophic.  
While the Bokros package proved to stabilize economic growth by 1997, it also 
reinforced the cleavage along the socioeconomic policy by introducing a visible economic 
divide between the right and left. The latter now has been economically defined based on 
its more pro-market, conservative austerity measures, and taking advice from 
international institutions (aka the IMF or EU for structural assistance). The former has 
embraced more paternalistic and pro-redistribution socialist policies, focusing on the 
internal growth of smaller scale private ownership and the social mechanisms of 
redistribution and welfare (Fowler 2004). While the populist side of such initiatives 
90 
 
became more pronounced further down the road with Fidesz criticizing the IMF and EU 
policies as encroaching on the freedoms of the Hungarian people (Saltman 2014: 33), the 
key dividing lines were created back in 1995. 
Although Hungary’s economic situation improved after the Bokros package, the 
population was reluctant to accept the huge costs of transformation. The stabilization 
policies were followed by a sharp increase in social dissatisfaction and a loss of social 
support for the ruling coalition. The reform resulted in a sharp decline in the living 
standards of the majority of Hungarians (Greskovits 2000). The major cuts in public 
spending (unemployment benefits, education, pension and healthcare) led to an increase 
in mortality and a reduction in fertility (Kando 2001). 
 Although it was successful in the short term, the MSZP strategy put a strain on its 
relationship with the blue-collar constituencies and labor unions and over time led to the 
increasing frustration with the left among the social groups that historically supported 
MSZP. In chapter 4, I analyze the individual-level surveys in Hungary to trace the 
dynamics of the working-class support for the MSZP. I show that while the blue-collar 
working status is positively and significantly associated with likely support for MSZP in 
1994 (prior to implementation of the Bokros package), the turnaround occurs in 1998 
election, when the working-class status for the first time becomes negatively associated 
with the support for the left party. By contrast, following the 1998 election, I find a 
consistent positive association between the working-class status and probability of voting 
for the right Fidesz party. Hence the blue-collar workers initially turned to Fidesz to 
oppose the MSZP neoliberal policies. In the following years, however, those 
constituencies became increasingly disappointed with Fidesz as well (Eszter-Tóth 2015) 
and continued radicalizing by shifting further to the right of the political spectrum. 
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Second Wave of Realignment 
The Bokros package and its welfare cuts eventually cost MSZP support in the 
1998 election. The right parties capitalized on the increase of dissatisfaction among the 
Hungarian people. Agh (2002) draws a parallel between MSZP and Blair’s government, 
which implemented similar policies (such as privatizing the British National Health 
Service) in the UK (Agh 2002). In both cases, such strategies contributed to the electoral 
success of the radical right parties in both the UK and Hungary. 
The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) was 
a radical nationalist party, founded in 1993, that managed to enter the parliament with 
5.47% of votes in 1998. The party used an anti-Semitic platform (which was also an anti-
left platform due to the existing tradition in Hungary to frame the Communist/left 
government as a benefactor of Hungary’s Jewish community) and campaigned against 
Hungary’s accession to the European institutions. 
Most importantly, rightwing Fidesz used the opportunity to transform its platform 
from a cosmopolitan liberal ideology.  It reconstructed itself as a conservative party with 
populist elements and combined rightwing attitudes on public- and Christian-conservative 
morality with left-wing attitudes on economics. Committed to state-led economic 
development, Fidesz advocated the defense of Hungary’s national interests and domestic 
employers against foreign influences and rejected the takeover of state companies by 
foreigners through privatization (Toth 2015). The strategy proved to be a winning one—
the support for Fidesz, which had not been in power before, rose from around 9 percent 
in 1990 to 26 percent in 1998.  
Having won the 1998 election, Fidesz’s leader Victor Orban became Hungary’s 
new prime minister by forming a government with MDF and FKGP parties. While in 
power, Fidesz continued to criticize the neoliberal policies of the previous MSZP-SZDSZ 
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government, especially those related to the industry privatization and the welfare cut-offs. 
In a series of public speeches, Orban referenced neoliberalism as a western ideology, 
which was not to be entirely trusted due to its tendency to prioritize the market over the 
individual before the culture and society in which it was embedded (Wilkin 2016 :61). 
Yet Fidesz was constrained in its use of the populist policies due to the need to ensure 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union (and hence to comply with the restrictions 
imposed by the EU).  Thus, despite its rhetoric, Orban’s government undertook a series 
of reforms aimed at cutting the existing budget deficit and public-sector debt, and largely 
continued the MSZP track.  
However, from that point on, the populist appeals became an important electoral 
component in Hungarian politics. Fidesz’s rhetoric became more aggressive and populist 
over time with Victor Orban attacking the elites, the banks and the multinationals while 
emphasizing the country’s national symbols and traditions (Enyedi 2016; Palonen 2009). 
To avoid defeat in the 2002 elections, the Fidesz government implemented a massive 
stimulation of consumer demand by raising public sector wages by 75 percent, the 
minimum wage by 60 percent and implementing a lavish mortgage lending program. 
Attempting to outbid Fidesz, in the 2002 election MSZP promised wage increases 
in the public sector, a 13th-month bonus, the abolition of income tax for the low paid and 
an ambitious investment program in infrastructure (Lehndorff 2014: 236) and won the 
election. Despite the fact that Fidesz lost, Hungary’s economic policy-making took a new 
direction since 2002: both Fidesz and MSZP sought to outbid one another calling for a 
“new social system.” When the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition returned to power, its economic 
policy became subordinated to reelection campaign promises. While the expansive 
spending program gave a boost to Hungary’s economy, the increase in public debt now 
became a permanent problem.  
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The relevance of socioeconomic issues was evident in the 2006 campaign, which 
focused on economic issues and the convergence with the Maastricht criteria after the 
recent accession of Hungary to the EU (Korkut 2007; Sitter and Batory 2006).  The 2006 
elections continued the populist cycle of both the MSZP and Fidesz competing on who 
promised the voters more, largely ignoring the budget deficit of over 9% at the time 
(Batory 2010). Concerned with losing votes in the forthcoming elections in 2006, the 
MSZP government led by new prime-minister Ferenc Gyurcsány returned to an expansive 
deficit-financed spending policy.  
Although the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition managed to secure reelection, the new 
government suffered a massive popularity drop few months later, largely due to its 
economic policies. Having returned to power in 2006, Gyurcsány had to comply with the 
European Commission’s request to curb new debt in accordance with the Maastricht 
stability criteria, but the majority of Hungarians were not prepared to a sudden change of 
course in the direction of public spending cuts (Lehndorff 2014: 236). 
The impending implementation of the austerity measures stayed in the top 15 news 
in Hungary in April and May 2006 (Nagy and Rona 2012). The MSZP-SZDSZ coalition 
government adopted the first set of measures, the so-called New Balance Program, on 
June 9th. The key issues included raising of gas prices by 30%, electricity prices by 10-
14%, increasing the medium VAT rate from 15% to 20%. Five exceptionally negative 
months followed consecutively for MSZP between July and November 2006 and were 
accompanied by a negative public mood: by August 2006 72% Hungarians thought that 
things in Hungary was headed in the wrong direction, in comparison with 49% of 
Hungarians in June. By the end of summer 2006, MSZP popularity experienced its 
greatest decline in the entire 2006–10 term (Nagy and Rona 2012).  
94 
 
The situation escalated when Gyurcsány’s private comment that the state of 
Hungary’s economy was much worse than any party had admitted was leaked on the 
national radio in September 2006. By then, the MSZP rating has been declining 
dramatically for three consecutive months. Observers often blame the dramatic collapse 
in MSZP support on the leaked Gyurcsány’s Őszöd speech. Yet, in fact, it was austerity 
measures that made MSZP’s support reach a level that even Gyurcsány’s speech did not 
decrease further (26-28%). Thus, Gyurcsány’s popularity did not implode following the 
exposure of his secret speech: his ratings fell before (from 55% in May 2006, to 34% in 
August 2006) (Nagy and Rona 2012).  
Yet the exposure of Gyurcsány’s Őszöd speech was a last straw that sparked a 
wave of riots and further dropped the popularity of the left government. Fidesz accused 
the MSZP of election fraud and demanded new elections, but the MSZP government 
refused and instead continued its austerity program. So much public criticism followed 
that Fidesz’s campaign for a referendum on the reforms was supported by the population. 
The referendum, which was held in spring 2008, dramatically reinforced Fidesz as the 
party that promised to defend the welfare state against the neoliberal deregulation 
(Lehndorff 2014: 236). As if that was not bad enough, the 2008 global economic 
unraveled in mid-2008. Lehndorff (2014: 237). Forint devaluation followed pushing up 
monthly payments for foreign-currency denominated mortgages and put a severe burden 
on many Hungarian households (Batory 2009).  As result, the Hungarian economy stalled, 
and its GDP plunged by 6.8 percent in 2009. The crisis was exacerbated by the legacy of 
government spending driven growth since anticyclical measures were now off the agenda 
and Hungary’s high foreign indebtedness. 
Owing to the 2008 financial crisis and the inadvertent fiscal policies of the 
Hungarian government, by mid-2008 Hungary was on the verge of bankruptcy. Things 
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became so bad that the MSZP government was forced to rely on an IMF-led bailout. The 
loan of 20 billion euros secured by the European Commission, the IMF and the World 
Bank helped Hungary to avoid bankruptcy, but they included a series of conditionalities 
that severely restrained Hungarian government’s room to maneuver for the Hungarian 
government (Csaba 2013: 8). These socially unpopular stipulations included raising the 
retirement age, severing disabilities and cutting unemployment benefits.  
Rising popular discontent eventually led to Gyurcsany offering his resignation in 
March 2009. He stated, “I hear that I am the obstacle to the co-operation required for 
changes, for a stable governing majority and the responsible behavior of the 
opposition…if so, then I am eliminating this obstacle now” (Batory 2009). Following 
Gyurcsany’s resignation, MSZP scrambled to find a new prime minister—a number of 
candidates refused the offer. Eventually, MSZP appointed Gordon Bajnai in April 2009. 
In an attempt to gather cross-party and popular support, Bajnai promptly introduced a 
comprehensive set of austerity measures designed to reform the tax and benefits systems. 
The latter included paid parental and sick leave cuts, pensions and government support 
for housing.  It also included an increase in VAT and excise taxes (Batory 2009).  
Already by Spring 2009, even before the introduction of the Bajnai package, 
Hungary’s public opinion of the MSZP government was exceptionally negative. In a 
Median poll in March 2009, 87% of respondents reported that their household’s financial 
situation worsened over the past 12 months (47% thought it got a lot worse), while the 
vast majority expected it to get even worse even in the next year months. A few weeks 
after his appointment new prime-minster Bajnai was almost as unpopular as his 
predecessor Gyurcsany (Batory 2009). The announcement of the austerity measures 
delivered the coup de grace to the MSZP that received in the June 2009 European 
elections the smallest share of the vote since 1990 (Batory 2010).  While Bajnai’s fiscal 
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stabilization succeeded in significantly reducing the deficit, the austerity measures 
together with the IMF-imposed conditionalities gave the MSZP government little room 
to relax the crisis measures which could help recover popular support for the party. 
Ultimately, a number of noisy corruption scandals, such as a series of revelations about 
large sums stolen from the (massively subsidized) Budapest public transport company 
delivered a final blow to the MSZP in the run up to the 2010 elections (Batory 2010). 
Nagy and Rona (2012) argue that the combined effect of austerity measures and 
corruption allegations toppled MSZP in 2006–2010 electoral round. In fact, they 
demonstrate that from June 2008 on, there was not a single month when news favorable 
to MSZP dominated the agenda, which gradually eroded the support for MSZP. The party 
suffered the greatest blow in the early months following the second Gyurcsány-
government’s entry in the office, when the prime minister announced his austerity 
package. Following this announcement, MSZP support within the population at large 
dropped from 37% in May 2006 to 26% in August 2006, while its relative position vis-à-
vis Fidesz fell by 20% below the level seen immediately after the elections. Subsequent 
erosion of MSZP popularity continued more gradually. The domination of austerity 
measures, the unsuccessful reform policies and the corruption scandals within MSZP on 
the political agenda between 2006 and 2010 resulted in massive drop in the polls (Nagy 
and Rona, 2012). 
In the meantime, Fidesz continued a campaign against the MSZP government that 
attacked the measures demanded by the IMF and the European Commission and portrayed 
Fidesz as the spokesman for the general discontent. Fidesz argued that once the neoliberal 
and corrupt politics of the ex-Communist left was stopped dead in its tracks, a new period 
of strong growth could begin (Lehndorff 2014: 237). As result, Fidesz won the 2010 
election with a landslide victory, securing a two-thirds majority in parliament. MSZP 
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lagged far behind, while the right radical Jobbik secured a third place with 16.7% of vote. 
Following its 2010 electoral defeat, the MSZP has never been able to recover and has 
continued to lose votes over time. New left parties that subsequently emerged in the 
Hungarian politics were also unable to gain substantive levels of popular support. 
This period illustrates the continuous shift of the dissatisfied Hungarian voters 
along the right dimension. Together with center right Fidesz that actively uses populist 
rhetoric, the radical right Jobbik rose on the wave of frustration with the establishment, 
capitalizing on social grievances. Jobbik’s focus on the economy explains a substantive 
share of its electoral popularity. Varga (2014) shows that the electoral success of Jobbik 
can be explained not only by its attempts to mobilize the anti-Roma sentiment, but also 
by its ability to present itself as a party that takes considerable interest in the economic 
issues of poverty and inequality triggered by capitalism. For example, an attack on MSZP 
and neoliberalism played a strong role in Jobbik’s 2010 electoral platform (Volford 2012). 
In its electoral manifesto “Radikalis Valtozas” (Jobbik 2010; Jobbik 2014), Jobbik in its 
economic section accused the established elites of misleading the country and causing 
devastating economic conditions during the transition process. Csaba Gyüre, Jobbik MP, 
argued that “Jobbik unanimously attacked— and still attacks—the established parties that 
emerged during the transition to democracy. They are responsible for mishandling the 
systemic change. The general public has seen that a large amount of state property has 
been up for sale for 25 years [meaning since the fall of communism state property has 
been sold off unfairly], in the meantime, [levels] of state debt have increased significantly. 
Hundreds of thousand people cannot avoid moving to Western Europe, as they had a 
difficulty in making ends meet. Driven into the [current] situation, the established parties 
were accountable. Jobbik called for their removal from power” (Kim 2016: 349). In 
particular, Jobbik’s program portrayed the MSZP as being responsible for most of 
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Hungary’s problems. According to Jobbik, as direct result of MSZP’s policies and 
attachment to the EU—a “corrupt capitalist organization”—Hungary lost its sovereignty 
and got stuck in the economic crisis. Negative references to MSZP featured in each section 
of Jobbik’s 2010 program contrasting it with a polar opposite stance of Jobbik (Volford 
2012). Along with the established parties, Jobbik also attacked globalization and the 
multinational corporations allegedly responsible for the destruction of the economy and 
for pushing Hungarian businesses to the state of bankruptcy.  
After the 2009 European parliament election (where Jobbik received 14.8 
percent), a Budapest polling firm, the Perspective Institute, ran a survey that discovered 
that large shares of the left-wing voters were turning toward Jobbik. They concluded that 
Hungary’s radical right primarily recruited its supporters from members of the leftist 
camp that were disappointed with the governmental performance of MSZP, not from the 
center-right camp (Phillips 2010). In a 2009 survey of Jobbik voters about their 2006 party 
preferences, Median discovered different results. Of those surveyed 9% did not remember 
or refused to answer; 25% voted for Fidesz-KDNP, and 14% came from the MSZP camp 
(Balogh 2009). The difference in findings may have to do with voters’ proclivity to forget 
their previous voting choices.  In some cases, Jobbik doubled its nationwide share of the 
votes in cities that had been Socialist strongholds (Phillips 2010). In the analysis 
conducted in chapter 6, I find similar results for Hungary’s district-level constituencies: 
there is a consistent positive association between the vote for MSZP in the 2006 election 
and the vote for Jobbik in the 2010 election on constituency level. This conclusion is not 
trivial, since a mass exodus of the former supporters of the left party to the far right of the 
political spectrum (rather than to a competing left party or to the immediate centrist 
competitor - Fidesz) is a paradox that requires explanation.  
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The anti-establishment backlash of disaffected voters was exacerbated by the 
economic recession, unemployment, and demand for protectionism in light of 
globalization (Norris 2005). That such anti-establishment backlash took the form of a 
radical right voting in Hungary may be understood in terms of the dealignment process. 
In Hungary, the left parties increasingly came to be associated with the neoliberal 
economic policies. Hence, Hungarian voters disappointed by such policies were 
increasingly shifting to the right parties, which in turn adopted a more protectionist 
paternalistic rhetoric. The economic factors, such as global economic crisis, high levels 
of unemployment (particularly, in Hungary’s north-east regions which became Jobbik’s 
strongholds), and Jobbik’s own rhetoric that accused the governing parties, international 
capital and the Roma minority ensured the success of the radical right (Varga 2014; 
Szombati 2018).   
Jobbik’s efforts to reach out to the disaffected blue-collar constituencies paid off. 
Batory (2010) conducted a series of the interviews with workers at Hungary’s factories 
and discovered that workers who supported MSZP and/or leaned to the left in their 
political preferences constituted a minority among those interviewed. Instead, while few 
explicitly embraced the radical right Jobbik, many indirectly confirmed that Jobbik would 
be their preference in the next elections. By some estimates, up to a third of the factory 
employees were ready to vote for the radical right, due to their earlier disappointment 
with Fidesz and MSZP. Recent studies also show that a significant segment of the 
electorate that is disappointed in Fidesz do not support the left, but are opting for the 
radical right party Jobbik instead (Győri 2015: 14). 
The figure below shows the share of blue-collar respondents among the radical 
right parties’ supporters in comparison to the growth in the electoral share of the radical 




Figure 5. The Share of Blue-Collar Workers in the Radical Right MIEP/ Jobbik Vote and the Vote for the Radical Right 
parties, Medián Opinion and Market Research Ltd Omnibus Polls, Hungary, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 
 
In other words, the political dealignment in Hungary’s politics opened up a 
political space for the radical right party Jobbik to reach out to the constituencies of the 
former MSZP.   
 
 
The Left and Labor Policies 
The success of the radical right parties may also be explained by the fact that they 
offer new possibilities of political expression and mobilization and substitute the 
patronizing function for the social groups previously catered by socialist or communist 
parties (Perrineau 1997; Oesch 2008). Therefore, the weakening of trade unions, which 
traditionally served as networks intended to integrate workers into the left-wing support 
base, might have given an extra boost to the popularity of the radical right parties among 
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theorized to make workers subject to political alienation and more attracted to new 
channels of political expression and mobilization offered by the radical right that 
substitutes the function traditionally implemented by the left parties ( Perrineau 1997; 
Oesch 2008).  
However, the conditions of the post-Communist countries make one skeptical 
about how applicable the unions’ explanation may be in this context. Here, the alliances 
between political parties and trade unions have traditionally been weaker than in western 
European countries (with the possible exception of Poland) because the Communist rulers 
manipulated trade unions and replaced them with fictitious structures. Eventually, like 
most other quasi-independent Communist institutions, the unions only existed to conduct 
pro-Communist policies—often at the expense of the workers. 
In post-Communist Europe, the unions’ historical weakness made them of little 
importance to the workers and politics in general. The left parties predominantly failed to 
lead the radical workers’ protests and for the most part, mass left organizations did not 
emerge in the post-Communist countries. Most trade unions avoided structured political 
alliances except for several alliances with more moderate forces, such as the social 
democratic successor parties of Poland and Hungary.  
Hungary is a canonical case for illustrating the trade union situation in the post-
Communist world. As shown by Andras Toth (1994: 88), during the Communist period 
the unions were transformed into subordinate dummy organizations of the Communist 
dictatorship. Their goal was to serve as a “transmission belt”, conveying central economic 
policy from the decision-making Communist bodies to workers. This detached the unions 
from their original social functions—collective bargaining and social rights protection. 
As result, the interests of Hungarian trade unions and workers diverged. Toth (1994) 
speaks of a double history of the official trade-union hierarchy on the one hand, and a 
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separate history of workers’ attempts to defend their own rights outside the trade unions 
on the other. As a result, the unions have not played a particularly influential role in 
Hungarian politics. Hungary’s fragmented union structure with “partial links with 
political parties” led to partial successes but mostly failures in enacting pro-labor policy 
(Avdagic 2005; Sil 2017).  
The independent anti-communist Hungarian unions (particularly LIGA and 
MOSZ) have never been particularly strong. However, some ties between the unions and 
political parties developed, as described by Avdagic (2005). MOSZ established links with 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and its chairman entered the first parliament on 
the MDF ticket (Bruszt 1995). LIGA developed strong informal links to the Alliance of 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ). MSZOSZ, one of the descendants of the old official union 
center SZOT, established a formal alliance based on the common “leftist values” with the 
Socialist Party (MSZP) (Rácz 1993: 662). 
In the first years of transition, unions often signed tripartite agreements mostly 
limited to the income policy.  Matthes (2004) argues that Hungarian unions have played 
a crucial part in the pension reforms. When MSZP won the 1994 elections, the president 
of MSZOSZ, Sándor Nagy, ran second on the Socialist party list. The new MSZP-led 
government started negotiations on broader social pact, which were soon abandoned. 
Because of the worsening economic situation and government conflicts, MSZP turned its 
back on the union and initiated a harsh austerity Bokros package, while Sándor Nagy 
resigned from his union post. This general trend continued under the subsequent right-
wing governments. 
The weakened and divided unions were little obstacle to the Fidesz government, 
which often portrayed unions as a “Bolshevik travesty”, drastically reduced the role of 
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the tripartite council, and excluded the unions from the most important areas of economic 
policy-making.  
The situation has persisted into the present; Hungarian unions have little impact 
on the policy-making. In interviews, workers named Jobbik, as the only party which put 
trade unions’ rights in its program, promised to remove the trade union leaders who 
aligned with corrupt politicians and make the unions completely politically independent 
and only fight for workers’ rights (Eszter-Tóth 2015). However, in a private conversation 
with me, Jobbik’s Márton Gyöngyösi argued that trade unions played a zero role in 
Jobbik’s ability to attract working class constituencies in the unemployed regions of 
Hungary back in the 2010 in 2014 election. While more recently, Jobbik attempted to 
attract support of smaller trade unions (such as teachers’ unions), this approach played a 




In this subsection I complement the above qualitative analysis of Hungary’s 
parties’ historical trajectory with the individual-level observational data. On the individual 
level over the span of 20 years, I look at the odds of the blue-collar workers supporting 
the left MSZP and the right Fidesz and Jobbik parties in Hungary. I show that in line with 
the original expectations, the support of blue-collar respondents’ decreases for the center 
left MSZP and increases for the populist and radical right parties.  
As my theoretical argument postulates, in light of the shifting political allegiances 
of the working-class voters, one shall expect their support for the populist and radical 
right to increase over time, at the expense of the left parties. Therefore, my basic 
expectation is that: 
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• Hypothesis I:  In Hungary, after 1994 (period of the austerity reforms 
implementation) the working-class status has been decreasingly associated to the 
support for the center-left MSZP. 
• Hypothesis II: In Hungary, the working-class status over the years has been 




One important reservation has to address the timing of the expected party 
realignment.  
Historically, in Western countries, working-class voters tended to be embedded in 
networks of trade unions and pro-labor structures, held pro-redistribution preferences and 
were attached to the traditional left parties. However, in the case of the post-Communist 
countries, the blue-collar workers’ preference for the post-Communist parties was less 
obvious. In the aftermath of the democratic transitions, such social groups might have 
chosen to abandon these parties in light of their authoritarian legacy. 
Hence, before proceeding to the next section, I have to show that the working-
class voters were more likely to embrace MSZP at some point during the analyzed time 
span. To prove this point, I first provide some evidence available in the literature, and then 
confirm it with my own analysis using the Median omnibus surveys. 
The available scholarly research suggests that at the start of the reforms back in 
the early 1990s, MSZP strongly enjoyed the support of blue-collar workers, particularly 
the non-agricultural manual workers (Toka 1999: 176). Using the Median exit-poll data, 
Szelenyi, Fodor and Hanley (1997: 216) showed that in the 1994 Hungarian election the 
representation of the blue-collar and agricultural workers in the MSZP vote increased 
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substantively and these groups became the main support base of MSZP. The blue-collar 
respondents were significantly more likely to vote for MSZP than professionals or white-
collar workers.  
Hence, the erosion of the working-class support for the Hungarian left did not start 
until the mid-1990s, and gradually continued until a dramatic collapse in the popularity 
of MSZP in late 2000s. By early 2000s, MSZP preserved about 80% of its previous voters, 
despite the harsh economic reforms; about 70% of the party members approved and 
supported the reform policies pursued by the party, and only about 13% favored returning 
to a more welfarist course (Markus 1999; Curry 2003; Morlang 2003). Some scholars 
explain MSZP’s impressive electoral performance by emphasizing the fact that its voters 
put the blame on its liberal coalition partner, SZDSZ, whose vote fell from about 20% 
before to about 7% after the reforms (Morlang 2003); others explain MSZP’s success with 
the lack of serious leftist competitors due to the political system’s two-party tendencies.  
Yet by the mid-2000s, the realignment processes became more apparent. In the 
study of reported voting in the 2006–2009 Hungarian election, Knutsen (2013) discovered 
that Fidesz had the strongest support among workers and the petty-bourgeoisie and the 
weakest support among managers, while MSZP had the strongest following primarily 
among managers and middle-class professionals. 
The overall review suggests that the realignment processes did in fact occur in 
Hungary in the observed period, with the working-class workers increasingly shifting 
away from the Hungarian center-left. In the below section I present my own analysis that 





The Shifting Allegiances of the Hungarian Working Class 
In my analysis, I focus on working class support patterns for the Hungarian left 
and right parties. My theoretical expectations go in line with the party realignment 
hypothesis outlined above. I argue that in Hungary the working-class constituencies are 
increasingly less likely to vote for the center-left MSZP party and increasingly more likely 
to embrace the populist and radical right Fidesz and Jobbik parties. 
To test this hypothesis, I use the data collected in the years 1994–2014 by the 
Medián Opinion and Market Research Ltd, a major, well-respected Hungarian polling 
company. Median’s monthly omnibus-type opinion polls (representative survey for the 
population 18+, sample size: 1,200 individuals) control for basic party preference 
questions.  Not all surveys were available for each month, so depending on their 
availability, I used 7–12 surveys per each electoral year in Hungary (1994/5, 1998, 2002, 
2006, 2010, 2014) coding all variables identically in each case.9 
To see whether the assumption was correct, I looked at the differences in party 
support between Hungary’s blue- and white-collar respondents. The below graph 
illustrates the differences in support between blue- and white- collar supporters for 
Hungary’s center left MSZP, center right Fidesz and radical right Jobbik respectively 
(Figure 6). 
 
                                                          
9 Belonging to the worker-class category was coded based on the variable ‘fogl’ (‘the occupation of the 
respondent’), a categorical variable consisting of eight categories (‘top leader’, ‘middle management’, 
‘public intellectual’, ‘other intellectual, ‘foreman, technician’, ‘workman’, ‘other physical’, ‘other’). I 
recorded the ‘fogl’ variable as a dummy variable, taking a value of ‘1’ when for one of the following 




Figure 6. The Differences in Support Between Hungary’s Blue- and White-Collar Respondents for the Center Left 
MSZP, Center Right Fidesz and Radical Right MIÉP/ Jobbik Parties, Medián Opinion and Market Research Ltd 
Omnibus Polls, Hungary, 1995/6, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 
 
The above graph confirms the main theoretical expectation and both my 
hypotheses. Over time, working-class support becomes increasingly associated with the 
right parties (both populist Fidesz and radical right Jobbik) (H1). By contrast, one also 
notices an increasing negative association between the working-class status and the 
probability of supporting the center-left MSZP (H2). Very importantly, the change in the 
working-class preference for MSZP happens between the years 1994–1998, i.e. precisely 
during the period of the implementation of the radical austerity reforms (the Bokros 
package) by MSZP. It continues further following another round of austerity implemented 
in 2006-09.  
This finding goes directly in line with my theoretical argument that the switch in 






















In this chapter, I have applied the key core elements of my theoretical argument to 
the Hungarian case study. 
I have shown that the adoption of pro-market economic policy switch (as 
instrumented by the implementation of the austerity packages in 1996 and 2006 by the 
ex-Communist left MSZP opened up an opportunity for the right parties (Fidesz and 
Jobbik) in Hungary to challenge the left from a more redistributionist economic agenda 
and to appeal to reform losers. This launched the process of political realignment, which 
led to the blue-collar workers becoming the main constituency of the right (populist and 
radical) Hungarian parties, while the working class has increasingly abandoned the 
Hungarian center-left parties. Over time, this ensured the consistent electoral success of 
Hungary’s radical right Jobbik party. 
I have also traced this dynamic on the individual-level data in Hungary by showing 
how over time Hungary’s working-class support became decreasingly associated with the 
center-left party MSZP while increasingly associated to the right parties. I have 
specifically demonstrated that, in line with the argument, the change in the working-class 
occurred during the periods of implementation of austerity packages by the center-left 
MSZP party (the 1994–1998 and 2006–09 respectively).  
Overall, the analysis in this section goes in line with my general theoretical 
argument. To extend the external validity of my argument, I repeat this analysis on a set 
of other Visegrád Group cases— the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia—in the next 
chapter of this dissertation. Again, I will focus on the economic policy choices made by 
the left parties to trace how those choices influenced the electoral fortunes of the populist 
and radical right parties in each respective country. In the cases of Czech Republic and 
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Poland, I complement this analysis with the individual-level data analysis of blue-collar 
voters’ support for the left and right parties analogous to the one used in this chapter. 
In addition, the above analysis does not allow me to address the causality problem 
in a rigorous fashion. Hence, in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I will focus 
on the causality problem and will use a number of alternative methodological approaches 
(constituency-level and experimental analysis) to establish the direction of the causal link 





Chapter 5. Cross-Country and Case Study Analyses 
In the above chapter, I illustrated my theory using the example of Hungary. I have 
shown how the policy choices of the ex-Communist Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP, 
determined the successes of the populist and radical right parties in this country. 
Specifically, I have demonstrated that the implementation of the pro-market reforms and 
the austerity package by the MSZP pushed the blue-collar constituencies away from the 
left party and that these constituencies were later incorporated by the populist (Fidesz) 
and radical right (Jobbik) parties. I combined the qualitative analysis with the individual-
level survey data to illustrate the dynamics of this movement in Hungary over the last two 
decades. 
To extend the external validity of my theory, in this chapter I expand the above 
analysis to a larger set of Central and Eastern European countries. I test my argument 
using the analysis of observational and individual data. 
First, on the cross-country level, I examine the relationship between the dynamics 
of the blue-collar support for the center-left and the radical right parties on the European 
Social Survey data for the available samples of Central and Eastern European countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The 
analysis follows the framework that Arzheimer (2013) applied to western European 
polities. By exclusively limiting the analysis to respondents employed in unskilled and 
semi-skilled manual occupation, I look at the determinants of their vote for either an ex-
Communist left party (0) or a radical right party (1) in the respective years of observations. 
Among the explanatory factors, I include the left parties’ position on economic policy and 
immigration policy (which reflects the assumption on parties’ competition along the 
cultural and economic axes, as discussed in chapter 1). 
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Second, I provide an overview of the experiences of the three other countries that 
together with Hungary constitute the Visegrád Group—the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia. The approach in this section largely follows the analysis for the Hungarian case 
in chapter 4. I look at the ex-Communist party’s economic policy choices in each country 
case and the impact of those choices on the subsequent electoral fortunes of the radical 
and populist right parties. I also complement this approach with the individual-level 
analysis on the Comparative Study of the Electoral System dataset by tracing the 
dynamics of blue collar respondents’ support for the center-left and the populist and 
radical right parties in the Czech and Polish cases (the Slovak data was not available) over 
time. 
Overall, the findings in this chapter are consistent with my general theoretical 
argument. In line with my expectations, the quantitative analysis confirms that the blue-
collar constituencies switched their support from the ex-Communist left to the radical 
right parties over the decade and that this trend is correlated with the ex-Communist left 
parties’ pro-market economic policy positions. The qualitative analysis demonstrates that 
the left parties in the post-Communist setting tended to alter their positions on the 
economic dimension and move to the center of the economic axis, which later helped the 
radical right parties to attract new supporters by promoting a redistributionist paternalistic 




In Chapter 1, I argued that blue-collar respondents (the traditional constituencies 
of the ex-Communist left parties) are more likely to switch to embrace the radical right 
parties as result of the programmatic shift of the left parties. I have illustrated this 
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argument on the example of Hungary by tracing how specific policy choices of the ex-
Communist left MSZP party provided a political opening for the populist and radical right 
parties to attract those constituencies.  
In this chapter, I test this argument using the European Social Survey (ESS) data 
through a quantitative cross-country analysis. While cross-country analysis has its fair 
share of limitations (see Chapter 3), it provides a great opportunity to test the external 
validity of my theory and its ability to explain the success of the radical right parties in 
countries beyond Hungary. Below, I present the main hypotheses and discuss my 
empirical findings in more details.  
In light of my theoretical expectations, I make the following empirical predictions: 
(1) Hypothesis I: There is an exodus of the working-class respondents from the 
center left parties towards the radical right parties over time. 
(2) Hypothesis II: The chosen positions of the center left parties on the economic 
policies play a significant role in this trend: the more pro-market the left party 
is, the more likely it is that the working-class respondents will switch to 
support the radical right parties. 
Arzheimer (2013) uses the Eurobarometer data collected between 1980–2002 to 
demonstrate comparatively and longitudinally that the Western European radical right 
electorates underwent a process of proletarization between 1980 and the early 2000s.  
Below, I ran a simple baseline Arzheimer’s (2013) model, applying his framework 
to a set data of Central and Eastern European countries. In this model, I use the data from 
the eight rounds of the European Social Survey by limiting the sample to semi-skilled and 
unskilled manual occupation respondents only (using the ISCO08 data) who voted for 
either an ex-Communist left party (0) or a radical right party (1) in the respective years of 
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observations. Instead of the multi-level model, I have used a standard probit model with 
clustered errors. While both approaches address the same problem - the correlation of 
residuals within a cluster, the latter approach does not account for possible random effects. 
 
Country 
Working Class Vote for the Radical Right vs ex-Communist Left, % 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
BG   15.67 15.75 19.83 4.00   
CZ 0 0  0 0 0 7.35 7.56 
HU 1.63 0.90 2.07 1.35 41.78 28.93 50.30  
PL 7.76 15.15 88.43 84.16 81.45 88.41 88.15  
RO    5.96     
SI 5.83 21.65 11.86 16.31 12.20 11.54 0 0 
SK  0 0 0 7.47 0   
Table 4. The Working-Class Respondents and Voting for the ex-Communist Left vs Radical Right Parties over Time. 
Proportions of Blue Collar Votes Received by a Given Radical Right Party in Each Respective Wave. European 
Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Selected Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
The above table shows the proportions of blue collar votes received by a given 
radical right party in each respective wave of the European Social Survey. The dependent 
variable was recoded based on the question, which asked “Which party voted in the last 
election.” The following responses were coded as “1”: “Attack,” “Usvit,” “Jobbik,” “Law 
and Justice,” “The Greater Romania Party,” “Slovenian National Party,” and “Slovak 
National Party.” The following responses were coded as “0”: “Bulgarian Socialist Party,” 
“Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia,” “Hungarian Socialist Party,” “Democratic 
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Left Alliance,” “Social Democratic Party,” “Liberal Democracy of Slovenia,” and 
“Direction – Social Democracy.” 
As the data in the Table 4 shows, the support for the radical right parties is not 
equally distributed across different years. For example, there are few observations for 
such countries, as the Czech Republic or Slovakia. 
I then proceed to using the model to measure this data. Since my dependent 
variable “party” is a binary variable (with “1” indicating the blue-collar vote for the 
radical right and a “0” a blue-collar vote for the ex-Communist left), I used the regular 
probit model with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. The model also 
included a single socio-demographic control (gender) to account for the fact that male 
respondents tend to be more likely to support the radical right parties and a linear time 
trend with two-year lags between the respective ESS rounds (“trends”) to account for the 
time effects of the eight rounds of the ESS. For my two hypotheses of interest, my key 
independent variables included (1) the time trend designed to test the over-time 
relationship between the blue-collar vote for the left and radical right parties; (2) the left 
parties’ positions on the economic policy dimension. 
For the latter parameters, I merged the ESS data with the Chapel Hill dataset and 
introduced the variables measuring the ex-Communist left parties’ positions on the 
economy and the immigration policy. These specific party policy positions were included 
in the model in line with the theoretical assumptions about party competition on two axes 
(cultural and economic) discussed in Chapter 1. In this analysis, the party position on the 
economic policy reflects the competition on the economic scale, and the immigration 
policy position reflects the party competition on the cultural scale respectively. I used the 
lagged Chapel Hill data assigning to each ESS observation a respective CHES value from 
a previous electoral round. The following variables were included: 
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- Immigrate_Policy—is a variable that reflects a given party’s position on immigration 
policy with a “0” reflecting a strong opposition to a tough immigration policy, and a 
“10” —being in favor of a restrictive immigration policy. 
- Spending—is a categorical variable that reflects a given party’s on improving public 
services vs. reducing taxes with a “0” reflecting a strong support for improving public 
services, and a “10”—strongly favoring tax reduction. 
- Deregulation—is a categorical variable that reflects a given party’s position on 
deregulation with a “0” reflecting a strong opposition to market deregulation, and a 
“10” —strongly supporting the deregulation of markets. 
- Redistribution—is a categorical variable that reflects a given party’s position on 
redistribution with a “0” reflecting a strong support for redistribution, and a “10” —
strongly opposing redistribution. 
Additional controls from the World Bank data included the country-level unemployment 
rates, annual GDP growth rates, and a share of the asylum requests per year (adjusted for 
the size of a country’s population) to reflect the refugee influx into a given country. 
All variables were standardized to account for their different scale. The results of 
the analysis (marginal probit for easier interpretation) are presented in the below tables. 
Each respective table contains the estimates for three different positions of the left parties 
on the economic scale (increased spending vs reduced taxation, decreased vs increased 
deregulation, and supporting vs opposing redistribution).  
The results of the analysis for the left parties’ position on increased redistribution 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trend 0.025*** 0.023 T 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.021** 
 (3.73) (1.88) (2.66) (3.07) (2.42) 
Male 0.036 0.0425** 0.042** 0.040** 0.039 T 
 (1.27) (1.99) (2.01) (1.97) (1.85) 
Left: strongly favors  0.097T 0.072 0.183** 0.136*** 
reducing taxes (Y-1)  (1.90) (1.57) (2.14) (2.82) 
BG 0.144*** 0.098*** 0.054T 0.159 T 0.347*** 
 (5.33) (3.47) (1.68) (1.92) (3.43) 
CZ -0.100*** 0.087 -0.030 0.370 0.145 
 (-2.59) (0.84) (-0.29) (1.23) (1.15) 
HU 0.149*** 0.099** 0.092** 0.037 0.211*** 
 (5.60) (2.22) (2.26) (0.74) (4.95) 
PL 0.412*** 0.443*** 0.450*** 0.225 T 0.237 T 
 (20.10) (21.94) (4.16) (1.87) (1.82) 
SI 0.172*** 0.162*** 0.074 0.334 T 0.218 T 
 (6.55) (3.20) (1.04) (1.68) (1.87) 
Unemployment (Y-1)   -0.051 0.010 -0.025 
   (-1.34) (0.15) (-0.49) 
Growth (Y-1)   -0.014 0.048 0.107* 
   (-0.36) (1.46) (1.66) 
Left: Favors tough policy on     -0.080  
immigration (Y-1)    (-1.49)  
Asylum Requests (Y-1)     -0.115*** 
     (-5.03) 
N 7815 4860 4860 4860 4860 
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class Respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on Spending vs 
Taxation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. Chapel Hill 
Dataset. Probit Model with Clustered Standard Errors, Marginal Effects. 
 
 
The below Table 6 presents the results of the analysis results of the analysis for 















 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Trend 0.011 0.016 T 0.013 0.020** 
 (1.55) (1.94) (1.51) (2.14) 
Male 0.041 T 0.040T 0.040** 0.038 T 
 (1.94) (1.92) (1.96) (1.84) 
Left: strongly supports 0.045** 0.043T 0.068** -0.017 
deregulation of markets (Y-1) (2.22) (1.85) (2.22) (-0.64) 
BG 0.103*** 0.069 T 0.066** 0.249*** 
 (4.21) (1.77) (2.03) (2.98) 
CZ 0.012 -0.087** -0.149** -0.116** 
 (0.19) (-1.96) (-2.00) (-2.37) 
HU 0.177*** 0.146*** 0.134*** 0.295*** 
 (7.41) (10.25) (5.75) (6.73) 
PL 0.385*** 0.313 0.151 0.628*** 
 (16.33) (1.50) (0.61) (3.03) 
SI 0.133*** 0.071 0.083 -0.020 
 (4.39) (1.06) (1.43) (-0.24) 
Unemployment (Y-1)  -0.054 T -0.047 -0.086** 
  (-1.69) (-1.57) (-2.20) 
Growth (Y-1)  0.016 0.081 -0.044 
  (0.23) (0.95) (-0.61) 
Left: Favors tough policy   0.039  
on immigration (Y-1)   (1.39)  
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.100*** 
    (-5.45) 
N 4860 4860 4860 4860 
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 6. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on Deregulation 
Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. Chapel Hill Dataset. 




Ultimately, the Table 7 below presents the results of the analysis results of the 




 (10) (11) (12) (13)    
Trend 0.012 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (1.32) (3.55) (3.10) (3.15)    
Male 0.041** 0.040** 0.040** 0.038*   
 (1.97) (1.97) (1.98) (1.87)    
Left: strongly opposes 0.014T 0.009 0.003 -0.062*** 
redistribution (Y-1) (1.65) (1.47) (0.08) (-8.86)    
BG 0.112*** 0.0297 0.0318 0.300*** 
 (5.57) (0.63) (0.64) (5.11)    
CZ -0.043 -0.146*** -0.128 -0.122**  
 (-1.38) (-3.25) (-0.91) (-2.05)    
HU 0.183*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.332*** 
 (8.26) (11.71) (7.08) (10.08)    
PL 0.424*** 0.532*** 0.575* 0.908*** 
 (15.42) (4.20) (1.79) (9.24)    
SI 0.112*** -0.0164 -0.016 -0.075    
 (5.72) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-1.10)    
Unemployment (Y-1)  -0.080 T -0.079 T -0.089**  
  (-1.76) (-1.73) (-2.12)    
Growth (Y-1)  -0.054 -0.070 -0.111*** 
  (-1.05) (-0.58) (-2.75)    
Left: Favors tough policy   -0.009                 
on immigration (Y-1)   (-0.15)                 
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.136*** 
    (-10.56)    
N 4860 4860 4860 4860    
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 7. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on Redistribution 
Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. Chapel Hill Dataset. 
Probit Model with Clustered Standard Errors, Marginal Effects. 
 
 
The results in Tables 5-7 generally follow my initial expectations. First, the 
coefficient to the time trend variable shows that the odds of a radical right vote have risen 
substantively over the years. For example, from a simple baseline model (1), taking the 
estimates at face value a one-unit change in the trend (a two-year shift) increases the 
probability of a working-class respondent voting for the radical right by 0.025. The results 
for the time trend variable are generally robust to alternative model specifications and 
inclusion of additional variables, although the significance of the coefficient tends to 
depend on the inclusion of additional control variables in the model (see models (1)–(13) 
above). Overall, these findings suggest that the ex-Communist left parties are losing 
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support among the working-class respondents in favor of the radical right parties. This 
confirms the main theoretical expectation that the blue-collar constituencies in the post-
Communist region tend to behave in a pattern that their counterparts follow in the western 
European countries as well—they abandon the center left parties in favor of the radical 
right. In other words, these findings go in line with the realignment Hypothesis I. 
The share of refugee asylum applications per country is negatively correlated with 
the radical right vote in all models (5), (9), and (13), which is somewhat counter-intuitive, 
but suggests that the immigration issue has been less important for the Central and Eastern 
European region (as discussed in Chapter 1). The unemployment rate tends to be 
negatively correlated with the working class radical right support, which again goes 
against the expectations. The coefficient to the economic growth rates is not robust to 
alternative model specifications. The coefficient to the center-left parties’ positions in the 
immigration policy is not statistically significant in different specifications of my model 
Finally, the results of the analysis also generally confirm the expectations for the 
economic positions of the left parties. In particular, the coefficients of the left parties’ 
policy positions on spending and deregulation in the model are positive and statistically 
significant in most specifications of my model (Tables 5 and 6), which suggests that a 
more pro-market position chosen by a given ex-Communist left party increases the 
probability of the working-class vote for the radical right party. For example, according 
to the model (5), a one-unit change in the left parties’ position on the spending policy 
towards a stronger support for tax reduction (at the expense of improving public services) 
increases the probability of the working-class vote for the radical right parties by 0.136. 
Similarly, according to the model (8), a one-unit change in the left parties’ position on the 
deregulation policy towards a stronger support for deregulation increases the probability 
of the working-class support for the radical right parties by 0.068. However, the findings 
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are not as supportive for the last left parties’ economic policy position (Table 7). While 
the coefficient to the left parties’ position on redistribution policy in positive in most 
model specifications (models (10)-(12)), it is not significant and turns negative in the last 
model (13). While the results for the redistribution variable are not robust regarding the 
inclusion of additional controls, overall these findings confirm Hypothesis II. 
When it comes to the country fixed effects, in most model specifications one 
notices a negative association between country fixed effects for the case of the Czech 
Republic and blue-collar voting for the radical right (as opposed to Slovakia chosen as a 
baseline category). This goes in line with my earlier finding regarding the preservation of 
the traditional alignments for the Czech case: I find a consistent and stable association 
between a working-class status and voting for the (ex-Communist) left parties over time. 
By contrast, I also find a strong positive association between country fixed effects for the 
case of Hungary and Poland and blue-collar voting for the radical right (as opposed to 
Slovakia chosen as a baseline category). 
Overall, the above results confirm my theoretical expectations. I show that the 
exodus of the voters from the left parties to the right is a cross-country phenomenon in 
Central and Eastern European countries, and that the chosen positions of the ex-
Communist left parties on the economic scale play a role in this process. My findings 
about the policy positions of the left parties hold even when variables related to 
immigration are introduced. 
One possible limitation of this study may be the fact that the trend variable absorbs 
some of the variation in my dependent variable. Since the realignment process happens 
over time, the “trend” variable may be consuming some of the effect of the voting for the 
radical right parties. To account for this possibility, I run the identical model excluding 
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the “trend” variable and substituting it with year fixed effects; the results of the analysis 
are presented below (Tables 8-10). 
The below Table 8 presents the results of the analysis results of the analysis for 
the left parties’ position on increased redistribution vs reduced taxation issue. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Male 0.042** 0.042** 0.041** 0.040** 0.039 T 
 (2.01) (2.05) (2.05) (2.01) (1.88) 
Left: strongly favors   0.047 0.045 0.152** 0.109*** 
reducing taxes (Y-1)  (0.70) (0.79) (2.00) (3.37) 
BG 0.131*** 0.107*** 0.086T 0.163 0.356** 
 (5.20) (3.76) (1.80) (1.60) (2.04) 
CZ -0.0778** -0.00379 -0.0580 0.294 0.112 
 (-2.02) (-0.03) (-0.53) (1.05) (1.10) 
HU 0.144*** 0.124** 0.109** 0.051 0.232*** 
 (6.09) (2.21) (2.05) (1.05) (2.63) 
PL 0.407*** 0.431*** 0.392*** 0.220 0.228 
 (23.37) (22.88) (4.03) (1.35) (1.19) 
SI 0.169*** 0.125** 0.0885 0.307 0.206* 
 (7.85) (2.38) (1.27) (1.54) (1.65) 
Unemployment (Y-1)   -0.032 0.017 -0.025 
   (-0.79) (0.22) (-0.48) 
Growth (Y-1)   0.008 0.053 0.110 
   (0.22) (0.95) (1.11) 
Left: Favors tough policy     -0.0671  
on immigration (Y-1)    (-1.35)  
Asylum Requests (Y-1)     -0.114** 
     (-2.57) 
2002 -0.373***     
 (-6.50)     
2004 -0.317***     
 (-4.09)     
2006 -0.127**     
 (-2.06)     
2008 -0.130** -0.147** -0.161*** -0.173*** -0.117 




-0.0932* -0.100** -0.118** -0.0505 
 (-2.70) (-1.84) (-2.01) (-2.13) (-0.55) 
2012 -0.128** -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.106*** -0.0500 
 (-2.52) (-2.92) (-3.09) (-2.65) (-0.92) 
N 7815 4860 4860 4860 4860 
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 8. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on Spending vs 
Taxation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 





The below Table 9 presents the results of the analysis results of the analysis for 
the left parties’ position on increased deregulation issue. 
 
 (6) (7) (8) (9)    
Male 0.041** 0.040* 0.041** 0.038 T   
 (1.98) (1.95) (2.00) (1.88)    
Left: strongly supports  0.034*** 0.054** 0.086*** 0.004    
deregulation of markets (Y-1) (2.70) (2.03) (4.85) (0.23)    
BG 0.107*** 0.168 0.183 T 0.290    
 (4.32) (1.55) (1.85) (1.58)    
CZ -0.021 -0.052 -0.099 -0.083  
 (-0.43) (-0.62) (-0.90) (-1.36)    
HU 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.146*** 0.276*** 
 (6.22) (4.80) (3.59) (3.06)    
PL 0.389*** 0.011 -0.215 0.345    
 (21.77) (0.03) (-1.23) (1.24)    
SI 0.119*** 0.206 0.247 T 0.090 
 (4.14) (1.26) (1.76) (0.62)    
Unemployment (Y-1)  0.0112 0.027 -0.041 
  (0.15) (0.38) (-0.70)    
Growth (Y-1)  0.132 0.223*** 0.0523    
  (1.05) (3.23) (0.42)    
Left: Favors tough policy    0.042                 
on immigration (Y-1)   (1.58)                 
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.086**  
    (-2.09)    
2008 -0.106** -0.072 -0.039 -0.093    
 (-2.54) (-0.77) (-0.56) (-0.89)    
2010 -0.055 -0.022 0.004 -0.024   
 (-1.33) (-0.25) (0.06) (-0.23)    
2012 -0.103** -0.103** -0.094** -0.070    
 (-2.42) (-2.50) (-2.29) (-1.30)    
N 4860 4860 4860 4860    
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 9. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Deregulation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia. Chapel Hill Dataset. Probit Model with Clustered  Standard Errors, Marginal Effects. Trend 
Variable Excluded. 
 
Ultimately, the Table 10 below presents the results of the analysis results of the 






 (10) (11) (12) (13)    
Male 0.041** 0.040** 0.040** 0.038 T   
 (2.04) (2.01) (2.02) (1.90)    
Left: strongly opposes 0.012 0.029 0.044 -0.055**  
redistribution (Y-1) (0.70) (0.92) (1.33) (-2.45)    
BG 0.114*** 0.132 0.144 0.308**  
 (5.44) (1.12) (1.21) (2.05)    
CZ -0.0645 T -0.107 -0.135 -0.112 T   
 (-1.70) (-1.58) (-1.34) (-1.73)    
HU 0.166*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.333*** 
 (7.44) (5.00) (4.98) (4.13)    
PL 0.412*** 0.171 0.034 0.844*** 
 (11.36) (0.42) (0.08) (2.73)    
SI 0.102*** 0.127 0.149 -0.065    
 (4.69) (0.72) (0.85) (-0.49)    
Unemployment (Y-1)  -0.017 -0.011 -0.093 T   
  (-0.23) (-0.15) (-1.83)    
Growth (Y-1)  0.0770 0.128 -0.0915    
  (0.52) (0.86) (-0.76)    
Left: Favors tough policy    0.018                 
on immigration (Y-1)   (0.59)                 
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.138*** 
    (-3.53)    
2008 -0.117*** -0.108 -0.092 -0.141    
 (-2.81) (-1.26) (-1.23) (-1.57)    
2010 -0.0636 T -0.0479 -0.0334 -0.060    
 (-1.75) (-0.53) (-0.40) (-0.61)    
2012 -0.122*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.041   
 (-2.61) (-3.24) (-3.32) (-0.70)    
N 4860 4860 4860 4860    
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 10. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Redistribution Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 





As the above table suggests, the results remain largely similar. Yet again, I find a 
consistent positive association between the indicators of the left parties’ pro-market 
economic policy positions and blue-collar voters’ shift to the radical right parties, except 
for the left parties’ position on the redistribution policy. The signs and significance of the 
coefficients stay largely the same. This confirms the robustness of my results.  
Overall the above analysis goes in line with my theoretical expectations. The 
analysis demonstrates the process that Arzheimer (2013) calls the “proletarization of the 
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radical right” (a trend in which the radical right electorates that used to be heterogeneous 
become more working class-dominated constituencies). This process is not unique to 
Hungary, but rather represents a common trend in (both Eastern and Western) European 
countries and stems from the twin process of de-alignment and social change, in which 
the working-class groups stop affiliating as strongly with the traditional left parties and 
increasingly become more available for other parties. In response, the radical right in 
different countries has modified its programmatic appeal considerably, thereby becoming 
more palatable for members of the working class (Snegovaya 2018). I provide more 
evidence to support these claims in Chapter 7, where I use experimental survey data to 
show that the use of the protectionist economic platform by the radical right party brings 
it more support from the blue-collar constituencies if the left parties adopt pro-market 
economic policies. In the below sections of this chapter I trace how this process unraveled 
on case studies of three other Visegrád countries—the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia. 
One possible limitation of my analysis is the choice of the statistical model - 
instead of the multi-level model used in the original analysis by Arzhimer (2013), I have 
used a standard probit model with clustered errors. Since the latter does not account for 
possible random effects, future analysis could apply the multi-level model approach to 
the question of interest. 
Another possible limitation is that as the previous chapters stipulated, along with 
the radical right parties my theoretical argument is generally also applicable to the 
electoral success of the populist parties. Therefore, in order to check the robustness of my 
findings, I also have recorded the dependent variable to account for the blue-collar 
respondents who voted for the populist right Fidesz in Hungary. Then I repeated the above 
analysis. The results of the analysis with the modified dependent variable are provided in 
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the Appendix I. Overall, I find a positive association between the support for the 
populist/radical right parties and the left parties positions on the spending policy and 






While cross-country studies allow scholars to track the emergence of trends across 
a selected dataset and confirm the external validity of the theoretical argument, they fail 
to eliminate substantive variation present at the high level of aggregation. Therefore, the 
case study approach can complement the quantitative cross-country analysis by allowing 
a researcher to examine the data within a specific context and account for the variation 
unique to a particular country case. 
In the below sub-sections of this chapter, I focus on three Visegrád countries—the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia—that are more easily compared with each other 
than they are with other Central and Eastern European countries because of their historical 
experiences (see the introduction chapter for more details). I implement a qualitative case-
study analysis on secondary data in each of these countries by tracing the timing of the 
emergence of the socio-economic cleavage, the policy choices made by the ex-
Communist left parties at the beginning of the market transition, the party realignment 
process that followed those choices, and the subsequent emergence of the populist and 
radical right parties in these countries. 
I show that in the countries where the ex-Communist left parties implemented the 
market reforms, the blue-collar constituencies tended to switch to the right side of the 
political spectrum and eventually embraced the radical right parties. I use some 
individual-level quantitative evidence to back these findings from the Comparative Study 
of the Electoral System. Specifically, I compare the differences in support of blue- and 
white-collar respondents for the ex-Communist left and populist and radical right parties.  
While the case-studies allow me to address a number of limitations of the cross-
country comparative analysis, they also have a number of important limitations. 
Specifically, the characteristic intricacy in qualitative case studies make it difficult to 
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prove scientific thoroughness and difficult to validate the resulting findings (Baškarada 
2014). The subjectivity and preferences of researchers may bias the data selection. 
Therefore, I supplement the case-study analysis with more rigorous quantitative methods 




Historical Legacy and Transition Period 
The programmatic choices of Czech’s ex-Communist left were largely shaped by 
the party’s historical legacy during the Communist period. KSČM is a direct heir of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka Strana Ceskoslovenska - KSČ), 
which was Czechoslovakia’s ruling party between 1948 and 1989. Unlike Hungary, where 
the 1956 resulted in a victory of a pro-reformist wing, the 1968 revolution had a different 
impact on the Czech Communist party (KSČ). The reformist wing was heavily purged out 
of the Party apparatus, and those left among in the party were the most rigid, ossified, and 
resistant to programmatic change (Stolarik, 2016). This trend was further fostered by the 
Communist leadership. The respectability and career growth of high-ranking party 
functionaries depended on their activities during the 1968 Prague Spring; politicians that 
were complicit in the suppression of dissidents in 1968 had higher odds of being 
nominated for a seat in either legislative chamber (Rizova 2016: 152). As result, the Czech 
Communist party accumulated very rigid and anti-reform-oriented cadres and was not in 
a position to embark on democratic reforms during the democratization period. 
After the transition, KSČM gradually supplemented Leninism with a more 
Marxist democratic left stance, but its image continued to carry some reflection of its past 
(Hanley 2001). The party leadership has even opted to keep the label “Communist” even 
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in the party name, unlike the majority of other ex-Communist parties in the region that 
have opted to change their names to “social democratic” (Lach et al. 2010); KSČM has 
remained “the least social democratized and least organizationally like other European 
left parties” (Ishiyama 2006). One explanation for KSČM’s ability to survive relatively 
unchanged after the Velvet Revolution is its ability to preserve for the most part its 
membership in comparison with other ex-Communist parties. The KSČM’s departing 
members did not attempt to create a specific secessionist party (unlike Hungary’s MSZP 
or KSČ Slovakian wing); and therefore, KSČM avoided early competition with a party of 
a European leftist type as it happened in Poland or Hungary (Lach et al. 2010: 368-369). 
Holubec (2015) lists several other reasons for the resilience of the KSČM communist 
identity: 1) its reform wing, which was purged after 1968, was relatively weak; 2) unlike 
the Baltic and Romanian Communist parties that were banned between 1989–1991, the 
legal existence of KSČM was relatively secure, so the party didn’t need to reinvent its 
identity; 3) given the strong anti-Communist public sentiment in the Czech Republic, 
KSČM was concerned that taking on a social-democratic identity would disrupt the 
existing support base without bringing a new one. KSČM’s inability to move closer to the 
political center was also a consequence of a boycott from the mainstream parties, which 
tried to punish KSČM for its Communist past. Every time KSČM was elected to the Czech 
National Parliament, other parties avoided forming coalitions and alliances with it, 
contributing to the preservation of its anti-establishment and ideologically conservative 
platform.  
The lack of governmental responsibility ended up helping KSČM; because KSČM 
had not participated in government for 20 years, it could claim the outsider status of the 
uniquely “clean” party in a corrupt political system (Lach et al. 2010: 369). This made 
KSČM largely a protest party, which was able to preserve relatively orthodox positions 
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on the economic issues and attracted the support of blue-collar workers, “globalization 
losers”, and those dissatisfied with the status quo. Lach et al (2010: 321) show that 
regional unemployment levels and crime rate were among the top predictors of KSČM 
vote. By the 2006 Czech Election Study, KSČM voters had the highest dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of democracy, highest distrust in the institutions, and prioritized 
crime reduction over civil liberties (Stegmaier and Vlachova 2009: 808–10).10 
Reflecting the party’s ideological rigidity, the KSČM platform consistently 
stressed some of the Marxist dogmas, for example, identifying capitalism as the main 
disease afflicting world’s population and offering to combine the Marxist collectivist 
goals with democratic objectives (Lach et al. 2010: 375). A particular sub-section of the 
party platform was devoted to creating new jobs, increasing social protection, fighting the 
unemployment and the unfavorable conditions of the young, disabled and elderly people. 
Interestingly, KSČM also addressed the cultural policy: it offered specific economic 
assistance to the Roma groups, and opposed the Czech accession into “the US- and 
Germany-dominated” NATO and the EU. In other words, KSČM largely used a platform 
combining redistributionist and national appeals (Lach et al. 2010: 376; KSČM Party 
Manifesto 2006, 2010, 2013). 
Another centrist left party in Czech Republic, ČSSD, was also able to maintain a 
traditional left platform and did not engage in the market transition reforms. ČSSD, which 
dates back to the period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, re-appeared after the Velvet 
Revolution in 1989 and remained one of the two largest political parties in the country. 
Initially, ČSSD assumed a party platform of a typical western European social democratic 
                                                          
10 Initially it was popular among the Czech commentators to assume that KSČM would perish in isolation 
after its voters died off. This argument was supported by the empirical data showing that KSČM voters 
were generally older. Yet the party’s electoral share proved remarkably stable over time and almost quarter 
a century later it ended up winning its second highest share of vote in 2013 election (Stolarik, 2016). In the 
2017 election the result dropped to 7.8% (but it was synchronized with the falling electoral fortunes of 
ČSSD, which got only 7.3% of votes. 
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party, supporting a mixed economy, strong welfare state, progressive taxation, and 
European integration. Since 1993, when ČSSD was headed by Milos Zeman, its left-wing 
orientation started to be more clearly pronounced. 
Since the Czech ex-Communist parties did not attempt to embark on a reforms 
trajectory, the center-right parties took on that endeavor. The right-wing alliance between 
the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) with the Christian Democratic Party (KDS) that won 
the majority of votes in 1992 launched privatization and European integration. These 
policies were continued when the alliance won the consecutive 1996 parliamentary 
election. The ČSSD criticized the specific form of transformation chosen by the right-
wing government and exploited the KSČM’s orthodox-communist background to position 
itself as the only acceptable party for the voters dissatisfied with the results of the 
economic transformation. The emerging division between the left and right reflecting the 
socioeconomic cleavage became the most important indicator of the positions of the 
individual parties around that time (Hlousek and Kopecek 2008: 10). 
In this sense, the traditional left-right parties’ alignment along the economic axis 
has been preserved in the Czech Republic. The formation of the socioeconomic cleavage 
took place around the 1992–96 elections during the reforms implementation period 
(Kitschelt et al. 1999: 226–231, 244–260; Hlousek and Kopecek 2008: 10), and its effects 
on voting in the Czech Republic have remained stable or increased slightly over time 
(Smith and Matějů 2011; Linek and Lyons 2013). The main policy issues concerning this 
division included wealth redistribution, state regulation, and public welfare (Linek 2015: 
4).  
Social class remained the primary cleavage, separating the left-wing parties (the 
traditional left KSČM and the center-left ČSSD) from the liberal and conservative right-
wing parties (ODS, ODA, US, TOP09). Linek (2015) finds a strong and consistent 
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association between belonging to a particular social group and party choice between 
1990–2013. The right-leaning ODS has consistently received high support among 
entrepreneurs (around 50%), higher and lower professionals, and gained lower support 
among the manual workers and the retired (below 20%). By contrast, the ČSSD support 
was the strongest among the manual workers (above 35%) and the retired. KSČM also 
retained a large share of blue-collar workers and the retired voters. In 1996 KSČM 
received 10% of all workers’ support (Grzymala-Busse 1996). In 1999 its membership 
structure included a disproportional share of blue-collar workers (14.2%) (Strmiska 2002), 
and in 2016 working class voters were overrepresented among KSČM voters (34.2%).11 
The Czech left parties’ collaboration with labor unions (Avdagic 2005) and their 
implementation of more pro-labor policies also explain their ability to retain higher 
support among the working class. While KSČM12 and ČSSD did not pursue a coalition, 
they collaborated with Bohemian-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) 
and frequently voted together on issues relevant to Czech labor (Sil 2017), which created 
a relatively more pro-labor climate in the Czech Republic than that in Hungary or Poland 
(Ost 1997; Orenstein 2000). On several occasions, ČSSD and KSČM independently lined 
up to the left, including during the period of the ČSSD-led government in 2002–06, when 
the Czech Labor Code was passed. Under Jiri Paroubek, who served as ČSSD Prime 
Minister in 2005–06, the ČSSD and KSČM jointly worked on revisions to the Labor Code 
and other issues (Sil 2017).  
Overall, the presence of a viable left party (or set of parties) that resisted the efforts 
to undercut the rights of trade unions and to reduce the social protection of workers that 
                                                          
11 Czech Median 2016 MML-TGI survey accumulates the data on 15,000 of Czech respondents per year. 
Data available upon request. 
12 KSČM preserved strong links to trade union activists; in 1992, 57% of KSČM supporters were drawn 
from union members, and in 1996, 38%. In 2000 about 20% of trade union members were supporters of 
the KSČM and 17% of ČSSD (11% and 22% in 2001 respectively). 
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came from the reformist right parties strengthened Czech workers’ support for the left (Sil, 
2017). 
Individual-Level Surveys 
For the Czech case, the data allows me to test this argument regarding the 
consistency of the alignments. As explained above, I expect the left-right political 
alignment to be largely maintained in the Czech case, and for blue-collar workers’ support 
for the left parties to remain strong over time. 
I used the data from the Comparative Study of the Electoral System (CSES) 
dataset available for the following years: 1996, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 201313 to test this 
hypothesis. The CSES dataset allows me to classify respondents as blue-collar workers 
based on their occupational status: “Main occupation: worker” (“D2011”). The variable, 
which I recoded as a dummy, takes a value of “1” for all of the physical work/ labor related 
occupations. 
The below figure maps the differences in party support between the Czech blue- 
and white-collar respondents. The below graph illustrates the differences in support across 
blue- and white- collar supporters for the Czech center left ČSSD and the old left KSČM 
parties respectively (Figure 7). 
 
 
                                                          
13http://www.cses.org/electionstudies.htm Unfortunately, CSES data is only available for the Hungarian 




Figure 7. The Differences in Support between Czech Blue- and White-Collar Respondents for the Center Left ČSSD 
and Old Left KSČM, CSES, 1996, 2002, 2006, and 2011. 
 
The findings seem to confirm my expectations: a voter’s blue-collar status is 
positively and consistently associated with their support for the Czech left parties over 
time. This finding goes in line with my theoretical expectations: the preservation of 
traditional party alignments is manifested through a consistent positive association 
between physical worker status and support for the left parties in the Czech Republic.  
Overall, in line with my theoretical expectations, in the case of the Czech Republic, 
the political alignments of the right and left have been preserved throughout time. 
Moreover, the Czech blue-collar voters still overwhelmingly support the left parties, 
unlike the blue-collar respondents in, say, Hungary or Poland. I illustrated this pattern by 
looking at the differences in support for the ex-Communist left parties between blue- and 



















The Polish case is one of the clearest examples of electoral swings related to 
popular frustration with economic reforms and a longing for the social safety net of the 
bygone Communist era. Poland’s division into winners and losers generated nostalgic 
longings for the times of full employment and a reliable social safety net and eventually 
contributed to the emergence of political populism. The electoral fortunes of the Polish 
left parties reflected this dynamic quite well. The resistance to the liberal reforms in the 
Polish context centered on a set of populist gestures associated with the emergence of a 
new right and the steady disappearance of the left beginning in 1989 (Shields 2012). 
The Polish transition was launched by the free trade union Solidarity, which 
became a broad, non-violent, anti-communist social movement and greatly contributed to 
the fall of communism. Eventually, Poland’s communist government was forced to 
negotiate with Solidarity, opening a road to the round table talks which eventually led to 
semi-free elections in 1989. The Polish Round Table allowed for a peaceful transition of 
power to the democratically elected government and the formation of a Solidarity-led 
coalition government by the end of August 1989. In December 1990, Lech Wałęsa became 
the elected President of Poland and the Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the first 
non-Communist Polish government embarked on a program of economic reform aiming 
to start the transition to a market-oriented economy. The key components of these reforms 
were those implemented in early 1990 by a team of economists headed by Leszek 
Balcerowicz and known as shock therapy. 
In light of growing resistance to Communism, the collapse of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party (PUWP) became inevitable. Some of the former activists of the PUWP 
established the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which was assigned 
to take over all the rights and duties of the PUWP and divide out its property. The rest of 
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the activists formed the Social Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland (UsdRP). Just 
prior to Poland’s first free elections in 1991, SdRP together with the Polish Socialist Party 
(PPS), trade unions, feminists, the unemployed and other groups within the working class 
formed an electoral alliance known as Democratic Left Alliance (SDL, the Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej). In the first 1991 election that was won by the liberal Democratic Union, 
the SDL finished second with 12% of votes (only 0.3% of votes below the winner). The 
newly formed five-party center-right coalition continued with Balcerowicz reforms. 
The implementation of painful shock-therapy reforms contributed to the success 
of the left SLD in the next 1993 election (Rae 2007: 105). Many observers were surprised 
that the Polish voters decidedly swung to the left and away from the reformist right 
embracing non-Solidarity parties (Hunter and Ryan 1990: 172). During its electoral 
campaign, SLD supported market reforms, but it also demanded higher consideration for 
the interests of labor and continued “central intervention” in the economy to reduce the 
costs of transformation (Hunter and Ryan 1990: 172). As the popular frustration with the 
reforms grew, SLD gained 20.4% of votes, which allowed it to form a ruling coalition 
with the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL), beating the Christian-Liberal Democratic 
Union. Two years later, in 1995, Aleksander Kwasniewski, SLD candidate, was elected 
Polish president. 
While PSL represented the interests of Polish farmers and, as the party of the 
countryside, had a larger proportion of practicing churchgoers among its voters and drew 
the support of the Catholic Church, SLD voters were leaning to a more secular side. A 
greater share than the general electorate of SLD supporters opposed privatization and the 
closure of factories (CBOS 1993; Gibson and Cielecka 1995). SLD was supported by 
industrial and other public-sector workers and pensioners, but also employers, including 
many private entrepreneurs. Gibson and Cielecka (1995: 769) found that the SLD was 
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successful in drawing support from reform “losers” who demanded reforms modification, 
a greater emphasis on spending and an increase in social services (Paradowska, Janicki 
and Markowski 1993). Chan (1995) interpreted the results of the 1993 election as a proof 
that the major political cleavage in Poland has shifted from the ideological to the socio-
political dimension. 
Having come to power in 1993, the parties in the left coalition found themselves 
facing two opposing demands. Their supporters expected the left parties to reduce 
transformation costs and increase pensions, unemployment insurance, wages, protect the 
farmers, limit foreign participation in the economy and raise taxes. By contrast, the 
government urgently needed IMF approval to qualify Poland for the second stage of a 50% 
cut in its $33 billion foreign debt. A need for debt restructuring and an inflow of the much-
needed greater foreign investment created strong incentives to limit budgetary spending 
(Gibson and Cielecka 1995: 770). The result was the continuation of reforms and fiscal 
adjustment. After a short oscillation, the new government announced that it would “push 
ahead with a mass privatization scheme” and continued with the Balcerowicz’s plan of 
privatization, deregulation, and sound fiscal policies (Hunter and Ryan 1998: 172). A 
relatively tight budget was passed for 1994, and an increase in pensions’ indexation and 
social payments in that budget were well below what was promised during the election 
campaign (Gibson and Cielecka 1995: 770). By 1995, when Deputy Premier and Minister 
of Finance Grzegorz Kolodko announced his “Strategy for Poland”, it became clear that 
the ruling left coalition chose the neoliberal approach of controlling budget deficits, 
combatting inflation, cutting down expenditures and opening the Polish economy to 
foreign investors (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002: 66).  
Despite the four years of the economic growth and decreasing unemployment, the 
voters punished SLD in 1997 by voting for Solidarnosc Election Action (AWS), a right-
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wing coalition of Solidarnosc trade unions and the Catholic parties led by the Polish trade 
union leader Marian Krzaklewski. In its electoral program, the SLD continued to evolve 
towards a more neoliberal economic platform, and openly advocated support for new and 
small businesses, even labelling one segment of its platform “Entrepreneurism Above All” 
(Jackson, Klich, Poznariska 2005: 43). By contrast, the AWS campaigned on a less liberal 
platform than the SLD, by offering to aid the badly lagging coal and steel sectors, which 
were not yet restructured or privatized. While AWS emphasized the economic 
interventionism, it also offered to continue with privatization and economic reforms. Yet 
despite its electoral promises, ASW formed a coalition government with the Freedom 
Union, a pro-market party headed by Leszek Balcerowicz, who became the deputy prime 
minister and the minister of finance in the new government. In turn, the new government 
focused on further privatization of services and industries, along with reforms directed at 
overhauling the state administration and welfare services (pensions, healthcare and 
education) (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 2013: 200). In other words, the Polish 
voters were left with no party representing a viable pro-redistribution alternative. 
This might have been the reason why in 2001 they voted for SLD. The pendulum 
swung back, ensuring a 41% landslide victory of SLD in coalition with Labor Union. In 
their campaigns, both parties capitalized on the economic turmoil and the decline in living 
standards, which followed the reforms of previous center-right government. Despite the 
economic recovery, the unemployment remained high and a sense of social and individual 
dislocation spread in Poland. At the time the center-right parties, the liberal Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, 
PiS), failed to offer credible alternatives (Shields 2012). 
Yet again, the left parties were not in the position to cater to social demands. They 
needed to ensure the Polish accession to the European Union, which constrained the ruling 
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parties’ policy choices, since the European Union demanded that the government 
continued with the reform program. In addition, the previous AWS-UW government's 
social reforms proved to be extremely costly (as well as unpopular). Therefore, when the 
SLD-PSL regained office in 2001, it had to focus on avoiding fiscal crisis. The 
government’s economic policy prioritized the interests of business, introduced a more 
flexible labor code, expanded entrepreneurship support and proposed a flat-income tax in 
Poland. To support small and medium-sized enterprises, the new government also 
intended to make labor market more flexible and more closely conforming with the laws 
of the EU. The program document of the new government “Entrepreneurship Above All”, 
which was approved in the beginning of 2002, reflected this spirit and sought to liberalize 
the Polish Labor Code by making hiring and firing easier, cutting sick pay, reducing 
overtime pay and limiting union consultation rights (Phelan 2007: 313). While the 
program intended to decrease the unemployment, initially, the already high 
unemployment spiked even higher. 
The voters did not appreciate the new government’s policies. Having introduced 
large tax increases and expenditure cuts in its first budget, the left parties in power 
immediately saw an unusually sharp downturn in their approval ratings (Szczerbiak 
2002). Several corruption scandals during the SLD term (such as the “Rywin affair”) 
helped to further weaken its support. The negative impact of the corruption scandals was 
exacerbated by the introduction of economic austerity measures at the end of 2003 to 
prevent the budget deficit from spiraling out of control (Shields 2012). Overall, between 
the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections the SLD support fell from over 40% to 15%, 
and since then the party remained on the margins of Polish politics, creating the space for 
the populist right to fill in (Szczerbiak 2007). In the 2005 election, SLD lost 30% of its 
voters and for the first time since its establishment, it entered parliament as the third party, 
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winning only 11% of votes. This trend continued in the subsequent elections. Despite 
several new left-wing parties consecutively formed to fill the vacuum of left-wing 
reformism (Razem, the Greens and Social Justice Movement Party), none has been able 
to achieve substantial success. In ten consecutive years since the collapse of the SLD, the 
main contestation on the Polish political scene occurred between Polish right parties – 
populist Law and Justice and a liberal Civic Platform. 
In the 2005 election, the decline of the electoral support for SLD came partly due 
to the abstention of its voters, but also because of the increased switching of its voters to 
the right parties, such as Self-Defense (6% of SLD voters) and Law and Justice party (13% 
of SLD voters) (Szczerbiak 2007). The right parties increasingly capitalized on Poles’ 
frustration with the losses incurred by the economic transition. In a specific post-
Communist context, this bitterness took the form of attacks on the communists for old-
regime’s repressions and transition losses. The most powerful of these parties, the Law 
and Justice party, used this ressentiment to campaign against corrupt government officials 
and “the elite”, promising to end corruption and inequality and to punish and exclude the 
communists and their agents from power (Wolchik and Curry 2008: 175), while 
emphasizing the Polish traditions and Catholic religious values. This emerging populist 
discourse configured virtuous homogeneous national people against a set of self-serving 
corrupt politicians (predominantly associated with the left parties), who allegedly 
conspired to deprive the “people” of what is rightfully theirs in terms of their economic 
and social standing. Using such rhetoric, PiS won the parliamentary election and its head 
Lech Kaczyński won the presidential election in October 2005. In his electoral slogans, 
Kaczynski used a socio-conservative program and pledged not to re-nominate the 




PiS, elected in 2005, emphasized its “Fourth Republic” program for the moral and 
political renewal of the Polish state, along with a vague pledge to build a “solidaristic” 
Poland in contrast to Civic Platform’s economic liberalism. PiS particularly lamented the 
fate of workers abandoned by post-communist neoliberal economic policies, but blamed 
the identity of the new leaders, rather than the nature of the new capitalist system for their 
misfortunes (Ost 2018: 114). PiS proposed that the conditions of Polish workers could 
have been improved if Poland had leaders who followed true Polish values, such as 
banning abortion, purging former communists, and distributing a piece of state property 
to all citizens. PiS’s electoral program largely echoed the claims of Solidarity leaders from 
the mid-1990s, who did not oppose capitalism, but wanted to offer solutions for the 
economic problems experienced by their members (Ost 2018: 119). In its first tenure in 
2005–7, PiS continued fairly liberal economic policies; it eliminated the inheritance tax, 
cut payroll taxes, and created a deficit in the social security account that led to pressure 
to raise the retirement age (Ost 2018: 114). The party’s subsequent success came from 
Poland’s continuing economic growth and falling unemployment rates, along with PiS’s 
ability to avoid radical social or economic reforms that could have produced negative 
short-term electoral consequences (Szczerbiak 2007). In the local 2006 local elections, 
PiS pushed the populist slogans even further under the banner “Close to the People”, 
promising “to create a social order in Poland, in which good is good, and bad is bad” 
(Solidarne państwo, solidarnych obywateli 2006, Wysocka 2009). Yet it pursued fairly 
orthodox, pro-market economic policies by lowering income and payroll taxes, pushing 
through a tax relief package for families, and bearing down on the budget deficit and 
public debt (Szczerbiak 2015). 
A political crisis (the result of corruption allegations on the part of Andrzej Lepper, 
leader of the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland) broke up the ruling coalition and 
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led to the earlier parliamentary election called in 2007. The main competition unraveled 
between the right Civic Platform and Law and Justice. Interestingly, both parties moved 
away from the economic liberalism in their slogans by squeezing the center-left. Civic 
Platform promised to bring about an “economic miracle” that would pay for improved 
public services and infrastructure by abandoning excessive regulation. Distancing itelf 
from an open espousal of economic liberalism, CO targeted public-sector workers’ 
dissatisfaction with the PiS-led government by promising better salaries for doctors, 
nurses and teachers. The party argued that such policies would prevent Poles from being 
forced to work abroad in order to improve their standard of living (Szczerbiak 2007: 5). 
By contrast, Law and Justice failed to develop an effective response to PO slogans and 
attempted to shift the campaign back to anti-corruption issues (Szczerbiak 2007: 5). The 
election resulted in a clear victory for the Civic Platform with 41.51% of the votes and 
209 (out of 460) seats in the Sejm. The “Left and Democrats”—an electoral alliance of 
four center-left parties anchored by the Democratic Left Alliance—received the third 
result of 13.15%. Yet this result was below the total combined vote for these parties in the 
2005 election and below the 55 seats that the Democratic Left Alliance won on its own in 
the previous election. 
The 2011 election saw a clear victory for the Civic Platform, which became the 
first incumbent governing party to secure re-election for a second term of office since 
1989, while the right-wing PiS party came a strong second. Yet PO support was not based 
on particular enthusiasm about its policies. While PO took credit for ensuring that Poland 
was the only EU member that avoided recession during the 2007–8 financial crisis, it did 
not deliver on its 2007 campaign pledge to create an “economic miracle.” Moreover, 
while Poland managed to avoid the 2008 crisis, social frustration continued to accumulate 
because of years of insecure labor contracts, stagnant wages and regional disparities: most 
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Poles generally with unstable contracts and without union representation (Ost 2018: 114). 
Hence concerned about avoiding the fate of the SLD, the PO government also avoided 
more radical social and economic policy reforms. As a result, the government was 
criticized from both sides for lack of major achievements and ambition, which led to a 
steady erosion in the government’s public approval ratings and satisfaction with its 
performance, particularly the evaluations of its handling of the economy (Szczerbiak 
2011). While in the office, after 2011 the party continued to depart from its market-
oriented roots; it abandoned its flagship promises to reduce taxes and curb pension 
privileges for selected professional groups and it was accused of acting illegally in 
dismantling the obligatory private pension fund (Markowski 2016: 1313). The PO 
moderation about further economic liberalization suggests that it was relatively perceptive 
to changing societal demand in Poland. 
The decline of PO popularity culminated in 2015, when PiS won the parliamentary 
election with 37.6% of votes and gained 235 seats. For the first time in democratic Poland, 
a winning party was able to create a government without having to negotiate with coalition 
partners. Having lost the elections of 2007, PiS’s made appeals to workers the center of 
its 2015 campaign. Prior to May 2015 presidential election, PiS candidate Andrzej Duda 
signed an agreement with Solidarity trade union. In exchange for the union’s support, 
Duda promised to roll back the retirement age, increase the minimum wage, strengthen 
tripartite social dialogue, and fight the short-term “junk contracts.” Following Duda’s 
victory, PiS party accepted these terms (Ost 2018: 119). 
During the 2015 parliamentary campaign, PiS and a new right populist movement 
set up by a rock singer, Paweł Kukiz, argued that Poland was in the hands of corrupt elites; 
that Polish economic development was proceeding more slowly than it might have; that 
Poland was left “in ruins” by the maladministration of previous governments. PiS also 
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made a number of costly pledges popular among the wider public: a universal child 
benefit; reversing the PO-PSL government’s unpopular but necessary plan to increase the 
retirement age to 67 for people of both sexes; and increasing the tax-free income 
thresholds (Markowski 2016: 1312).  
These promises aimed to attract those Poles who had lost as a result of the Polish 
modernization—even if that loss was only relative— in particular, the blue-collar 
workers. PiS was closest to industrial workers employed full-time in manufacturing firms 
(Ost 2018: 121). The strongholds of PiS support also included the economically depressed 
rural regions of Poland’s south and east, whose sense of marginalization had a basis in 
economic reality (Traub, 2016). PiS electorate of PiS had a dramatic over-representation 
of (a) people with primary (53%) and vocational (56%) education; (b) peasants and 
farmers (53%); (c) people over 50 years of age (48%); (d) pensioners (49%); (e) workers 
and rural residents (47%). Kukiz’15, which received 8.8% of active voters, also had a 
disproportional representation of workers (13%) (Markowski 2016: 1317). In other 
words, the societal division about the economic transformation remained a key cleavage 
in the Polish politics 25 years later. The more striking difference between the 2015 
election and the previous 25 years was the complete absence of parliamentary 
representation for the left parties as a logical continuation of the realignment process 
ongoing in the Polish politics.  
A smaller sub-group of PiS supporters includes the non-unionized workers from 
small towns and cities. PiS mostly appealed to this group via nationalism, offering to work 
together to build a strong Poland where one can stay home and thrive instead of living as 
a second-class citizen somewhere in western Europe. Yet nationalism has a concrete 
economic appeal for this group: “We will build industry at home, we will renovate the 
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places liberalism bypassed, and we will not allow Poles to be treated as neocolonial 
subjects” (Ost 2018: 122). 
Since coming to power for the second time in 2015, PiS has proceeded to deliver 
on its electoral promises. For example, PiS reversed the previous government’s increase 
of the retirement age, offered new drug benefits for the elderly and initiated a broad 
program for the construction of new affordable housing (Ost 2018: 115). In addition, PiS 
imposed limits on the use of insecure short-term “junk contracts,” raised the guaranteed 
hourly minimum to 13 złotys, introduced a new child-benefit program with a monthly 
payment of 500 złotysto parents of each additional child, introduced a new surcharge tax 
imposed on foreign-owned banks and insurance companies. These policies made full-time 
manufacturing employees PiS’s most loyal working-class constituency (Ost 2018: 115, 
122).  
Given its program and policies, today’s PiS combines the right policies on the 
cultural dimension with the left policies on the economic dimension—the combination 
that proved successful for many other populist and radical right parties. Adopting this 
successful platform was made possible due to left SLD’s abandonment of its traditional 
policy stances, because no other movement was going to appeal to Polish workers’ 




For the Polish case, the data allows us to test the argument regarding the 
consistency of the alignments. As explained above, I expect the left-right political 
realignment to occur in Poland largely in the same way observed in Hungary— I expected 
the support of blue-collar voters to shift to the populist right PiS party over time. 
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I used the data from the Comparative Study of the Electoral System (CSES) 
dataset available in Polish case for the following years: 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, and 
201114 to test this hypothesis. CSES dataset allows for classifying respondents as blue-
collar workers based on their occupational status: “Main occupation: worker” (“D2011”). 
The variable, which I recoded as a dummy, takes a value of “1” for all of the physical 
work/ labor related occupations. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Differences in Support Between Poland’s Blue- and White-Collar Respondents for the Centre-Right PO, 
Center Left SLD, Populist Right PiS, CSES, 1997, 2001, 2005,2007,2011 
 
The above graph confirms my hypothesis (H1) (Figure 8). Over time, relative 
working-class support becomes increasingly associated with the right party PiS. 
Additionally, one also notices an increasing negative association between the working-
class status and the probability of supporting the center-left SLD. There is also a negative 
association between the blue-collar status and support for the center-right PO. This 
analysis confirms my theoretical expectations. The adoption of austerity economic 
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policies by the ex-Communist left SLD opened up the opportunity for the right PiS party 
in Poland to challenge the left from a more redistributionist economic agenda and to 
appeal to reform losers and workers. This contributed to the political realignment, leading 
to increasing embrace of blue-collar voters for the populist PiS party, and a subsequent 




The Slovak story is somewhat different due to the persistence of the non-
democratic tendencies until the 1998 election, which was mostly a problem of institutional 
rather than electoral accountability. Slovakia’s case is mixed: both right and left parties 
were in power while implementing reforms, and hence the reaction came from both sides. 
On the left, populist Smer found a political opportunity, split from the ex-Communist left 
and went in opposition to the reforms. On the right, the national populist Slovak National 
Party (SNS) also used the participation of the left SDL in the reforms as an opportunity 
to challenge them from the right. In the long run, however, Smer has been more successful 
in capturing the anti-reformist vote and drawing such voters from SNS and another 
reactionary party HZDS. 
Slovakia’s Communist party elites, in contrast to their pragmatic and reform-
minded Polish and Hungarian counterparts, were more orthodox and traditional due to the 
legacy of the post-Prague Spring normalization (Williams 1997). As result, in both the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Communist successor parties reflected a more orthodox 
stance on political and economic transition. Founded in 1991, the People's Party—
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) was a newly established Slovakia party 
that ruled the country from 1992 to 1998 (with a short break in 1994). Featuring many ex-
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Communist party members, HZDS nonetheless embodied the Slovak national movement. 
HZDS’s leader, Vladimír Mečiar, led Slovakia through the Velvet Divorce, and during 
his tenure - which lasted until 1998, Slovakia was considered a non-democratic political 
system. 
Slovakia’s ex-Communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) was a social-
democratic political party in Slovakia, which was founded in 1990 out of the Communist 
Party of Slovakia and stayed in power from 1990 to 2004. Being the most objectionable 
party in Slovakia (Grzymala-Busse 2002) prompted SDL to stress pragmatism, 
commitment to democracy and market reform and avoid joining the government of HZDS 
throughout the 1990s (Deegan-Krause 2006). While the nationalist HZDS implemented 
only partial economic reforms, when the right-leaning government took power in 1998, 
SDL chose to stand out “as technocrats and advocates of reform” in the newly formed 
cabinet (Vachudova 2008, 391; Tavits and Letsky 2009). 
Initially, the HZDS and the SDL programs bore strong similarities. HZDS 
advocated managed economic reforms with an emphasis on market transition, but 
particularly stressed the “social aspect” of the market (Haughton 2004; Williams 2000: 
4–8). This language resembled SDL’s, which called for privatization with the least 
amount of social losses. While SDL emphasized solidarity, social justice and the 
promotion of the health and economic well-being of working people, HZDS emphasized 
the preservation of the Slovak nation. Yet the traditional left constituencies of the 
communist-successor party in Slovakia that were skeptical about the marketization and 
nostalgic for Communist times generally supported HZDS rather than SDL (Bútorová and 
Bútora 1994: 32; Evans and Whitefield 1998: 131; Haughton 2004: 183). According to 
Haughton (2004), HZDS policy towards the trade unions diluted SDL’s support base—
HZDS had de facto control over the largest unions in Slovakia, while the lack of a strong 
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link between the unions and SDL in mid-1990s deprived it of a potentially strong left-
leaning support base. The absence of reforms and similar economic stances of the main 
parties delayed the formation of socioeconomic cleavages in the party system until late 
1990s (Deegan-Krause 2006; O’Dwyer 2006). 
The real change to Slovak political system came in 1998. In light of the EU’s 
rejection of Slovakia’s accession in 1998, all segments of civil society mobilized to bring 
the reformers to power. Although Mečiar’s HZDS won again, the right-leaning 
conservative parties managed to compose a broad pro-European coalition in which SDL 
was dominated by the center-right Slovak Democratic Coalition party (SDK) and formed 
a government. Together with the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank, Prime 
Minister Dzurinda implemented one of the most exemplary market reforms in the region. 
The fundamental public-sector reforms and economy-wide restructuring included 
privatization of the SOEs, passing anticorruption laws, introducing a flat tax, liberalizing 
the Labor Code, restructuring of the health care and social welfare systems (Laursen and 
Sasin 2004). The reforms resulted in one of the least demanding regulatory and tax 
environments in Europe and a minimal social policy. As result, Slovakia got admitted to 
the OECD and joined the EU and NATO in 2004. 
While these policies attracted a lot of foreign investment, they created loud 
opposition from the country’s unions. The radical reforms ended a tripartite bargaining 
system that de facto existed in Slovakia since 1989. Dzurinda’s government dismissed the 
unions as reform partners (O’Dwyer and Kovalcík 2007). Meciar’s HZDS and the Slovak 
National Party (SNS) went into opposition. 
As the reforms proceeded, the ex-Communist SDL found itself in an ambiguous 
position as a left-wing party in a largely center-right government (Henderson 2002). The 
SDL decision to take the finance portfolio during the reform years and therefore to 
149 
 
become the public face of painful economic reform decreased its public support and 
exacerbated internal tensions within SDL. As result, SDL suffered a dramatic decline in 
its support, exacerbated by some serious corruption scandals and by internal divisions on 
its positioning vis-à-vis government policy. The SDL eventually lost the 2002 election 
gaining only 1.4% of the vote. In the end, SDL ended up merging with another left party, 
Smer-SD in January 2005. 
The 2002 elections again brought to power a center-right coalition, which 
continued the reforms until 2006. This period marked an increasing relevance of the 
socioeconomic cleavage in Slovakia’s party politics. The center-right government was 
heavily criticized by the opposition parties, particularly Smer, which increasingly 
portrayed the government as neo-liberal, a term with negative connotations. Rybář (2006) 
illustrates the growing importance of socio-economic themes in Slovakia throughout the 
2002–06 election cycle on two expert surveys carried out in 2004 and 2006. The 2004 
survey revealed that two economic issues—redistribution and state-run versus market 
economy—were the most prominent in the Slovak party politics, followed by nationalism 
and democracy (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2004). In the 2006 expert survey (Rybář 
2006), two economic issues (state versus market and social welfare) were also estimated 
as the most important on the political scene, followed by nationalism and social order. 
Hence, by 2006 the socioeconomic dimension came to dominate Slovak party politics. 
The presence of the left SDL in a generally right-leaning coalition created an 
opportunity for the populist right parties to capitalize on the anti-reforms platform. For 
example, Slovakia’s SNS party— which Mudde (2011: 12) classifies as a populist radical 
right party that combined a mixture of nationalism and xenophobia, authoritarianism and 
populism—was able to use this political opening. SNS combined a nationalist stance with 
left-leaning economic program, including elements of state interventionism, paternalism 
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and redistribution. SNS voters favored state intervention, redistribution, state paternalism 
and etatism (Gyarfasova 2013: 9). 
Using the anti-reform platform (which was also utilized by its left competitors—
HZDS and Smer), SNS made it to the parliament in 2006 election with 11.83% of votes. 
The party’s 2006 electoral program entitled “We Are Slovaks. A Slovak government for 
Slovaks” devoted a large section to the analysis of the overall threat brought about by the 
processes of globalization and Europeanization. The SNS manifesto portrayed 
globalization as a process that created easily malleable cosmopolitan citizens lacking 
bonds to their families and nations. Although SNS program accepted the international 
cooperation, it questioned liberalization, commercialization and the dechristianization of 
Europe that threatened the Latin-Slavic identity of the Slovak nation (Černoch, Husák, 
Schütz and Vít 2011: 187). In response, SNS offered to “return Slovakia into the hands 
of Slovaks!” and overall devoted about a fifth (22%) of its program to the elaboration of 
the socio-economic themes in its manifesto (Haughton and Rybář 2008). Similarly, the 
2010 SNS manifesto offered a considerable space to its economic program by 
emphasizing the need for economic sovereignty and autarky, particularly in the areas of 
food production and energy industry. SNS remained skeptical of foreign capital and big 
corporations, stressing a need to replace them with Slovak companies instead (Černoch, 
Husák, Schütz and Vít 2011: 190). 
However, SNS was successfully challenged on the left by the Smer-SD party. 
Smer (Smer-SD since 2005 when it absorbed the SDL) emerged in 1999 as a breakaway 
from the SDL and was headed by Robert Fico, the most popular SDL member at that time. 
Fico sensed a political opportunity to campaign against the market reforms led by the 
center-right ruling coalition from the left, and quickly made Smer-SD one of the most 
popular parties in Slovakia.  
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Smer-SD consecutively campaigned on a traditional left platform, criticizing the 
Slovak center-right governments for ignoring Slovakia’s growing disparities, catering to 
the multinational corporations and financial interests. Instead, Smer offered a 
protectionist solution, emphasizing the need to return to the basic principles of solidarity 
and state involvement in the economy, offering changes in the labor code, pension and 
taxation systems, pledging to increase public spending on healthcare, pensions and 
education and to introduce a second VAT on basic goods (Rybář 2006).  
Combining strong left-leaning social etatism and paternalism with moderate 
nationalism, Smer-SD was able to integrate substantial shares of former SNS supporters 
into its own constituency (Gyarfasova 2013; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2016). In 
addition, the populist left rhetoric allowed Smer-SD to gradually capture former HZDS 
voters, the traditional left constituencies of the communist-successor party who tended to 
come from the poorer, older, less educated and more rural part of the Slovak population 
(Henderson 2012: 2). 
In 2006 decrying the “extreme right-wing government” that had brought poverty 
to Slovakia and led to 300,000 people moving abroad to seek work (Henderson 2006: 6) 
brought Smer-SD a decisive victory with 29.1% of votes. In the subsequent elections, 
Smer-SD continued to position itself as the defender of Slovak national and state interests 
and to combine elements of ethnocentrism and protectionist economic appeals in its 
platform. For example, in the 2012 election, Smer-SD campaigned on criticizing the 
spending cuts undertaken by the center-right Radicova government. Fico claimed: "We 
are against privatizations, we support a better protection of workers and greater state 
investments" (The European Elections Monitor: Slovakia 2012). Smer-SD also offered to 
get rid of the 19% flat VAT rate and to increase it to 25% for the wealthiest Slovaks and 
to 22% for the wealthiest businesses. Like Viktor Orban, Fico proposed a special 0.7% 
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tax on bank deposits (The European Elections Monitor: Slovakia 2012). In other words, 
Smer-SD campaigned or a typical populist platform combining protectionist economic 
policies with a nationalist stance and an attack on the reformist right parties. This 
approach proved successful in the Slovak case (just as it did in the other country cases 
outlined above), leading to Smer-SD winning 44.41% of the vote and 83 of the 150 seats 
in the National Council in 2012 election. 
Overall, over the years Smer-SD gradually captured former SNS (Gyarfasova 
2013; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2016) and HZDS voters, whose characteristics 
(poorer, older, less educated and more rural social groups) align with the blue-collar 
constituencies which are the main focus of the analysis in this dissertation (Henderson 
2012: 2). 
The Slovak example suggests that the destinies of ex-Communist left parties are 
not predetermined. In fact, successful rebranding is possible under the right 
circumstances. In Slovakia, Smer-SD has been able to notice a political opportunity, reject 
the SDL’s neoliberal legacy, to challenge the reform-oriented right-wing governments 
from a protectionist economic agenda and to successfully retain the support of the 




                                                          
15 The CSES data is only available for Slovakia for the years 2010 and 2016 (by that time the SDL has 
already disappeared from the political landscape), and in both of them the variables that would allow to 
identify respondents’ socio-economic status (“Occupation”, “Socio-Economic status”) are missing. Hence, 
I was unable to provide a quantitative analysis of the support of blue-collar voters for the left and right 




In this chapter, I developed my argument further by extending the earlier analysis 
for Hungary to a larger set of country cases. The results above generally confirmed my 
expectations. 
First, I ran a cross-country regression to look at the dynamics of the blue-collar 
support for center-left and the radical right parties in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I have demonstrated that the odds of the blue-
collar constituencies in these countries backing a radical right party (as opposed to 
supporting the ex-Communist left party) have risen substantively between 2002–2016. 
The results suggest that this shift is associated with a more pro-market economic policy 
position on taxation, deregulation and redistribution policy issues chosen by each 
respective ex-Communist left party. 
Second, I ran case study analysis by focusing on the party dynamics in three 
Visegrád Group countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. I looked at the 
economic policy choices made by the ex-Communist parties in each respective country 
and the subsequent electoral dynamics of the radical and populist right parties. I also 
traced the overtime dynamics of blue collar respondents’ support for the center-left and 
the populist and radical right parties in the Czech and Polish cases (the Slovak data was 
not available).  
In the Czech case I found that the presence of a credible left KSČM party with a 
more traditional economic left policy allowed the Czech left to retain substantive shares 
of support among the blue-collar constituencies. This largely preserved the traditional left-
right parties’ alignment along the economic axis in the Czech Republic and limited the 
size of the blue-collar constituencies available for mobilization to the Czech radical right. 
This explains the limited success of the Czech radical right parties until recently. These 
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findings are complemented with the individual-level analysis that shows that in the Czech 
Republic, the blue-collar status has been positively and consistently associated to the 
support for the Czech left parties over time.  
In the Polish case I found dynamics that are very similar to the Hungarian case. I 
show that the implementation of neoliberal and austerity measures in 1993-1997 and 2003 
by the ex-Communist left SLD party led to the overtime decline in the blue-collar support 
for this party. This provided the Polish right parties (particularly the populist right Law 
and Justice) with an opportunity to use Pole’s frustration with the losses incurred by the 
economic transition and the left parties and launched the party realignment process. 
Eventually that led to the increasing incorporation of the blue-collar voters by the PiS, 
which targeted those support groups through elaborate combination of offering and 
implementing consistent pro-labor policies and negotiating with labor unions. I 
complement this analysis with the individual-level data that confirmed (just as in the case 
of Hungary) that overtime support of Polish working-class constituencies became 
increasingly associated with the right party PiS and negatively associated with the ex-
Communist left SLD.  
Ultimately, I showed that in the Slovak case the results have been mixed. 
Originally the trajectory of the ex-Communist SDL was very similar to the cases of the 
Hungarian and Polish center-left parties (embrace of the painful economic reform and the 
subsequent electoral collapse). I even show that the Slovak right SNS attempted to use 
this opportunity at its own advantage (just as the right parties in the Hungarian and Polish 
case did). However, Smer-SD, a breakaway faction from the SDL headed by Robert Fico, 
noticed the political opening as well, successfully combined moderate nationalism with 
strong left-leaning social etatism and protectionism, and was able to retain the support of 
the traditional left constituencies. The Slovak case suggests that successful rebranding 
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may preserve traditional party alignments and ensure the electoral success of the left 
parties. 
Overall, the findings in this chapter are consistent with my theoretical argument. 
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses confirm that the blue-collar constituencies in 
Central and Eastern European countries tend to switch their support from the ex-
Communist left to the radical right parties over time. However, this trend is correlated 
with the ex-Communist left parties’ pro-market economic policy positions and austerity 
reforms implementation and may be prevented if the left parties preserve their traditional 
pro-labor policy (as in the Czech Republic) or adopt more protectionist policy stances (as 
in Slovakia). These findings may be used for policy implications and I return to them in 





Chapter 6. The View from the Constituency 
The Approach 
In the above chapters of my dissertation, I argued that the success of the radical 
right parties in Hungary could be partly explained by a switch of the traditional 
constituencies of the ex-Communist left parties to the right parties. In particular, on the 
cross-country level, I demonstrated the external validity of my argument that the switch 
of blue-collar respondents from the left to the right parties over time is a phenomenon that 
characterizes many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. I also provided the 
individual-level data to demonstrate that the shift of blue-collar constituencies away from 
the ex-Communist left to the populist and radical right parties has occurred over the years 
in countries such as Hungary and Poland.  
However, the individual-level data does not necessarily translate into the electoral 
shares of votes won by specific parties. This chapter seeks to ask the following question 
in relation to the results of the above analysis—what does this individual-level data mean 
in terms of the likely numbers of Jobbik seats? Do voters’ preferences change by shifting 
from the support for the ex-Communist left to the radical right parties in light with the 
logic outlined in the theoretical parts of this dissertation?  
Some available survey data tracks closely with my expectations. For example, 
according to Medián Opinion and Market Research Ltd, among Jobbik supporters in 2010, 
37% supported Fidesz in 2006 and 21% of supporters came from MSZP, while 20% did 
not report their preferences and 13% were first-time voters (Figure 9). Therefore, the data 
shows that former MSZP voters constituted at least the second largest group among 2010 
Jobbik voters (although it is hard to estimate the actual size of this group due to a large 





One important limitation of this data is the unreliability of respondents’ reports of 
their previous voting history, since they tend to forget their former party preferences.16 
Hence, while an analysis of the past voting behavior would have substantively 
complemented the picture, the available data does not provide persuasive conclusions. 
While a panel for individual-level data does not exist in Hungary,17 one can repeat 
the same analysis on the constituency level, by testing whether the districts that voted for 
MSZP in 2006 tended to support Jobbik in the 2010 election. In the below subsection of 
the chapter, I run such an analysis on the constituency (electoral precinct) level by looking 
at the electoral fortunes of Hungarian Jobbik in relation to the results of the ex-Communist 
left party—MSZP —in the preceding national election. 
                                                          
16 Laszlo Beck, a sociologist from Medián suggests that this is due to memory distortion. Before the 2010 
election, only 26 percent remembered they had voted for MSzP in 2006, and 40 percent they had voted for 
Fidesz. The actual results of 2006 elections was 43% and 42% respectively. The ratio of those who 
remembered having voted for MSzP in the 2010 elections decreased from 42% to 32% between April and 
December in the same year. 
17 Essentially the only panel available for the period starting in 2006 is the Tarki panel—Hungarian 
Longitudinal Election Survey 2008–2009 (http://www.tarki.hu/cgi-
bin/katalogus/tarkimain_en.pl?sorszam=TDATA-H27), which asked about respondents’ political 
preferences in 2006 and 2009, but in 2009 the number of Jobbik supporters in the panel is insufficient to 
make any conclusions. 
Figure 9. Retrospective Party Preferences of 2010 Jobbik Voters. Source: Median pre-election survey, April 2010. 
Április. From Nagy et al. (2012): A szélsőjobboldal Magyarországon. A Policy Solutions tanulmánya a Friedrich Ebert 




Specifically, I use the data from the Psephos, Adam Carr's Election Archive to look 
at the changes in constituency-level party support in Hungary’s 2006 and 2010 national 
parliamentary elections. In line with my theoretical expectations, I find a consistent 
positive association between the vote for MSZP in 2006 and the 2010 vote for Jobbik on 
constituency level. 
I explain the method and the results of the analysis below. 
 
 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
From the analysis in the above chapters, one should expect that the former 
constituencies of the centrist parties switched to embrace the radical right parties 
following the programmatic shift of the ex-Communist left parties to the center of the 
economic axis. Below I test this argument on the electoral data that was available within 
Hungary. 
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that the implementation of the austerity reforms by 
the left MSZP party was one of the key issues that toppled it in the 2006–2010 electoral 
round and provided the electoral advantage to the radical right Jobbik, which capitalized 
on the MSZP demise. Quantitatively, it means that between the 2006 and 2010 
parliamentary elections in Hungary, one should have observed the increasing shift to the 
rightwing outsider party Jobbik among those constituencies that previously supported the 
centrist left MSZP.  
Existing evidence confirms this expectation. In the 2010 parliamentary election, 
the extreme right Jobbik did extremely well—better than any new party ever in the post-
communist history of Hungary (Batory 2010: 10). The combined vote received by 
Hungarian right parties (Jobbik’s 17% and Fidesz’ 53%) demonstrated that the absolute 
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majority of Hungarian voters turned away from the left. In other words, the 2010 
parliamentary election resulted in a fundamental swing to the right in Hungarian politics. 
Jobbik’s success was particularly visible in the counties East of the Danube, where 
the center-left MSZP support shrunk so drastically as to allow Jobbik to attain the position 
of the second strongest party (Batory 2010: 10).  During its breathtaking rise in 2010, 
Jobbik won many of the counties that previously were considered the bastions of the 
Socialist Party. Specifically, in this election Jobbik outperformed MSZP in seven 
counties—of which six were situated in Northeastern Hungary, which had hitherto been 
the left ’s most important bastion outside Budapest: Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, Szabolcs-
Szatmar-Bereg, Hajdu-Bihar, Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnnok, Heves, and Nograd (Szombati 
2018). 
The above qualitative evidence can thus be converted in the following empirical 
hypothesis: 
- Hypothesis I: The constituencies that supported MSZP in the 2006 election were 
statistically likely to embrace the radical right Jobbik in the 2010 election in 
Hungary  
In order to test this hypothesis, I run a regression analysis using the Hungarian 
2006 and 2010 voting results on the constituency level. In Hungary, certain constituencies 
held two electoral rounds, while others only held one. To avoid confusion and distortions 
that may result from strategic voting in the second round of the elections, I used the results 
for the first round of the election for all of my voting data. 
Because I limited the study to the first round of the national parliamentary 
elections, the dependent variable used was constituency-level voting for the Jobbik party 
in the first round of the National Assembly Election held in April 2006 from Psephos, 
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Adam Carr's Election Archive. Psephos Archive includes detailed statistics for 
presidential and legislative elections from 182 countries for every country that holds 
genuine national elections.18  
Based on the Archive electoral data for Hungary, I constructed voting variables, 
which contained 177 independent observations. The main explanatory variable included 
constituency-level MSZP support data in the first round of the National Assembly 
Elections held on April 2010.19 One limitation is due to the fact that in 2006, MSZP in six 
constituencies ran in an alliance with SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), a liberal 
political party. Hence, I introduced a special dummy variable to control for those six 
observations. 
I also control for the time-dependence in the radical right vote and introduce a 
variable “MDF2006”—voting for Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) in 2006 election. 
MDF was a Hungarian party with a nationalist, national-conservative and Christian 
democratic ideology, which ran in 2006 election, and can be counted among Jobbik 
predecessors. I also used voting for another centrist right Fidesz (Alliance of Young 
Democrats) among other controls. 
Among other variables that are typically listed among predictors of the radical 
right support, I also introduced the size of the Roma population and unemployment data. 
The size of the Roma population on the precinct level came from the data available at 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office.20 The Roma population in percentages is available 
from the 2011 census (the previous census was run in 2001, so I chose the data closest to 
the time of my analysis). The data was available on constituency level. Among other 








controls, I also introduced the unemployment data at constituency level from Hungary’s 
National Employment Service.21 I used the proportion of registered jobseekers according 
to their permanent residency in a given constituency on January 20, 2010 as a measure of 
unemployment. 
Ultimately, I added regional controls using NUTS1 regions: one for the Central 
Hungary (Budapest and Pest), and one for Transdanubia (Central, Western and Southern 
Transdanubia) to control for the variation in the regional voting patterns.22 
All of the variables were standardized to account for the differences in scales. 




Table 11 below summarizes the results of my analysis. 
  





Variable: Jobbik First 
Round Vote 2010 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MSZP2006 0.209** 0.184** 0.455*** 0.177*** 0.149** 0.151** 0.146** 0.249** 
MSZP-SZDSZ -0.429 -0.122 -0.666 -0.579 -0.512 -0.216 -0.366 -0.409 
MDF2006  -0.049  -0.003 0.013 -0.044 -0.010  
FIDESz2006   0.323***     0.076 
Roma Share 2011     0.338***  0.257** 0.255*** 
Share Jobseekers 2010      0.397*** 0.182 0.387*** 
Central Hungary    -1.366*** -0.984*** -0.612** -0.730**  
Transdanubia    -1.079*** -0.762*** -0.714*** -0.664***  
_cons 0.025 0.013 0.034 0.723*** 0.554*** 0.398*** 0.446*** 0.057 
N 175 157 175 157 145 157 145 161 
r2 0.044 0.040 0.091 0.410 0.475 0.475 0.485 0.410 
r2_a 0.032 0.022 0.075 0.390 0.452 0.454 0.459 0.390 
T p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Table 11. Jobbik first round vote in 2010 and MSZP first round vote in 2006, Constituency-Level Analysis. 
OLS Standardized Coefficients, Robust Standard Errors. 
 
In line with my expectations, Table 11 shows a consistent positive association 
between the vote for MSZP in 2006 and the post-crisis vote for Jobbik in 2010 on the 
constituency level. The coefficient of the variable “MSZP vote in 2006 election” is 
consistently positive and significant even after introduction of other control variables. 
Another popular explanation—the Roma share (see, for example, Karácsony and Róna, 
2011)—is statistically significant in most regressions as well (and its standardized 
coefficient is larger).  
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By contrast, in this specification the unemployment variable matters only when 
introduced independently and loses its significance when the Roma share is included in 
the equation. This might be due to the introduction of the regional controls. Since Great 
Plain and North Hungary are the poorest regions in the country (Duseka et al. 2014), 
controlling for this area might eliminate some of the variation in the economic indicators 
otherwise captured by the unemployment variable as the model (8) illustrates. 
Overall, the above results confirm my theoretical expectations (H1): at least part 
of the electoral success of Jobbik in the 2010 election came from the constituencies that 
supported MSZP in 2006. This finding goes in line with my theoretical argument: the 
increase in support for the radical right Jobbik over time came in part from the 




In the above chapter, I ran a regression analysis on the constituency level to test 
whether the districts that voted for MSZP in 2006 supported Jobbik in the 2010 election. 
The theoretical expectation from the above chapters is that the implementation of the 2008 
austerity package by the center left MSZP party resulted in the switch of its constituencies 
away from MSZP to embrace the radical right Jobbik party in the subsequent 2010 
parliamentary election. The results of the above analysis confirmed my original 
theoretical expectations: I discovered a consistent positive association between the vote 
for MSZP in 2006 and the vote for Jobbik in 2010. 
The constituency level analysis allowed me to address the limitations of the cross-
country and individual-level data analysis. This analysis allowed me to reduce the data 
variation in the cross-country analysis by reducing the scope of the analysis to within-
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country variation only. Moreover, the constituency-level analysis complemented the 
findings from the individual-level analysis by showing that the individual-level political 
preferences of Hungarian respondents translated into the electoral shares of the votes won 
by MSZP and Jobbik parties. This chapter has demonstrated that the shift in the 
individual-level preferences away from the center left MSZP to the radical right Jobbik 
occurred in between the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary, which is 
consistent with the logic outlined in the theoretical parts of this dissertation. This shift in 
the individual political preferences manifested itself in the increase in the number of seats 
won by the radical right Jobbik party in the 2010 parliamentary election. 
However, the constituency level analysis has a number of limitations. First, the 
problem of the ecological fallacy (mistakenly extending the inferences about the nature 
of individuals from the inferences about the group to which those individuals belong) 
remains on the constituency level just as it exists on the country level. In this context this 
means that the conclusion that the regions that supported MSZP in 2006 embraced Jobbik 
in 2010 does not allow to directly extend the implications to the behavior of the individual 
voters.  Thus, such an analysis should be further substantiated with individual-level 
approaches. 
Second, data limitations on the constituency level do not allow me to control for 
alternative sources in temporal variation in the support for the radical right Jobbik. Hence, 
there is still a possibility that the omitted variable bias may be influencing the results of 
my analysis. 
These concerns may be addressed by the individual-level experimental survey 
analysis, which I perform in the below chapter.  
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Chapter 7. A Survey Experiment on Support for the Radical 
Right 
In the above chapters of this dissertation, I traced the process of the exodus of the 
blue-collar constituencies from the ex-Communist left parties to the populist and radical 
right parties, as the left parties became more economically centrist. 
I have demonstrated this on two different levels of analysis, using cross and within 
country data. On the cross-country level, I have shown that the working-class respondents 
in the post-Communist Europe increasingly shifted away from the old left parties to 
support the radical right in the span of the last fifteen years (the period available for the 
analysis in the European Social Survey). As the regression analysis demonstrates, this 
process is correlated with the anti-redistribution and pro-market positions of the ex-
Communist left parties. On the individual level, I have shown that the working-class 
respondents in Hungary increasingly switched away from the ex-Communist left MSZP 
to support the right populist Fidesz and radical Jobbik in Hungary in the period between 
1994–2014 following the implementation of the austerity Bokros package by the ex-
Communist left MSZP party. Using the case studies, constituency-level and observational 
studies, I have shown that the center-left Hungarian party MSZP was in fact consistently 
losing the support of the blue-collar Hungarian respondents since the late 1990s. 
However, these findings do not allow to address the direction of the causality, as 
well as to check whether using the redistributionist platform is in fact advantageous for 
the radical right parties. While the results of the previous analysis go in line with the 
theoretical prediction of my dissertation, the methods chosen above make it difficult to 
establish causality since it is hard to isolate the effect of the interested cause on 
observational data.  
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In addition, while I have argued that the socioeconomic issues play an important 
role in the respondents turning away from the center-left parties to embrace the radical 
right in the Hungarian context, I have yet to demonstrate that quantitatively. For example, 
will survey participants in be more likely to support the radical right Jobbik party when 
presented with information about the pro-market MSZP policy stance, than when shown 
the information about redistributionist MSZP policy positions? How does Jobbik’s own 
policy platform condition these effects? 
The experimental surveys allow me to address this problem by manipulating the 
treatment information provided to respondents (and keeping all many important sources 
of variation constant) with the aim of exploring these causal mechanisms. Therefore, 
between late March and early April 2018 (just before Hungary’s April 2018 parliamentary 
election), I ran an experimental survey on a representative sample of Hungarian 
population. The survey was designed to address the following elements of my theoretical 
argument: 1) the center-left MSZP party shift to a more pro-market economic agenda 
increases the support for the radical right party Jobbik; 2) the use of the protectionist 
economic platform by the radical right party Jobbik increases its appeal to supporters 
when compared with the use of anti-immigration platform.  
Overall, I have found strong confirmation of my original expectations. I 
discovered a significant effect of my treatment (the MSZP’s use of a pro-market economic 
policy platform as opposed to a redistributionist economic policy platform) on increased 
support for the radical right Jobbik. The results were substantive and significant for 
alternative specifications of the dependent variables and different subsamples of blue-
collar respondents. However, these results only remained consistent under the use of the 
protectionist platform by Jobbik. In the treatment option when Jobbik used an anti-
immigration platform, the change in Jobbik support was not significant. While I 
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discovered significant heterogeneous effects only for the blue-collar voters subsampled 
by education (the results for the blue-collar subsamples were not that different from the 
general samples results), overall, the results confirmed my original expectations. In cases 
like Hungary, the blue-collar constituencies frustrated by the abandonment of the 
mainstream left political parties on the economic policy are more likely to shift to the far-
right of the political spectrum and support the radical right parties. The lack of 
heterogeneous effects suggests that I class behavior is not the only factor that drives the 
voters’ shift to the radical right parties, but rather this process is also found among other 
social groups. 




The Policy Switch of the Center-Left and Protectionist Radical Right 
Experimental Design 
Unlike observational studies, the experimental setting allows me to tackle the 
causality issues in a more systematic way by determining whether the relationship studied 
in an experiment is actually caused by the manipulation (administered treatment). As the 
theoretical basis of my experiment, I followed the framework proposed in Brader and 
Tucker (2008) and Lupu (2014). Under this framework, the respondents are split into 
several groups that are shown the information regarding different party positions. By 
assigning the center-left MSZP different (pro-market and redistributionist) positions on 
the economic scale, I intended to show that the socioeconomic issues contributed to the 
working-class constituencies’ defection to the radical right parties away from the center-
left parties. By assigning the radial right Jobbik different (economic protectionist and anti-
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immigration) positions I tested whether the use of economic protectionist platform brings 
more voters to the radical right parties. 
My main research focus is the blue-collar working constituencies, since they are the 
social group that is most susceptible to the radical right populism in the current political 
context. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the blue-collar workers are more likely to be 
hurt by globalization, since it is a major force beyond the real wages decline and 
destruction of the low-skilled jobs. I argue, however, that this constituency is also more 
likely to switch to the radical right parties when the center-left parties embrace the policies 
of economic openness and abandon their traditional pro-labor stance. Therefore, my 
theory predicts that the disenchantment with the left parties’ centrist position along the 
economic scale brings a very specific response from the blue-collar workers group: it 
increases the workers’ frustration with the center-left parties (that have allegedly betrayed 
workers’ expectations by shifting economic policy positions) and hence lowers their 
supports for the left, and it also pushes the workers further to the right of the political 
spectrum (increasing their radicalization along the self-identification scale).  
Hence the expectations of my theory for the case of Hungary are: 
- Hypothesis I: the pro-market economic policy stance of MSZP fuels the support 
for the radical right Jobbik party. 
- Hypothesis II: the pro-market economic policy stance of MSZP fuels the support 
for the radical right Jobbik party among the economically disaffected groups, 
specifically blue-collar workers. 
In late March 2018, I ran an internet-based experimental survey in Hungary of a 
total size of 1,000 participants (500 respondents for two treatment groups respectively). 
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The subjects were randomly recruited from a representative sample of Hungary’s 
population by the professional polling company Solid Data.  
My experimental design was as follows. I split the sample into two groups of equal 
size, each of which was shown different combinations of the information about Hungary’s 
largest parties’ alleged platforms in the upcoming Hungarian April 2018 election. The 
administered treatment provided the respondents with two alleged excerpts from a 
Hungarian non-partisan newspaper article, which contained the information regarding the 
party platforms in the upcoming parliamentary election.  The respondents were told that 
the experiment would study the frequency of their exposure to the specific type of news. 
The respondents were debriefed in the end of the survey.  
To strengthen the treatment and simplify the content, the respondents were shown 
the same information about the three Hungarian parties in different combinations. First, 
they were shown the information about Fidesz and MSZP platforms; second, they were 
demonstrated the information regarding the Fidesz and Jobbik platforms; and lastly, they 
were shown the information the policy positions of all three parties together. This was 
done in order to allow the respondents sufficient time to process the data, ensure 
compliance and allow the respondents to have a consistent focus on the provided 
information. Following the treatment exposure, I asked the respondents several questions 
regarding their specific party and policy preferences. 
The pictures below provide an illustration of the materials in Hungarian 
demonstrated to each treated group of the respondents during the internet experimental 










Figure 10. The Examples of Treatment Presented to the Survey Participants: Article Excerpt 




The only difference across the two treatments was the information on the policy 
stance of Hungary’s center-left party, MSZP. In the first treatment, MSZP embraced a 
pro-market policy, while in the second treatment it adopted redistributionist policy 
positions. The policy stance of both the center-right Fidesz party (neutral policy stance) 
and the radical right Jobbik (protectionist policy stance) remained constant across these 
two treatments. Hence, in this experiment, I measured how manipulating the center-left 
MSZP economic policy position affected respondents’ attitudes towards MSZP, Fidesz 
and Jobbik. 
In line with the theoretical expectations outlined in this dissertation, by assigning 
the center left MSZP pro-market and redistributionist positions on the economic scale, I 
mean to test whether the socioeconomic issues lead to the proletarization of the radical 
right vote. I hypothesize that the pro-market policy stance of the MSZP will decrease its 
support among the respondents in comparison with the redistributionist policy stance of 
MSZP. I had four Hungarian native speakers who consulted me discuss the specific 
formulations of the treatments to make them more synchronized with the realities of the 
political environment in Hungary. Whenever the sentence was in dispute, the four native 
Hungarian speakers deliberated until they reached an agreement. 
The pro-market treatment contained the following information: 
 
Please read the following newspaper abstract: “As the political parties prepare for 
the April 2018 parliamentary election, they are revising their political platforms 
and strategies. 




MSZP will push for policies of economic openness and seek to satisfy 
international investors/capital in order to further integrate the Hungarian 
economy into global markets. 
Jobbik in the meantime will maintain its focus on the protection of the Hungarian 
economy and propose to limit the presence of multinational companies because, as 
it claims, multinational companies stifle the development of Hungarian-owned 
enterprises.” 
 
The redistributionist treatment contained the following information:   
 
Please read the following newspaper abstract: “As the political parties prepare for 
the April 2018 parliamentary election, they are revising their political platforms 
and strategies. 
Fidesz, the ruling party, will preserve its current policy focus as part of its electoral 
strategy.  
MSZP has decided to focus on improving the living standards and will campaign 
for the introduction of a guaranteed basic income for all citizens. 
Jobbik, in the meantime, will maintain its focus on the protection of the Hungarian 
economy and propose to limit the presence of multinational companies because, as 









Following the treatment exposure, I asked the respondents in each group a set of 
questions designed to evaluate their political and policy preferences. I used several other 
versions of my dependent variable designed to measure the respondents’ political and 
policy preferences. 
 
Question: Now imagine you had to choose among the three above parties, which one 





Would you participate in the national elections to Hungarian Parliament in April? 
- certainly will go to vote, 
- probably will go vote 
- probably will not go vote 
- certainly won’t go vote 
 
How would you vote if the national election took place this Sunday? 
- Demokratikus Koalíció (DK) 
- Együtt 
- Fidesz-KDNP  
- Jobbik Magyarországért  
- Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt 
- Kétfarkú Kutya Párt 
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- Lehet Más a Politika (LMP) 
- Liberálisok (MLP) 
- Magyar Munkáspárt  
- Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) 
- Modern Magyarország Mozgalom (MOMA) 
- Momentum Mozgalom 
- MSZP – Párbeszéd közös lista 
- Párbeszéd 
- Polgári Konzervatív Párt 
- Új Kezdet 
- egyéb párt  
- semmiképpen nem szavazna  
- nem mondja meg, kire szavazna  
- nem tudja, kire szavazna” 
 
Given the controversial reputation of the radical right parties, there is always a 
concern that the respondents will not openly declare their preference for Jobbik. Along 
with the above questions, I also added several indirect questions about the party most 
likely to win the election, the legitimacy of the Jobbik party and support for the Jobbik 
joining the governing coalition. The latter two questions were structured as ordinal 
variables, ranking respondents’ attitudes on a scale from lowest to the highest.  
In your opinion, how likely it is that you will vote Jobbik (the Movement for a Better 
Hungary) party? 
- yes 
- probably yes 
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- probably not 
- no 
 
How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) became part of 
the government coalition? 
- strongly approve 
- somewhat approve 
- somewhat disapprove 
- strongly disapprove 
 
I also addressed the respondents’ positions on the economic and immigration 
policy issues following the treatment exposure and salience of these issues: 
 
There are some who believe the government should strongly regulate private 
businesses. How much do you agree with this? 
- strongly agree 
- agree 
- disagree 
- strongly disagree 
And how important do you consider for the government to strongly regulate private 
businesses? 
- very important 
- somewhat important 
- somewhat important 




There are some who believe the government should pay for health care and education 
for all citizens. How much do you agree with this? 
- strongly agree 
- agree 
- disagree 
- strongly disagree 
 
 And how important do you consider it is for the government to pay for health care 
and education for all citizens? 
- very important 
- somewhat important 
- somewhat important 
- not important at all 
 
 There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their traditional culture and 
wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much do you agree with this?  
- strongly agree 
- agree 
- disagree 
- strongly disagree 
 
And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society? 
- very important 
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- somewhat important 
- somewhat important 
- not important at all 
 
 
Categorizing the Blue-Collar Respondents 
I categorized the respondents’ working-class status in three different ways: 1) 
based on their professional occupational status; 2) based on the respondents’ “lower 
middle class” self-identification; and 3) based on their educational levels.  
This categorization is in line with the existing scholarship on the topic. The 
conventional approaches to measuring blue collar status include occupation, education 
and subjective self-identification. While the advantage of the objective measurements 
(occupation and education) is that they limit the impact of subjective biases in 
respondents’ self-reports, they are acontextual and may overlook the impact of other 
sociodemographic variables in educational and occupational contexts (for example, the 
impact of age, ethnicity and region on a person’s cultural and social capital) (Rubin et al. 
2014).23 The subjective (self-identification) measures compensate for the weaknesses of 
the objective measures by accounting for the impact of context (at least through the 
individual interpretation) and hence should be included alongside the objective measures 
of socioeconomic status. 
The occupation-based approach is the most widely accepted way to categorize 
blue collar respondents based on such types of physical work as manufacturing, mining, 
construction, mechanic, maintenance, warehousing, firefighting, technical installation 
and others (Rose and Pevalin 2003). The common justification for using occupation-based 
                                                          
23 For example, Rubin et al. (2014) suggest that although the education or occupation of a minority group 
member may be considered to be “low” relative to a majority population, it might also be considered “high” 
relative to the person’s minority group. 
178 
 
measures stress that they serve as good proxies for indicators of the individuals’ social 
positions (Connelly et al. 2016). While the position of the clerical work in the social class 
structure is a disputed question (DeVault 1990), I categorize the clerical work as a blue-
collar type of job due to the income and job type similarities. 
In line with the above discussion, a respondent was identified as a “blue-collar 
worker” based on his/her professional status if he selected one of the below options from 
a “professional status” category: 
 
What is your professional qualification? 
- Has never worked outside the home for pay 
- Small business owner (< 25 employees) 
- Clerk 
- Service or sales worker 
- Skilled agricultural or fishery worker 
- Craft or trade worker 
- Plant or machine operator 
- General laborers 
- Corporate manager or senior official 
- Professional (scientists, mathematicians, computer scientists, architects, 
engineers, life science and health professionals, teachers, legal professionals, 
social scientists, writers and artists, religious professionals) 
- Technician or associate professional 
 
As another objective measure of blue collar status, scholars sometimes include 
income, since it tends to be correlated with the type of occupation. However, such a 
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measure has a number of limitations. Specifically, income-based measures fail to account 
for geographic and temporal variation in living costs between various regions and 
different stages of life. In addition, most income measures use overall household estimates 
and hence fail to capture variation in sizes of households. Therefore, I substitute the 
income-based approach with a subjective self-identification that relies on respondents’ 
subjective assessment of the social class status and implicitly accounts of the contextual 
variables. In this dissertation, I use the conventional measure of the subjective social class 
status that categorizes respondents into five groups (lower class, lower middle class, 
middle class, upper middle class, and upper class). The blue-collar respondents are more 
likely to self-classify as the lower middle-class group, which usually includes 
semiprofessionals (people in technical and lower level management positions) 
(Tarkhnishvili 2014) and respondents with incomes above poverty line. 
Hence, in line with the above discussion, the respondents were identified as “blue-
collar workers” based on their subjective self-identification status if they selected the 
“lower middle class” option from a “subjective social status” category: 
 
Which of the following social groups or classes do you personally belong? 
- lower class 
- lower middle class 
- middle class 
- upper middle class 
- upper class 
 
Ultimately, yet another common approach to categorizing blue-collar respondents 
is through their educational attainment due to a strong correlation between the educational 
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attainment and the type of occupation. However, in the post-Communist setting, the 
education-based approach suffers from the inability to capture dramatic variation in the 
types of schooling quality in the various tracks of secondary education (Lannert 2000; 
Fodor et al. 2006). Typically, this measure categorizes as blue collar those respondents 
with less than a 4-year college education (Frank 2004; Brooks 2005). 
In this dissertation, I categorized a respondent as a “blue-collar worker” based on 
the educational criterion if he/she selected the following options from the “education 
level” category: 
 
The highest finished education level: 
- Bachelor’s degree 
- Doctoral Degree 
- High School Diploma 
- Less than a high school diploma 
- Professional degree 
- Some college, no degree. 
  
Below I present the results of the analysis in the following order: first, I analyze 
the impact of the treatment manipulation on the preferences among the respondents in the 
general sample, and then on the respondents from the working-class subsamples 





Below I provide the summary statistics for my two treatment groups. Only two 
individual-level controls were used for balancing the sample – subjects’ gender and age. 










[1 – man, 2 - woman] 
1.505952 1.507937 505 
Age 41.45635 41.17857 505 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics. (Group 1 vs Group 2) 
 
The results suggest that the data in both samples appear to be balanced by basic 
demographic characteristics. 
For the purposes of my experiment, I have included one manipulation check at the 
end of my post-treatment list of questions, asking the respondents whether they would 
support MSZP if it ran on a more protectionist platform. The results of the analysis are 







Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran 
on a more protectionist platform? 
2.081 2.224 z =  -2.525*** Prob > |z| =   0.012 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 13. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 
Support. Question: Would You Vote for MSZP If It Ran on a More Protectionist Platform? 
 
As one can see, the treatment exposure (pro-market vs redistributionist platform of 
the left MSZP party) is associated with a significant increase in the number of respondents 
who would support the left party using a more protectionist platform in the treatment 
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group with a pro-market economic policy stance of the MSZP party. This goes in line 
with my original expectation that the respondents are more likely to defect from the MSZP 




The results of the analysis are presented below. Treatment Group 1 (neoliberal, 
pro-market policy stance of the center-left MSZP) is compared against the Treatment 2 
(redistributionist policy stance of the center-left MSZP), holding positions of the other 
parties (Fidesz—neutral, Jobbik— protectionist) constant. 
Below, I map the results of the analysis. The means comparisons and relevant 
statistics are provided in the Appendix II. Overall, the treatment exposure has a 
substantive and significant effect on declining support for Hungary’s left. 
The below graph shows the results of the treatment exposure to the question “Of 
the above parties, which one appeals to you most?” As the Figure 11 suggests, the 
exposure to the treatment on the general sample results in a significant increase in support 
for the radical right Jobbik party, combined with a decrease in support for both 
mainstream parties- the center-left MSZP and the right populist Fidesz. By Table 22 
(Appendix II), I find a statistically significant increase in support for Jobbik (0.222 versus 
0.318, p=.000) and decrease in support for the MSZP party (0.355 versus 0.331, p=.213) 





Figure 11. The Impact of Treatment Exposure on Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one appeals to 
you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), General Sample, t-test 
 
I then plot the results of the analysis for my other dependent variable, which is the 
respondents’ answer to the question: “Which party would you vote for on the party list?” 
As the below figure suggests, the results generally go in line with the expectation: the 
treatment exposure results in a significant increase in support for the radical right Jobbik 
party (along with the “won’t tell category”, which also may be partly reflective of Jobbik 
support due to the reluctance of some respondents to openly name this party as their 
preferred party choice). By Table 24 (Appendix II), I find a statistically significant 
increase in support for Jobbik (0.141 versus 0.183, p=.036) and decrease in support for 
both Fidesz and MSZP party (0.331 versus 0.279, p=.038 and 0.069 versus 0.064, p=.352 
respectively) as result of my treatment. There is also an increase in support among the 









Figure 12. The Impact of Treatment Exposure on Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would you vote 
on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2), General Sample, t-test 
 
I then repeat the same analysis for the respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about respondents’ party and policy preferences (Figure 13, Table 23 and 
Tables 25-33 in the Appendix II). In line with my expectations, the treatment exposure is 
associated to a substantive increase in the number of respondents who are likely to vote 
for Jobbik. A Wilcoxon Rank test indicates, the median post-test ranks were statistically 
significantly higher than the median pre-test ranks for the likelihood of voting for Jobbik 
(z = 2.112, p = .035) (Table 26 in the Appendix II).  
Interestingly, I also discover a significant increase in anti-immigration attitudes 
and the salience of the immigration issue. According to Wilcoxon Rank test, the median 
post-test ranks were statistically significantly higher than the median pre-test ranks for 
stronger immigrants’ integration in the society (z = 2.604, p = .009, Appendix II, Table 
21) and salience of these preferences (z = 1.990, p = .046, Appendix II, Table 33). This 
















Figure 13. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is 
that you vote Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a 
Better Hungary) became part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: 
“The government should strongly regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the 
government to strongly regulate private businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government should pay for 
health care and education for all citizens. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider 
it is for the government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all 
immigrants should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much 
do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs Group 2), General Sample, t-test 
 
Overall, the above findings on the general sample follow my expectations.  The 
exposure to the pro-market policy platform of the center-left MSZP (in comparison to the 
pro-redistribution policy stance of the MSZP) results in a substantial increase of the 
support for the radical right Jobbik party. These results are robust for the alternative 
specification of my dependent variable. This allows me to accept my Hypothesis I: the 
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Blue-Collar Workers by Profession 
In the above chapters, however, my focus was on one particular constituency—
blue-collar workers who are more likely to support the radical right parties. This 
constituency is theorized to be most susceptible to the rightwing populism due to its lower 
educational levels and globalization-induced economic deprivation. In the below analysis, 
I focus on the response of this constituency to the treatment exposure. 
In this subsection, I categorized the respondents as blue-collar workers based on 
their occupational status (in line with the categorization approach described above): 
 
What is your professional qualification? 
Has never worked outside the home for pay 
Small business owner 
Clerk 
Service or sales worker 
Skilled agricultural or fishery worker 
Craft or trade worker 
Plant or machine operator 
General laborers 
Corporate manager or senior official 
Professional 
Technician or associate professional 
 
The below graph maps the results of the treatment exposure to the question, “Of 
the above parties, which one appeals to you most?” As the Figure 14 suggests, the 
exposure to the treatment on the blue-collar workers’ sample results in a significant 
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increase in support for the radical right Jobbik party, combined with a decrease in support 
for the populist Fidesz. In Table 34 (Appendix II), I find a statistically significant increase 
in Jobbik support (0.212 versus 0.313, p=.019) as result of my treatment. 
 
 
Figure 14. The Impact of Treatment Exposure on Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one appeals to 
you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Occupation, t-test 
 
Figure 15, below, shows the results of the analysis for the question: “Which party 
would you vote for on the party list?” As the below figure suggests, the treatment exposure 
leads to an increase in support for the radical right Jobbik party (along with the “won’t 
tell” and “don’t know” category). By Table 36 (Appendix II), I find a significant increase 
in vote for Jobbik (0.186 versus 0.278, p=.024), a statistically significant decrease in vote 
for Fidesz (0.372 versus 0.273, p=.027), and some decrease in support for the MSZP party 










Figure 15. The Impact of Treatment Exposure on Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would you vote 
on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Occupation, t-test 
 
Ultimately, I plot the difference in respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about respondents’ party and policy preferences (Figure 16). The treatment 
exposure is associated with a substantive increase in the Jobbik vote and some increase 
in support of Jobbik joining the ruling coalition. I again discover an increase in 
respondents’ anti-immigration attitudes and salience of the immigration. By Wilcoxon 
Rank test, the median post-test ranks were statistically significantly higher than the 
median pre-test ranks for the likelihood of voting for Jobbik (z = 2.366, p = .018) (Table 
38 in the Appendix II), and support for government regulation of businesses (z = 1.614, 















Figure 16. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is 
that you vote Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a 
Better Hungary) became part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: 
“The government should strongly regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the 
government to strongly regulate private businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government should pay for 
health care and education for all citizens. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider 
it is for the government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all 
immigrants should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much 
do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Occupation, t-test 
 
Overall, the results of the analysis on the subgroup of respondents with blue-collar 
occupations go in line with my expectations and confirm Hypothesis II.  The treatment 
exposure strongly and significantly increases the support for the radical right Jobbik. The 

















In the next section, I focus on a different way of coding the working class (the 
strengths and weaknesses of different classification approaches were addressed above). 
An alternative way to measure the working-class status is by asking the respondents to 
place themselves in a specific class category. In this section I focus on the subgroup of 
my respondents who chose to identify themselves as the “lower middle class”: 
 
Which of the following social groups do you personally belong? 
Lower class 
Lower middle class 
Middle class 
Upper middle class 
Upper class 
 
Again, I repeat the above analysis on this subgroup of respondents.  
The below graph maps the results of the treatment exposure to the question “Of 
the above parties, which one appeals to you most?” As shown in the Figure 17, the 
exposure to the treatment on the self-identified blue-collar respondents leads to a 
significant increase in support for the radical right Jobbik party, along with a substantive 
decrease in support for the center-left MSZP. By Table 47 (Appendix II), Jobbik support 
significantly increases (0.215 versus 0.359, p=.005), while the support for the MSZP 




Figure 17. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one 
appeals to you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Self-Identification, t-test 
 
The subsequent Figure 18 illustrates the results of the analysis for the question: 
“Which party would you vote on the party list?” As the below figure suggests, exposure 
to the treatment leads to a decrease in the center-left MSZP vote, some increase in support 
for the radical right Jobbik party, and a significant increase in the “won’t tell” category. 
By Table 49 (Appendix II), I find some increase in vote for Jobbik (0.154 versus 0.172, 
p=.340), and a statistically significant decrease in vote for MSZP (0.085 versus 0.042, 
p=.069) as result of my treatment. 
 
Figure 18. The Impact of Treatment Exposure on Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would you vote 
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Finally, Figure 19 shows the treatment effect on a set of categorical questions 
about respondents’ party and policy preferences. The treatment exposure is associated 
with a substantive increase in Jobbik vote. Along with an increase in respondents’ anti-
immigration attitudes, I also discover a decrease in the salience of the government 
regulation issue. By Wilcoxon Rank test, the median pro-market treatment test ranks were 
higher than the median redistribution treatment test ranks for the likelihood of voting for 
Jobbik (z = 1.342 p = .180) (Table 51), and support for immigrants to fully assimilate in 
the Hungarian society (z = 1.702, p =.089, Appendix II, Table 59). 
 
 
Figure 19. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is 
that you vote Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a 
Better Hungary) became part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: 
“The government should strongly regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the 
government to strongly regulate private businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government should pay for 
health care and education for all citizens. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider 
it is for the government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all 
immigrants should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much 
do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional 
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Again, the above results are consistent with my earlier findings and general 
theoretical expectations. The treatment manipulation significantly decreases support for 
MSZP among the self-identified blue-collar respondents. In the same time, in this blue-
collar sub-category, the treatment response is strong with the support for the radical right 
Jobbik party significantly increasing in different specifications of the outcome variable. 
Overall, in this specification of the blue-collar workers category, I find substantive 
confirmation for my Hypothesis II. 
 
 
Workers by Education 
Finally, I introduce the last specification of the blue-collar status based on a 
respondent’s education level. The respondents were classified as blue-collar if they chose 
the following responses as their “highest finished education level”: 
 
The highest finished education level: 
Bachelor’s degree 
Doctoral Degree 
High School Diploma 
Less than a high school diploma 
Professional degree 
Some college, no degree 
 




As in the previous subgroups of blue-collar respondents. The results confirm the 
original expectations. There is a visible increase in support for the radical right Jobbik as 
a result of the treatment exposure. 
The below graph shows the treatment effects for the question “Of the above 
parties, which one appeals to you most?” As the Figure 20 illustrates, the treatment 
exposure results in a significant increase in support for the radical right Jobbik party, 
combined with a decrease in support for both - a center right Fidesz and a center-left 
MSZP. By Table 60 (Appendix II), Jobbik support significantly increases (0.243 versus 
0.340, p=.002), while the support for the MSZP somewhat decreases (0.349 versus 0.320, 
p=.209) as result of my treatment. 
 
 
Figure 20. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one 
appeals to you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Education, t-test 
 
The below graph shows the results of the analysis for the question: “Which party 
would you vote on the party list?” As the Figure 21 suggests, the exposure to the treatment 
leads to an increase in support for the radical right Jobbik party (along with the “won’t 
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(Appendix II), I find a significant increase in vote for Jobbik (0.164 versus 0.210, p=.054), 
and some decrease in MSZP vote (0.063 versus 0.078, p=.219) as result of my treatment. 
 
 
Figure 21. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would 
you vote on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Education, t-test 
 
Ultimately, I plot the difference in respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about their party and policy preferences. Yet again the treatment exposure is 
associated with a substantive increase in Jobbik vote along with an increase in the anti-
immigration attitudes and the salience of the immigration. The latter finding once again 
hints at the existence of a link between the economic frustration and the anti-immigration 
attitudes. By Wilcoxon Rank test, the median pro-market treatment test ranks were higher 
than the median redistribution treatment test ranks for the likelihood of voting for Jobbik 
(z = 1.944 p = .052, Table 64 in the Appendix II), support for immigrants to fully 
assimilate in the Hungarian society (z = 3.452, p =.001, Table 71 in the Appendix II), and 















Figure 22. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is 
that you vote Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a 
Better Hungary) became part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: 
“The government should strongly regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the 
government to strongly regulate private businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government should pay for 
health care and education for all citizens. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider 
it is for the government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all 
immigrants should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much 
do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs Group 2), Workers by Education, t-test 
 
Overall, the results of the above analysis go in line with my original expectations 
and strongly confirms Hypothesis II. In different subsamples and alternative 
classifications of the blue-collar workers, I find a strong and significant increase in 
support for Jobbik following the treatment exposure. Since my treatment for both groups 
does not manipulate information on the radical right Jobbik and the center right Fidesz, 
but only the economic platform of the center-left MSZP (portraying it as using a pro-
redistribution and a pro-market policy platform respectively), I conclude that the shift in 
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Contrary to my expectations, I do not discover heterogeneous effects of treatment 
exposure for most of my dependent variables, except for the education-based blue-collar 
workers’ category (Appendix II). This suggests that the effects of my treatment is not 
specific to the blue-collar respondents, but expand to broader audience. 
Overall, for the radical right parties adopting a protectionist economic policy 
stance may be an advantageous strategy in the situation when the left parties move to the 




The Policy Switch of the Center-Left and the Anti-Immigration Radical Right 
In the above section of this chapter, I have addressed the connection between the 
economic policy switch of the center-left party and the use of redistribution platform by 
the radical right. The main argument developed in this dissertation states that in the 
countries where the ex-Communist left parties implemented the policy switch along the 
economic policy scale, one should observe the right parties adopting a redistributionist 
agenda, and subsequently, those radical right parties should achieve electoral success. The 
key element to my argument is that the center left and the radical right parties primarily 
compete along the socioeconomic policy dimension. 
However, a popular counterargument states that the radical right parties primarily 
compete for their voters along the cultural dimension (see the discussion about the two 
axes of party competition in chapter 1). If the latter assumption is correct, then we should 
expect that the radical right parties would attract the left constituencies regardless of the 
radical right economic policy positions. To account for this possibility, I repeated the 
above experiment by assigning the radical right Jobbik a more typical anti-immigration 
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policy position along the cultural scale. The experimental design was identical to the one 
outlined in the above part of this chapter, but Jobbik’s platform was replaced with an anti-
immigration policy position.  
The rest of this chapter looks at the results of the analysis for this treatment. If the 
key competition between the center left and the radical right parties happens along the 
economic policy scale, we should not see an increase in Jobbik support in current 
specification of the experimental survey. By contrast, if the cultural policy stance of the 
radical right matters for the competition with the center left parties, then we should expect 





In March 2018, I ran another internet-based experimental survey in Hungary of a 
total size of 1,000 participants (500 respondents for two treatment groups respectively). 
The subjects were randomly recruited from a representative sample of Hungary’s 
population by the professional polling company Solid Data. 
The sample was split into two groups of equal size, each of which was shown 
different combinations of the information about Hungary’s largest parties’ alleged 
platforms in the upcoming Hungarian April 2018 election. The treatment, which looked 
like a newspaper excerpt, contained the information regarding the party platforms in the 
upcoming parliamentary election.  
Again, the only difference across the two treatments shown to the groups was the 
information on the policy stance of Hungary’s center-left party MSZP. Group 1 received 
the information about the MSZP embracing a pro-market policy, while Group 2 received 
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the information about the MSZP taking a redistributionist policy position. Both groups 
received the information about the Jobbik party taking an anti-immigration policy stance. 
The positions of other two parties—the center right Fidesz party (neutral policy stance) 
and the radical right Jobbik (anti-immigration policy stance)—remained constant across 
these two treatments. 
Similar to the previous survey experiment, the respondents were shown the same 
information about the three Hungarian parties in different combinations. First, they were 
shown the information about Fidesz and MSZP platforms; second, they were 
demonstrated the information regarding the Fidesz and Jobbik platforms; and lastly, they 
were shown the information about the policy positions of all three parties together. 
Following the treatment exposure, I asked the respondents the same questions regarding 
their specific party and policy preferences, as above. 
The example of the information demonstrated to the respondents is provided 
below (Figure 23). 
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Figure 23. The Examples of Treatment Presented to the Survey Participants: Article Excerpt.  







The English translation of the treatment materials is provided below.  The treatment 
with a pro-market policy stance of MSZP contained the following information: 
 
Please read the following newspaper abstract: “As the political parties prepare for 
the April 2018 parliamentary election, they are revising their political platforms 
and strategies. 
Fidesz, the ruling party, will preserve its current policy focus as part of its electoral 
strategy.  
MSZP will push for policies of economic openness and seek to satisfy 
international investors/capital in order to further integrate the Hungarian 
economy into global markets. 
Jobbik’s leadership will return to the party’s radical roots and, leaving other issues 
aside, to focus primarily on the need to limit the inflow of migrants into Hungary.” 
 
The treatment with a redistributionist policy stance of MSZP contained the 
following information: 
 
Please read the following newspaper abstract: “As the political parties prepare for 
the April 2018 parliamentary election, they are revising their political platforms 
and strategies. 
Fidesz, the ruling party, will preserve its current policy focus as part of its electoral 
strategy.  
MSZP has decided to focus on improving the living standards and will campaign 
for the introduction of a guaranteed basic income for all citizens. 
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Jobbik’s leadership will return to the party’s radical roots and, leaving other issues 
aside, to focus primarily on the need to limit the inflow of migrants into Hungary.” 
 
Sample Statistics 
Below I provide the summary statistics for my two treatment groups. Only two 
individual-level controls were used for balancing the sample – subjects’ gender and age. 










[1 – man, 2 - woman] 
1.505952 1.50495 505 
Age 41.25694 41.34059 505 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics. (Group 1 vs Group 2) 
 
The results suggest that the data in both samples appear to be balanced on basic 
demographic characteristics. 
For the purposes of my experiment, I have included one manipulation check at the 
end of my post-treatment list of questions, asking the respondents whether they would 
support MSZP if it ran on a more protectionist platform. The results of the analysis are 







Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran 
on a more protectionist platform? 
2.181 2.244 z =  -1.157 Prob > |z| =   0.247 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 15. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 




As one can see, the treatment exposure (pro-market vs redistributionist platform of 
the left MSZP party) is associated with a positive increase in the number of respondents 
who would support the left party using a more protectionist platform in the treatment 
group with a pro-market economic policy stance of the MSZP party. Although the effect 
is not statistically significant, the difference between the means is substantive: the 





The results of the analysis are presented below. Treatment 1 (MSZP pro-market 
policy stance) is compared to Treatment 2 (MSZP redistributionist policy stance), holding 
positions of the other parties (Fidesz – neutral, Jobbik – anti-immigration) constant. 
Generally, the results suggest that the treatment exposure has little if any significant effect 
on the respondents’ preferences. The change in answers to most of the questions is not 
statistically significant.  
Below (Figure 24), I plot the results of the analysis of respondents’ answer to the 
question: “Of the above parties, which one appeals to you most?” (Table 73 in the 
Appendix III). As the graphs illustrate, the treatment does not have a significant effect on 







Figure 24. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one 
appeals to you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, General Sample, 
t-test 
 
I then plot the results of the analysis for my other dependent variable, as an answer 
to the question: “Which party would you vote for on the party list?” (Figure 25, Table 75 
in the Appendix III). As the below graph suggests, the treatment has no significant impact 
on support for any party from the list.  
 
 
Figure 25. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would 
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I then repeat the same analysis for the respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about respondents’ party and policy preferences (Figure 26, Tables 74 and 76-
85 in the Appendix III). 
 
 
Figure 26. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is that 
you vote Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a Better 
Hungary) became part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: “The 
government should strongly regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the government to 
strongly regulate private businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for the 
government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all immigrants 
should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much do you agree 
with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional culture and wholly 
accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of 
Jobbik, General Sample, t-test 
 
Overall, as the results above suggest, the exposure of the respondents to Jobbik’s 
anti-immigration platform under the center-left party policy switch does not have a 
significant impact on the respondents’ parties’ and policy choice. 
These null findings are highly consistent with my main theoretical argument—the 
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economic policy dimension, although this general orientation is not specific to the blue-
collar subjects. Therefore, the radical right parties fail to attract the former constituencies 
of the center left parties on the cultural dimension alone. It is only with the adoption of 
the economic protectionist platform that the radical right parties are able to increase their 
electoral shares. Hence, the parties’ competition and policy positions along the 
socioeconomic dimension play a key role in this context. 
There is a possibility, however, that the blue-collar constituencies respond 
differently to the treatment exposure. Therefore, in the remaining sections of this chapter 
I focus on the impact of the treatment exposure on blue-collar respondents’ support for 
the radical right Jobbik party. 
 
 
Blue-Collar Workers by Profession 
I then repeat the above analysis on the subsample of the respondents belonging to 
blue-collar workers based on their occupational status responds to the above treatment. 
The below tables summarize the main results of the analysis. 
Below I plot the results of the above analysis for the respondents’ answer to the 
question: “Of the above parties, which one appeals to you most?” (Figure 27, Table 86 in 
the Appendix III).  As the graphs illustrate, the treatment does not have a significant effect 





Figure 27. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one 
appeals to you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by 
Occupation, t-test 
 
I then plot the results of the analysis for my other dependent variable, as an answer 
to the question: “Which party would you vote for on the party list?” (Figure 28, Table 88 
in the Appendix III). 
 
 
Figure 28. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would 
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I then repeat the same analysis for the respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about respondents’ party and policy preferences (Figure 29, Tables 87 and 89-
98 in the Appendix III). 
 
 
Figure 29. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is that you vote 
Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) became 
part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: “The government should strongly 
regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the government to strongly regulate private 
businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government should pay for health care and education for all citizens. How much 
do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for the government to pay for health care and education for 
all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of 
the Hungarian society. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 
reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The 
Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by Occupation, t-test 
 
Overall, based on the results of the above analysis, I do not find any significant impact 
of my treatment on any of my other outcome variables for the subsample of blue-collar 
respondents based on their occupational status. 
Again, the above results provide more support for the assumption that the competition 
between the center-left and radical right parties occurs primarily along the economic 
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dimension alone, the radical right parties fail to attract substantive electoral support after 
the economic policy switch of the center left parties. By contrast, as the above analysis 
has demonstrated, the adoption of the economic protectionist policy stance allows the 
radical right parties to increase their electoral shares. These results are consistent on both 
the general samples and the blue-collar subsamples of my respondents. 
Overall, the above findings confirm the expectations that the center left vs radical 




An alternative way to measure the working-class status is by asking the 
respondents to place themselves in a specific class category. In this section I focus on the 
subgroup of my respondents who chose to identify themselves as “lower middle class.”  
I provide the results of the analysis for this subgroup below. 
Below I graph the results of the analysis for the subsample of self-identified lower 
middle-class respondents for the question: “Of the above parties, which one appeals to 
you most?” As the below figure suggests, I find a decline in support for the MSZP in this 






Figure 30. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one 
appeals to you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by Self-
Identification, t-test 
 
I then plot the results of the analysis for my other dependent variable, as an answer 
to the question: “Which party would you vote for on the party list?” (Figure 31, Table 101 
in the Appendix III). 
 
 
Figure 31. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would 
you vote on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by 
Self-Identification, t-test 
I then repeat the same analysis for the respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about respondents’ party and policy preferences (Figure 32, Tables 100 and 


















Figure 32. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is that you vote Jobbik (the 
Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) became part of the government 
coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: “The government should strongly regulate private businesses”; “And how 
important do you consider for the government to strongly regulate private businesses?”;” There are some who believe the government 
should pay for health care and education for all citizens. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for 
the government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; “There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 
traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you 
consider it is for all immigrants to reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs 
Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by Self-Identification, t-test 
 
Yet again, the results of the above analysis suggest that the exposure to the 




Workers by Education 
Finally, I introduce the last specification of the blue-collar status based on a 
respondent’s education level and repeat the above analysis for this specification. Overall, 
the results are similar to the ones presented above. 
Below I plot the results of the analysis for the subsample of lower educated 
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to the question: “Of the above parties, which one appeals to you most?”, I find a decrease 
in support for the MSZP in this specification of the blue-collar respondents significant on 
90% confidence level (Figure 33, Table 112 in the Appendix III). 
 
 
Figure 33. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: Of the above parties, which one 
appeals to you most? (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by 
Education, t-test 
 
I then plot the results of the analysis for my other dependent variable, as an answer 
to the question: “Which party would you vote on the party list?” (Figure 34, Table 114 in 
the Appendix III). 
 
 
Figure 34. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Question: And (if you go) which party would you vote 


















I then repeat the same analysis for the respondents’ answers to a set of categorical 
questions about respondents’ party and policy preferences (Figure 35, Tables 113 and 
116-124 in the Appendix III). 
 
Figure 35. The Impact of the Treatment Exposure on the Party Choice, Questions: In your opinion, how likely it is that you vote 
Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) party? How would you feel if Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) became 
part of the government coalition? How much do you agree with the following statement: “The government should strongly 
regulate private businesses”; “And how important do you consider for the government to strongly regulate private businesses?”;” 
There are some who believe the government should pay for health care and education for all citizens. How much do you agree 
with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for the government to pay for health care and education for all citizens?”; 
“There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian 
society. How much do you agree with this?”; “And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to reject their 
traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?” (Group 1 vs Group 2), Experiment 2: The Anti-
Immigration Stance of Jobbik, Workers by Education, t-test 
 
The above analysis suggests that in this specification, for this treatment specification 
I do not find a substantive change in respondents’ party and policy preferences. The 
treatment exposure decreases support for the center-left MSZP, the effects are significant 











-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
214 
 
However, this treatment specification does not have a substantive impact on support 
for the radical right Jobbik. In other words, the adoption of pro-market policy platform by 
the center-left party does not result in respondents’ embrace of the radical right party 




Overall, the results of both my experiments confirm my theoretical expectations. 
In the first treatment specification (protectionist platform of Jobbik), I discovered a 
significant effect of my treatment on increased support for the radical right Jobbik. The 
results are substantive and significant for alternative specifications of the dependent 
variables and different subsamples of blue-collar respondents. In cases like Hungary, the 
blue-collar constituencies frustrated by the abandonment of the mainstream left political 
parties’ centrist shift along the socioeconomic policy dimension are more likely (as the 
analysis of the subsample of the blue-collar respondents by education reveals) to support 
the radical right parties when the radical right parties adopt the protectionist economic 
policy positions. 
By contrast, in the second treatment specification (anti-immigration platform of 
Jobbik) I do not find that my treatment has a substantive impact on support for the radical 
right Jobbik. This suggests that the use of the anti-immigration platform per se does not 
suffice to attract the supporters to the radical right under the center-left policy switch. The 
protectionist platform of the radical right plays a key role in attracting the new supporters. 
This null finding goes in line with my main theoretical argument—the competition 
between the center left and the radical right parties takes place primarily along the 
economic policy dimension. Hence, the radical right parties fail to attract the former 
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constituencies of the center left parties on the cultural dimension alone but are able to do 
so when they adopt the protectionist positions on the economic policy scale. These 
findings explain why the radical right parties generally hold more left leaning policy 
stances on the economy when compared to other parties in their respective political 
systems (Allen 2015; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Burstikova 2017). 
This finding supports the main argument of this paper: when the views of the 
working-class voters are not represented by the political mainstream due to the center left 
parties’ shift along the economic policy scale, this constituency becomes more likely to 
shift to the right of the political spectrum and has a propensity to radicalize further when 





Summary of Main Findings 
In this dissertation I examine the variation in the electoral fortunes of the radical 
right parties as a function of the left parties’ economic policy positions. My argument 
contributes to the scholarship on the variation in the popularity of the radical right parties 
by explaining how the choices of the ex-Communist parties in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Communist systems created the political opportunities available for the 
radical parties. 
I show that following the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Communist successor parties were left with two major strategies: to maintain the 
economic orthodoxy and redistributionist platform (as did the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in the Czech Republic), or to embrace the liberal 
economic reforms and shift to the center of the political spectrum (as did the MSZP in 
Hungary and the SLD in Poland). According to my theory, while the latter strategy was 
profitable in the short term, allowing the ex-Communist left parties to expand their 
electoral bases, it was harmful in the long term since it pushed the traditional blue-collar 
constituencies of the left parties away. Abandoned by the left, these voters were 
eventually incorporated by the radical right parties that used redistributionist economic 
appeals to attract the former left supporters. This approach allows me to explain the 
current rightwards drift in the post-Communist region. 
I tested my hypotheses on different levels of analysis: cross-country observational 
and qualitative comparisons, the constituency level analysis and individual-level 
experimental surveys, which allowed me to address the respective weaknesses of each 
individual approach. First, I focused on cross-country level using quantitative evidence to 
trace the voting preferences of blue- collar voters over the last quarter century. I 
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demonstrated that the blue-collar voters do in fact switch away from the ex-Communist 
left to the radical right parties. I also demonstrated that this process is related to ex-
Communist left parties’ adoption of more pro-market positions. 
Second, I looked at four selected Visegrád countries — the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—and ran a qualitative case-study analysis on the 
secondary data by tracing the economic policy choices made by the ex-Communist left 
parties, the party realignment process that followed those choices and the electoral success 
of the radical right parties that followed. I demonstrated that in the countries where the 
ex-Communist left parties implemented austerity reforms (Hungary and Poland), the blue-
collar constituencies tended to switch to the right side of the political spectrum and 
eventually embrace the radical right parties. I supported my argument with the individual 
survey data from the Comparative Study of the Electoral System and Median Opinion Ltd. 
to show that the blue-collar constituencies shifted over time from supporting the ex-
Communist left to embracing the radical right parties. By contrast, in the countries where 
the ex-Communist left parties preserved their traditional pro-labor agenda (the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia), the success of the radical right was more short-lived. 
Third, I used the constituency-level data in Hungary to track the voters’ support 
for the ex-Communist left MSZP and radical right Jobbik in the 2006–2010 electoral 
round (after another round of the implementation of austerity package by MSZP in 2008). 
In line with my theoretical argument, I discovered a correlation between the support for 
Jobbik in the 2010 election and the support for the MSZP in 2006 on a constituency level 
following the implementation of austerity reforms by the MSZP. 
Fourth, I ran an experimental survey in Hungary that demonstrated that the 
embrace of a pro-market agenda by the ex-Communist left MSZP party led to a strong 
and significant increase in support for Jobbik on both general sample and different 
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specifications of blue-collar subsamples when the radical right Jobbik party adopts a 
protectionist economic agenda. By contrast, I found that my treatment had no effect on 
Jobbik’s support in the other experiment specification where Jobbik adopted a cultural 
(anti-immigration) agenda alone. 
My dissertation merges the different streams of literature in a coherent account 
describing the factors that contribute to the success of the radical right in Visegrád 
countries. In engaging the literature on the definitions of the radical right (Mudde 1995; 
Mudde 2000; Mudde 2002; Brug et al. 2000; Fennema 1997; Brug and Fennema 2003; 
Pop-Eleches 2010; Rovny and Marks 2011; Bustikova 2014) and populist right (Canovan 
1999; Weyland 1999; Mudde 2000; Mudde 2007) parties I highlight the conceptual 
distinctions between the two concepts. Specifically, I show that while populism is not 
limited to the radical-right politics, it may be combined with other constituent elements 
of the radical right politics, such as ethno-nationalism (Mudde 2007; Bonikowski 2017). 
I also discuss the specific circumstances that may make populist appeals a more attractive 
political strategy, such as when large social groups become frustrated with the policies of 
the establishment (Betz 1994, 2002; Canovan 1999; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Zakaria 
2016; Ishkanian and Marlies 2017). In addition, I engage the literature about the impact 
of austerity policies by mainstream parties on the electoral success of challenger parties 
(Vasilopoulou et Halikiopoulou 2013; Bailey et al. 2018; Barber and Hope 2015; Lupu 
2014; 2015; Nyman 2016a, 2016b; Thomas and Tufts 2016). I demonstrate that the 
austerity reforms implementation by the ex-Communist left parties increased the 
popularity of the populist and radical right parties in the region. 
I also build on the scholarship about the impact of economic policy convergence 
on the election successes of radical right parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Carter 2005; 
Nissan and Carter 2005; Brug and Fennema 2003) to show that in the post-Communist 
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setting, the policy choices of the Communist successor parties played a particularly 
important role in this policy convergence. I engage the literature on the political strategies 
and policy choices of the ex-Communist parties (Hanley 2001; Grzymala-Busse 2002; 
March and Mudde 2005; Tavits and Letki 2009) that determined their short-term success 
and long-term demise. As I demonstrate in the above chapters, these policy choices fueled 
the process of “proletarization” of the radical right (Ignazi 2003; Norris 2005; Rydgren 
2007), echoing the similar dynamics in western European countries (Arzheimer 2013; Ost 
2018). 
By merging different streams of literature from different European contexts and 
showing the similarity of the political processes in these contexts, I increase the breadth 
and depth of our understanding of the phenomenon in question. In this sense, my argument 
complements and unifies previous accounts of the success of the radical right parties.  
 
 
Contributions and Implications 
A number of implications of the theory described and tested in the above chapters 
are worthy of discussion.  
First, in this dissertation I demonstrate that the mainstream parties’ behavior on 
issues other than the radical right’s own immigration matters is important. I showed that 
party competition along the economic policy dimension (and not just the cultural 
dimension) plays an important role in building support for the radical right parties. 
Specifically, in Chapter 7, I tested the assumption that the radical right parties primarily 
compete for the center left party voters along the cultural dimension and did not find 
confirmation of this hypothesis. Instead, I found only null results. After the left parties’ 
economic policy switch, the radical right parties competing solely along the cultural 
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dimension did not gain additional votes. By contrast, in a slightly modified version of this 
experiment, the support for the radical right competing along the economic policy 
dimension increased substantively. The conclusion that the positions of the center left 
parties along the economic policy dimension matter for the electoral fortunes of the 
radical right parties is non-trivial and has important policy implications discussed below. 
Second, I demonstrated that political opportunity structures explain a substantive 
share of variation in support for radical right parties, specifically the political choices 
made by other (center left) parties; this is in line with the previous scholarship on the 
topic. Political opportunity structures can be defined as the set of structural factors 
external to the party that affect its success.  This suggests that along with purely economic 
factors, such as crises, economic stagnation or regional disparities, the programmatic 
strategies of mainstream parties (in particular, the left parties), and their positions on 
specific policy issues help explain substantive share of variation in the success of the 
radical right parties in post-Communist Europe over time. 
Third, I have shown that some of the political processes of the ex-Communist 
party systems largely mirror the political processes in Western Europe. In particular, the 
so-called “proletarization” of the radical right parties (a phenomenon first examined in 
Western European countries) also takes place in Eastern and Central Europe. In this sense, 
the findings in this dissertation suggest that the trajectories of the post-Communist polities 
are not as distinct from the rest of European countries, as some scholars have suggested 
(Ekiert 2015). The distance between Europe’s new European Union members and the rest 
of the countries may be shrinking, and the economic, social, and political differences may 
become less pronounced. 
My findings allow me to make important policy recommendations. Specifically, 
my research demonstrates that the left parties are often the ones responsible for the 
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convergence of the political mainstream on the economic policy dimension. Therefore, 
there might be a possibility of reducing a rightward drift among their populations if the 
left parties adjust policies and programs in their economic platforms that alienated the 
blue-workers’ constituencies in the first place (as the cases of Czech’s KSČM and 
Slovakia’s Smer-SD suggests).  
In particular, in the Czech case, I find that the presence of the KSČM party, which 
preserved the traditional economic left policy positions and succeeded in implementing 
pro-labor policies (in alliance with the ČSSD party) allowed the Czech left to retain 
substantive shares of support among the blue-collar constituencies. As result, the 
traditional left-right parties’ alignments (as suggested by the individual-level analysis) 
were preserved. Moreover, the Czech radical right parties failed to attract substantial 
support due to the limited size of the blue-collar constituencies available for mobilization 
(since they remained incorporated by the left parties to a large extent). Hence, the Czech 
populist and radical right parties failed to increase their popularity to the extent that 
Hungary’s and Polish populist and radical right parties did. 
In the Slovak case, the situation was somewhat similar, except that the Slovak 
populist left Smer-SD was able to rebrand itself as a pro-labor left party with strong left-
leaning social etatism and protectionism after the other left party SDL took part in the 
liberal reforms (like the Polish and Hungarian left did). As result, Smer-SD was able to 
retain the support of the traditional left blue-collar constituencies and prevent the populist 
right SNS from incorporating these groups. The Slovak case is particularly instrumental 
in terms of developing policy recommendations, since it suggests that successful 
rebranding of the left may limit the electoral success of the radical right parties. 
The analysis in this dissertation is also applicable to explaining the fortunes of the 
center left parties in Western Europe. Berman (2010) explains that since the 1970s, the 
222 
 
uninspiring administrators who offered little more than a gentler version of neoliberalism 
dominated on the left side of the western European political spectrum. This phenomenon 
led the left parties to lose the core social democratic insights (Berman 2010). As result of 
these policy choices by the western European left parties, the process of the proletarization 
of the radical right followed—in these countries, the blue-collar constituencies became 
continuously incorporated into the radical right (Arzheimer 2013). 
Given this problem with the political programs of the left parties, Habermas (2016) 
argues that today’s political left needs to re-establish a distinct position: “One would 
therefore have to make contrasting political programs recognizable again, including the 
contrast between the – in a political and cultural sense – liberal open-mindedness of the 
left, and the nativist fug of right-wing critiques of an unfettered economic globalization. 
In a word: political polarization should be re-crystallized between the established parties 
on substantive conflicts.” Such an approach would address the concerns of the radical 
right voters who are frustrated with the political establishment without rejecting the 
economic tenets championed by the international liberal institutions.  
The experiences of the left parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia discussed 
above suggest ways to adjust policies and programs of the left parties that would reduce 
the effects of the centrist drift in their economic platforms and attract back workers’ 
support. The left parties’ ability to retain parts of their blue-collar constituencies would 
limit the growth of the populist and radical right parties in these countries and ultimately 
contribute to the political stability in the region. Ost (2018: 124) suggests that only a 
significant left alternative will be able to stop the spread of populist right in Poland. While 
Ost acknowledges that it would be particularly hard to do in the post-Communist countries 
where the radical left is still associated with dictatorships, the example of successful 
rebranding by Smer-SD suggests otherwise. Moreover, the fact that the electoral success 
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of PiS, Fidesz and Jobbik has to do with their willingness to introduce economic policies 
hitherto identified with the left suggests that the parties on the left will play a large part 
in determining the future. 
The realignment theory introduced in this dissertation allows me to extend my 
conclusions beyond the electoral fortunes of the radical right parties and include the 
populist right parties more broadly. As I show in Chapters 4 and 5, in Hungary and Poland 
the electoral success of the populist right Fidesz and PiS was to some extent the function 
of the same economic policies stances chosen by the ex-Communist left parties. While 
focusing on populists may have the greatest payoff, the scope of this dissertation does not 
allow me to extend the analysis to those parties as well. Future research should address 
the fortunes of the right populist parties in the region as the result of the center-left parties’ 
economic policy choices. 
Another interesting methodological problem is the conceptualization of the left 
and right. The rise of the populist parties and the mainstream parties’ repositioning on 
policy dimensions and ideological blurring made some scholars wonder to what extent 
the traditional definitions of the left and right parties continue to apply to the 
contemporary political landscape. In this dissertation, I go around this problem by 
defining the parties on their position along the cultural policy dimension (which I hold 
fixed) and then focusing the analysis on parties’ strategic choices along the economic 
policy continuum. However, the potential problem remains. Future research should 
address the applicability of the usual left-right divide and traditional party labels to the 
emerging political landscape. This will help to complete the picture of the roles that the 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trend 0.0358*** 0.0243** 0.0244*** 0.0243** 0.0165 
 (6.20) (2.45) (2.99) (2.52) (1.23) 
Male 0.0202 0.0221 0.0220 0.0217 0.0213 
 (0.86) (1.17) (1.25) (1.23) (1.20) 
Left: strongly favors   0.106** 0.114** 0.258*** 0.156*** 
reducing taxes (Y-1)  (2.11) (2.16) (3.04) (5.65) 
BG 0.188*** 0.118*** 0.135 T 0.247** 0.329*** 
 (4.84) (3.41) (1.93) (2.32) (2.67) 
CZ -0.142*** 0.101 0.0850 0.545 T 0.189 
 (-3.00) (1.01) (0.48) (1.84) (1.48) 
HU 0.461*** 0.365*** 0.348*** 0.267*** 0.430*** 
 (12.51) (8.56) (6.70) (5.29) (6.98) 
PL 0.549*** 0.533*** 0.409*** 0.102 0.223 
 (16.51) (20.42) (3.25) (0.45) (1.21) 
SI 0.232*** 0.191*** 0.217 T 0.518** 0.317** 
 (6.21) (3.46) (1.74) (2.27) (2.30) 
Unemployment (Y-1)   0.00115 0.0600 0.0148 
   (0.02) (0.75) (0.20) 
Growth (Y-1)   0.0454 0.134 T 0.143 T 
   (1.21) (1.74) (1.70) 
Left: Favors tough policy     -0.0918**  
on immigration (Y-1)    (-1.97)  
Asylum Requests (Y-1)     -0.0730*** 
     (-2.88) 
N 9160 5952 5952 5952 5952 
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 16. Full Model: Populist Right vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class Respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Spending vs Taxation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 











 (6) (7) (8) (9)    
Trend 0.00849 0.0130 0.00883 0.0121    
 (1.00) (1.18) (1.03) (0.83)    
Male 0.0210 0.0203 0.0209 0.0200    
 (1.13) (1.17) (1.18) (1.16)    
Left: strongly supports  0.0202 0.0185 0.0593 T -0.000672    
deregulation of markets (Y-1) (0.86) (0.76) (1.65) (-0.04)    
BG 0.132*** 0.104 0.103 0.191    
 (5.24) (1.52) (1.64) (1.50)    
CZ -0.0245 -0.0805 -0.168 -0.0892    
 (-0.37) (-0.90) (-1.40) (-1.00)    
HU 0.459*** 0.440*** 0.422*** 0.507*** 
 (20.28) (12.72) (8.74) (8.26)    
PL 0.513*** 0.504** 0.261 0.574*** 
 (18.44) (2.22) (1.06) (3.02)    
SI 0.141*** 0.0937 0.118 0.0760    
 (4.52) (0.92) (1.36) (0.62)    
Unemployment (Y-1)  -0.0351 -0.0212 -0.0446    
  (-0.50) (-0.32) (-0.57)    
Growth (Y-1)  -0.00351 0.0953 -0.00659    
  (-0.05) (1.26) (-0.08)    
Left: Favors tough policy   0.0619                 
on immigration (Y-1)   (1.60)                 
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.0417 T   
    (-1.88)    
N 5952 5952 5952 5952 
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 17. Full Model: Populist Right vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Deregulation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. Chapel 













 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Trend 0.0116 0.0189** 0.0193*** 0.0155 
 (1.37) (2.24) (2.98) (1.08) 
Male 0.0215 0.0208 0.0208 0.0206 
 (1.14) (1.20) (1.20) (1.19) 
Left: strongly opposes -0.00173 -0.00599 -0.0105 -0.0354*** 
redistribution (Y-1) (-0.23) (-0.50) (-0.29) (-3.23) 
BG 0.138*** 0.0808 0.0821 0.238** 
 (5.81) (1.11) (1.06) (2.19) 
CZ -0.0680 -0.113 -0.101 -0.101 
 (-1.62) (-1.08) (-0.58) (-0.98) 
HU 0.453*** 0.437*** 0.438*** 0.543*** 
 (20.20) (11.99) (10.20) (9.65) 
PL 0.540*** 0.670*** 0.700** 0.776*** 
 (30.34) (3.54) (2.43) (3.89) 
SI 0.127*** 0.0409 0.0403 0.0343 
 (5.20) (0.37) (0.37) (0.24) 
Unemployment (Y-1)  -0.0455 -0.0455 -0.0482 
  (-0.57) (-0.58) (-0.57) 
Growth (Y-1)  -0.0553 -0.0664 -0.0528 
  (-0.84) (-0.67) (-0.63) 
Left: Favors tough policy   -0.00645  
on immigration (Y-1)   (-0.12)  
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.0706** 
    (-2.27) 
N 5952 5952 5952 5952 
T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 18. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Redistribution Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 





T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 19. Full Model: Populist Right vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Spending vs Taxation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Male 0.0310    0.0228 0.0223 0.0220 0.0217 
 (1.64)    (1.25) (1.28) (1.25) (1.23) 
Left: strongly favors   0.0886 0.0867 0.232*** 0.144*** 
reducing taxes (Y-1)  (1.08) (1.21) (2.94) (4.51) 
BG 0.165*** 0.122*** 0.116 T 0.219** 0.308 T 
 (5.06)    (3.06) (1.77) (2.02) (1.88) 
CZ -0.0570    0.0918 0.0368 0.479 T 0.156 
 (-1.54)    (0.64) (0.21) (1.82) (1.48) 
HU 0.441*** 0.380*** 0.364*** 0.280*** 0.444*** 
 (13.02)    (5.28) (5.43) (4.78) (4.96) 
PL 0.546*** 0.533*** 0.444*** 0.170 0.277 
 (20.47)    (19.55) (3.22) (0.76) (1.19) 
SI 0.234*** 0.183*** 0.166 T 0.456** 0.258** 
 (7.91)    (2.64) 0.0223 0.0220 0.0217 
Unemployment (Y-1)   -0.0219 0.0395 -0.0224 
   (-0.40) (0.53) (-0.45) 
Growth (Y-1)   0.0280 0.109 0.120 
   (0.58) (1.39) (1.10) 
Left: Favors tough policy    -0.0808 T  
on immigration (Y-1)    (-1.95)  
Asylum Requests (Y-1)     -0.0799** 
     (-2.00) 
2002 -0.483***     
 (-10.42)        
2004 -0.405***     
 (-5.61)        
2006 -0.104***     
 (-2.80)        
2008 -0.0976*** -0.141** -0.150** -0.154 T -0.0999 
 (-3.00)    (-2.07) (-2.16) (-1.90) (-0.92) 
2010 -0.0269    -0.0682 -0.0689 -0.0904 -0.0312 
 (-0.59)    (-0.95) (-0.96) (-1.20) (-0.31) 
2012 -0.0638    -0.0480 -0.0446 -0.0470 0.00443 
 (-1.09)    (-1.15) (-1.25) (-1.46) (0.06) 













T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 20. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on Market 
Deregulation Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 






















 (6) (7) (8) (9)    
Male 0.0222 0.0216 0.0225 0.0215    
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.27) (1.23)    
Left: strongly supports  0.0258 0.0448 0.105*** 0.0358T    
deregulation of markets (Y-1) (1.44) (1.26) (4.25) (1.66)    
BG 0.134*** 0.206 0.244** 0.226    
 (4.25) (1.30) (1.97) (1.09)    
CZ -0.0115 -0.0572 -0.134 -0.0652    
 (-0.18) (-0.64) (-1.10) (-0.92)    
HU 0.460*** 0.445*** 0.432*** 0.468*** 
 (15.93) (11.71) (7.99) (5.11)    
PL 0.505*** 0.0826 -0.352 0.146    
 (20.01) (0.16) (-1.28) (0.37)    
SI 0.143*** 0.241 0.330T 0.216    
 (3.99) (1.01) (1.84) (1.13)    
Unemployment (Y-1)  0.0140 0.0496 0.00156    
  (0.14) (0.59) (0.02)    
Growth (Y-1)  0.150 0.324*** 0.134    
  (0.76) (3.00) (0.79)    
Left: Favors tough policy    0.0776**                 
on immigration (Y-1)   (1.99)                 
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.0159    
    (-0.39)    
2008 -0.0655 -0.0270 0.0315 -0.0288    
 (-1.33) (-0.19) (0.32) (-0.20)    
2010 0.00424 0.0411 0.0867 0.0410    
 (0.06) (0.32) (0.93) (0.31)    
2012 -0.0494 -0.0525 -0.0469 -0.0424    
 (-0.89) (-1.39) (-1.63) (-0.68)    






























T p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 21. Full Model: RR vs ex-Communist Left Vote amongst Working-Class respondents, Left Parties’ Positions on 
Redistribution Policy. European Social Survey, 1-8 Waves, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 












 (10) (11) (12) (13)    
Male 0.0223 0.0215 0.0216 0.0213    
 (1.24) (1.25) (1.25) (1.23)    
Left: strongly opposes 0.00879 0.0233 0.0629 -0.0245    
redistribution (Y-1) (0.55) (0.62) (1.42) (-0.73)    
BG 0.138*** 0.162 0.196 0.240    
 (4.83) (1.00) (1.14) (1.27)    
CZ -0.0472 -0.0995 -0.164 T -0.114 T    
 (-0.89) (-1.38) (-1.82) (-1.77)    
HU 0.458*** 0.445*** 0.445*** 0.542*** 
 (16.24) (10.81) (10.48) (5.82)    
PL 0.521*** 0.259 -0.0937 0.660    
 (19.43) (0.45) (-0.15) (1.37)    
SI 0.130*** 0.159 0.222 0.0334    
 (4.22) (0.67) (0.89) (0.17)    
Unemployment (Y-1)  -0.0153 0.00432 -0.0694    
  (-0.16) (0.04) (-0.85)    
Growth (Y-1)  0.0861 0.216 -0.0178    
  (0.40) (0.93) (-0.10)    
Left: Favors tough policy    0.0420                 
on immigration (Y-1)   (1.52)                 
Asylum Requests (Y-1)    -0.0727    
    (-1.43)    
2008 -0.0809 T -0.0694 -0.0291 -0.0841    
 (-1.84) (-0.51) (-0.22) (-0.62)    
2010 -0.00901 0.0108 0.0467 -0.000903    
 (-0.14) (0.08) (0.36) (-0.01)    
2012 -0.0579 -0.0558 -0.0604 T -0.000540    
 (-0.99) (-1.47) (-1.74) (-0.01)    
N 5952 5952 5952 5952    
272 
 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.355 .331 t =   0.796 Pr(T > t) = 0.213 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.222 .318 t =  -3.422*** Pr(T < t) = 0.000 
Tp<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 22. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 
Jobbik. Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
 
 
Tp<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 23. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .067 .053 t =   0.924 Pr(T > t) = 0.178 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .015 .008 t =   1.161 Pr(T > t) = 0.123 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .331 .279 t =   1.779** Pr(T > t) = 0.038 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .141 .183 t =  -1.798** Pr(T < t) = 0.036 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .069 .064 t =   0.379 Pr(T > t) = 0.352 
Who would you vote for? LMP .069 .059 t =   0.641 Pr(T > t) = 0.261 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok .005 .001 t =   1.001 Pr(T > t) = 0.158 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.009 .001 t =   1.638** Pr(T > t) = 0.051 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .019 .032 t =  -1.192 Pr(T < t) = 0.117 
Who would you vote for? Other party .012 .006 t =   1.004 Pr(T > t) = 0.158 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .105 157 t =  -2.432** Pr(T < t) = 0.008 
Tp<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 24. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 






Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election: MSZP .119 .099 t =   1.010 Pr(T > t) = 0.156 
Who will win the election: Jobbik .155 .218 t =  -2.594*** Pr(T < t) = 0.005 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 25. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party Will 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
1.889 2.042 z =  -2.112** Prob > |z| =   0.035 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 26. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.393 2.464 z =  -1.061 Prob > |z| =   0.289 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 27. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.296 2.282 z =   0.081 Prob > |z| =   0.935 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 28. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government regulating 
business to you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – 
very important] 
2.258 2.270 z =  -0.327 Prob > |z| =   0.744 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 29. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to 










Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.462 3.490 z =  -0.756 Prob > |z| =   0.450 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 30. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
3.560 3.577 z =  -0.369 Prob > |z| =   0.712 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 31. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.692 2.859 z =  -2.604*** Prob > |z| =   0.009 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 32. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 










Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.413 2.540 z =  -1.990** Prob > |z| =   0.047 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 33. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 














T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more: 
MSZP 
.314 .330 t =  -0.300 Pr(T < t) = 0.382 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.212 .313 t =-2.088** Pr(T < t) = 0.019 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 34. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.506 3.563 Z =  -0.600 Pr(T < t) = 0.274 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 35. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .064 .068 t =  -0.149 Pr(T < t) = 0.441 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .006 .006 t =   0.085 Pr(T > t) = 0.466 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .372 .273 t =   1.938** Pr(T > t) = 0.027 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .186 .278 t =  -1.990** Pr(T < t) = 0.024 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .103 .080 t =   0.729 Pr(T > t) = 0.233 
Who would you vote for? LMP .038 .040 t =  -0.0613 Pr(T < t) = 0.476 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok 0 .006 t =  -0.9413 Pr(T < t) = 0.174 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.013 .006 t =   0.685 Pr(T > t) = 0.247 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .006 .011 t =  -0.475 Pr(T < t) = 0.318 
Who would you vote for? Other party .013 .011 t =   0.121 Pr(T > t) = 0.452 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .115 .148 t =  -0.866 Pr(T < t) = 0.194 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 36. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .0705 .057 t =   0.510 Pr(T > t) = 0.305 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .147 .188 t =  -0.971 Pr(T < t) = 0.166 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 37. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for MSZP and 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
1.859 2.125 z =  -2.366** Prob > |z| =0.018 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 38. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 










Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.327 2.426 z =  -0.914 Prob > |z| =0.361 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 39. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran on a more 
protectionist platform? 
1.987 2.227 z =  -2.483** Prob > |z| =0.013 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 40. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 










Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.449 2.273 z =   1.614T Prob > |z| =0.107 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 41. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important Government Regulation issue to 
you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.378 2.25 z =   1.251 Prob > |z| = 0.211 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 42. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
3.571 3.614 z =  -0.791 Prob > |z| = 0.429 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 43. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
3.660 3.671 z =  -0.092 Prob > |z| = 0.927 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 44. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.808 2.9886 z =  -1.536 Prob > |z| = 0.125 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 45. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.597 2.739 z =  -1.251 Prob > |z| = 0.211 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 46. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 










T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.408 .297 t =   1.937** Pr(T > t) = 0.027 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.215 .359 t =   1.937*** Pr(T < t) =0.005 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 47. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.569 3.669 z = -1.526 Prob > |z| =0.127 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 48. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 









T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .092 .090 t =   0.076 Pr(T > t) = 0.470 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .023 0 t =   1.844 Pr(T > t) = 0.033 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .246 .241 t =   0.0917 r(T > t) = 0.464 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .154 .172 t =  -0.414 Pr(T < t) = 0.340 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party 
list 
.085 .042 t =  1.487 T Pr(T > t) = 0.069 
Who would you vote for? LMP .046 .069 t =  -0.8048 Pr(T < t) = 0.211 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok .008 0 t =   1.056 Pr(T > t) = 0.146 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.023 0 t =   1.844 Pr(T > t) = 0.033 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .015 .041 t =  -1.280 T Pr(T < t) = 0.100 
Who would you vote for? Other party .015 0 t =   1.499 Pr(T > t) = 0.067 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .115 .179 t =  -1.487 Pr(T < t) = 0.069 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 49. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election: MSZP .169 .124 t =  1.057 Pr(T > t) = 0.146 
Who will win the election: Jobbik .169 .235 t =  -1.341 T Pr(T < t) = 0.091 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 50. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party Will 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
1.931 2.103 z =  -1.342 Prob > |z| = 0.180 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 51. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.538 2.545 z =   0.029 Prob > |z| = 0.977 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 52. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran on a more 
protectionist platform? 
2.131 2.235 z =  -0.962 Prob > |z| = 0.336 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 53. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.246 2.310 z =  -0.633 Prob > |z| = 0.527 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 54. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly regulate 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important Government Regulation 
issue to you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – 
very important] 
2.338 2.221 z =  1.144 Prob > |z| = 0.253 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 55. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to strongly 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.469 3.490 z =  -0.215 Prob > |z| = 0.830 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 56. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you?  
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
3.569 3.566 z =   0.382 Prob > |z| = 0.702 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 57. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society [1 – not important at all;  
4 – very important] 
2.708 2.897 z =  -1.702 T Prob > |z| =0.089 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 58. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.39 2.435 z =  -0.441 Prob > |z| = 0.660 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 59. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 
reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?  
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T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.349 .320 t = 0.810 Pr(T > t) = 0.209 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.243 .340 t =-2.904*** Pr(T < t) =0.002 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 60. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.621 3.677 z = -0.649 Prob > |z| =0.517 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 61. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 









T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .068 .049 t =   1.054 Pr(T > t) = 0.146 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .013 .011 t =   0.314 Pr(T > t) = 0.377 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .305 .259 t =   1.364 Pr(T > t) = 0.086 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .164 .210 t = -1.611** Pr(T < t) =0.054 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .063 .078 t = -0.776 Pr(T < t) =0.219 
Who would you vote for? LMP .057 .041 t =   0.983 Pr(T > t) = 0.163 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok 0 .003 t =  -1.007 Pr(T < t) = 0.157 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.013 0 t =   2.233 Pr(T > t) = 0.013 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .022 .028 t =  -0.506 Pr(T < t) = 0.306 
Who would you vote for? Other party .014 .006 t =   1.121 Pr(T > t) = 0.131 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .114 .163 t =  -1.899** Pr(T < t) = 0.029 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 62. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election: MSZP .123 .108 t =   0.629 Pr(T > t) = 0.265 
Who will win the election: Jobbik .191 .252 t =  -1.977** Pr(T < t) =0.024 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 63. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party Will 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
1.954 2.111 z =  -1.944** Prob > |z|=0.052 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 64. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.436 2.478 z =  -0.511 Prob > |z| =0.610 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 65. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran on a more 
protectionist platform? 
2.076 2.227 z =  -2.349** Prob > |z|=0.019 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 66. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 










Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.368 2.370 z =  -0.112 Prob > |z| =0.911 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 67. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government regulating 
business is to you? [1 – not important at all; 
4 – very important] 
2.311 2.348 z =  -0.666 Prob > |z| =0.505 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 68. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.523 3.536 z =  -0.297 Prob > |z| =0.766 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 69. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
3.608 3.597 z =   0.330 Prob > |z| =0.741 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 70. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional culture 
and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.679 2.945 z=-.3452*** Prob > |z|=0.001 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 71. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society [1 – not 
important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.433 2.652 z= -2.879*** Prob > |z|=0.004 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 72. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 
reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society 
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Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
































workerT -0.008 -0.021 0.029 -0.084 0.305** 0.130 -0.062 
T -0.062 0.297*** 0.161 -0.018 0.123 0.106 0.102 
_cons -0.371*** -0.765*** -1.076*** -1.480*** -1.016***   
N 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 
Chi-sq 0.638 11.679 3.279 0.350 12.321 6.237 1.799 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 73. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Blue-Collar Workers by Profession. Pro-Market and Redistributionist 
MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and Jobbik. Probit and Ordinary Probit. Questions: Which party appeals to 
you more? And (if you go) which party would you vote on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2? Who will win the 





































T -0.137 0.160 -0.054 -0.277 0.076 0.099 0.117 
T*worker -0.026 0.243*** 0.186* 0.022 0.216** 0.122 0.046 
worker -0.371*** -0.765*** -1.076*** -1.480*** -1.016***   
N 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 
chi2 1.759 13.220 3.376 1.956 7.034 5.489 2.666 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 74. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Self-Identified Blue-Collar Workers. Pro-Market and Redistributionist 
MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and Jobbik. Probit and Ordinary Probit. Questions: Which party appeals to 
you more? And (if you go) which party would you vote on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2? Who will win the 













































T -0.106 0.229* 0.406*** 0.485** 0.438*** 0.261** 0.054 
T*worker 0.011 0.123 -0.136 -0.428* -0.092 -0.038 0.041 
worker -0.371*** -0.765*** -1.076*** -1.480*** -1.016***   
N 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 
chi2 1.318 14.669 10.219 4.958 15.615 10.214 1.672 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 75. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Blue-Collar Workers by Education. Pro-Market and Redistributionist 
MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and Jobbik. Probit and Ordinary Probit. Questions: Which party appeals to 
you more? And (if you go) which party would you vote on the party list? (Group 1 vs Group 2? Who will win the 





















T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.420 .392 t =   0.885 Pr(T > t) = 0.188 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.199 .222 t =  -0.894 Pr(T > t) = 0.186 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 76. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.726 3.715 z =  -0.252 Prob >|z| =0.801 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 77. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .064 .065 t =  -0.112 Pr(T < t) = 0.456 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .019 .005 t =   1.963 Pr(T > t) = 0.025 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .292 .289 t =   0.110 Pr(T > t) = 0.456 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .074 .075 t =  -0.102 Pr(T < t) = 0.459 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .137 .122 t =   0.680 Pr(T > t) = 0.249 
Who would you vote for? LMP .078 .085 t =  -0.442 Pr(T < t) = 0.329 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok .002 0 t =   1.002 Pr(T > t) = 0.158 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.004 .002 t =   0.581 Pr(T > t) = 0.281 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .029 .042 t =  -1.006 Pr(T < t) = 0.157 
Who would you vote for? Other party .004 .018 t =  -2.118** Pr(T < t) = 0.017 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .155 .115 t =   1.870** Pr(T > t) = 0.031 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 78. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election (MSZP) .167 .155 t =   0.542 Pr(T > t) = 0.291 
Who will win the election (Jobbik) .127 .125 t =   0.119 Pr(T > t) = 0.453 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 79. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party Will 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
1.867 1.852 z =   0.512 Prob > |z| =0.609 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 80. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.370 2.329 z =   0.663 Prob > |z| =0.507 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 81. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Self-identification 
[1 – far left; 4 – far right] 
2.730 2.693 z =   0.469 Prob > |z| =0.639 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 82. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.266 2.244 z =   0.397 Prob > |z| =0.691 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 83. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important Government Regulation 
issue to you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – 
very important] 
2.235 2.232 z =   0.211 Prob > |z| =0.833 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 84. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.495 3.416 z =   1.537 Prob > |z| =0.124 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 85. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
.573 3.501 z =   1.231 Prob > |z| =0.218 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 86. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.835 2.780 z =   0.929 Prob > |z| =0.353 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 87. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject their 
traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society [1 – not important at all; 4 – very 
important] 
2.467 2.479 z =  -0.124 Prob > |z| =0.902 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 88. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 
reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?  
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T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.3892 .340 t = 0.995 Pr(T > t) = 0.160 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.265 .259 t = 0.133 Pr(T > t) = 0.447 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 89. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.595 3.690 z = -1.304 Prob > |z|=0.192 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 90. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 









T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .043 .040 t =   0.128 Pr(T > t) = 0.449 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .016 .005 t =   1.068 Pr(T > t) = 0.143 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .227 .274 t =  -1.059 Pr(T < t) = 0.145 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .184 .132 t = 1.391 Pr(T > t) = 0.083 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .065 .066 t = -0.044 Pr(T < t) = 0.482 
Who would you vote for? LMP .059 .066 t =  -0.262 Pr(T < t) = 0.397 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok .005 0 t =   1.032 Pr(T > t) = 0.151 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.011 .005 t =   0.633 Pr(T > t) = 0.264 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .027 .046 t =  -0.969 Pr(T < t) = 0.167 
Who would you vote for? Other party .005 .020 t =  -1.279T Pr(T < t) = 0.100 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .195 .183 t =   0.295 Pr(T > t) = 0.384 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 91. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election: MSZP .092 .117 t = -0.792 Pr(T < t) = 0.215 
Who will win the election: Jobbik .173 .178 t = -0.120 Pr(T < t) = 0.452 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 92. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party Will 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.038 1.924 z =   1.234 Prob > |z| =0.217 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 93. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.460 2.310 z =   1.496 Prob > |z|=0.135 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 94. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran on a more 
protectionist platform? 
2.181 2.244 z =  -1.157 Prob > |z| =0.247 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 95. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.324 2.340 z = -0.216 Prob > |z| =0.829 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 96. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly 










Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government regulating 
business to you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – 
very important] 
2.265 2.320 z =  -0.464 Prob > |z| =0.643 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 97. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.427 3.482 z =  -0.713 Prob > |z| =0.476 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 98. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
3.535 3.528 z = -0.093 Prob > |z| =0.926 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 99. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society [1 – not important at all; 4 
– very important] 
2.908 2.853 z =  0.436 Prob > |z|=0.663 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 100. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.595 2.553 z =  0.441 Prob > |z| =0.659 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 101. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 










T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.449 .373 T t =   1.355 Pr(T > t) = 0.088 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.247 .247 t =   0.003 Pr(T > t) = 0.499 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 102. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.696 3.813 z =-2.245** Prob > |z| =  0.025 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 103. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .044 .08 t =  -1.301 Pr(T < t) = 0.097 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .012 .013 t =  -0.052 Pr(T < t) = 0.479 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .215 .247 t =  -0.654 Pr(T < t) = 0.257 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .184 .147 t =   0.869 Pr(T > t) = 0.1929 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .095 .08 t =   0.462 Pr(T > t) = 0.3222 
Who would you vote for? LMP .082 .073 t =   0.292 Pr(T > t) = 0.385 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok 0 0   
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.006 0 t =   0.974 Pr(T > t) = 0.165 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .019 .033 t =  -0.789 Pr(T < t) = 0.215 
Who would you vote for? Other party 0 .02 t =  -1.790 Pr(T < t) = 0.037 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .196 .133 t =   1.484 T Pr(T > t) = 0.069 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 104. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for MSZP and 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election: MSZP .133 .153 t =  -0.511 Pr(T < t) = 0.305 
Who will win the election: Jobbik .158 .153 t =   0.118 Pr(T > t) = 0.453 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 105. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2 1.98 z =   0.232 Prob > |z| =  0.816 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 106. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.462 2.36 z =   0.853 Prob > |z| = 0.394 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 107. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran on a more 
protectionist platform? 
2.272 2.347 z =  -0.733 Prob > |z| =  0.464 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 108. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.272 2.34 z =  -0.679 Prob > |z| =  0.497 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 109. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly 











Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government regulating 
business to you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – 
very important] 
2.247 2.287 z =  -0.192 Prob > |z| =  0.848 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 110. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.519 3.48 z =   0.381 Prob > |z| =  0.703 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 111. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.247 2.287 z =  -0.192 Prob > |z| =  0.848 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 112. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their 
traditional culture and wholly accept the 
values of the Hungarian society [1 – not 
important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.842 2.827 z =   0.109 Prob > |z| =  0.913 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 113. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.494 2.507 z =  -0.169 Prob > |z| =  0.866 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 114. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 
reject their traditional culture and wholly accept the values of the Hungarian society?  
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T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
MSZP 
.418 .362 t =1.563T Pr(T > t)=0.059 
Question: Which party appeals to you more? 
Jobbik 
.219 .252 t =  -1.066 Pr(T < t) = 0.143 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 115. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Support for MSZP and 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you participate in the election? 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
3.689 3.690 z =  -0.574 Prob > |z|=0.566 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 116. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting 








T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who would you vote for? DK .066 .071 t =  -0.303 Pr(T < t) = 0.381 
Who would you vote for? Egyutt .019 .005 t =   1.674 Pr(T > t) = 0.047 
Who would you vote for? Fidesz .259 288 t =  -0.852 Pr(T < t) = 0.197 
Who would you vote for? Jobbik .156 .143 t =   0.503 Pr(T > t) = 0.308 
Who would you vote for? MSZP party list .082 .058 t = 1.296 T Pr(T > t) = 0.098 
Who would you vote for? LMP .068 .076 t =  -0.438 Pr(T < t) = 0.330 
Who would you vote for? Liberalisok .002 0 t =   0.999 Pr(T > t) = 0.159 
Who would you vote for? Magyar 
Munkaspart 
.005 .003 t =   0.576 Pr(T > t) = 0.283 
Who would you vote for? Momentum .082 .058 t =   1.296 T Pr(T > t) = 0.098 
Who would you vote for? Other party .003 .014 t =  -1.644** Pr(T < t) = 0.050 
Who would you vote for? Can’t tell .164 .134 t =   1.126 Pr(T > t) = 0.130 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 117. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Voting for Different 









T-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Who will win the election: MSZP .139 .118 t =   0.869 Pr(T > t) = 0.193 
Who will win the election: Jobbik .183 .175 t =   0.272 Pr(T > t) = 0.393 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 118. T-test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Belief in Which Party 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How likely vote for Jobbik 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
1.954 1.951 z =   0.338 Prob > |z|=0.735 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 119. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Support Jobbik joining ruling coalition 
[1-definitely no; 4 – definitely yes] 
2.432 2.384 z =   0.670 Prob > |z|=0.503 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 120. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Jobbik 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Would you vote for MSZP if it ran on a more 
protectionist platform? 
2.240 2.274 z =  -0.566 Prob > |z| =   0.572 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 121. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on MSZP 









Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should regulate business 
[1 – fully disagree; 4 – fully agree] 
2.260 2.299 z =  -0.586 Prob > |z|=0.558 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 122. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Business Regulation. Question: There are some who believe the government should strongly regulate 











Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government regulating 
business to you? [1 – not important at all; 4 – 
very important] 
2.221 2.296 z =  -0.970 Prob > |z|=0.332 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 123. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Business Regulation. Question: And how important do you consider for the government to strongly 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
Government should pay for health care and 
education for all citizens [1 – fully disagree; 
4 – fully agree] 
3.508 3.466 z =   0.674 Prob > |z|=0.500 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 124. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: There are some who believe the government should pay 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important government paying for health 
care and education for all citizens to you? [1 
– not important at all; 4 – very important] 
3.587 3.540 z =   0.808 Prob > |z|=0.419 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 125. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Government Paying for Healthcare and Education. Question: And how important do you consider it is for the 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
All immigrants should reject their traditional 
culture and wholly accept the values of the 
Hungarian society [1 – not important at all; 4 
– very important] 
2.836 2.833 z =   0.067 Prob > |z|=0.947 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 126. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on 
Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: There are some who believe all immigrants should reject their 








Z-statistic Ha, Pr(T > t) 
How important for all immigrants to reject 
their traditional culture and wholly accept 
the values of the Hungarian society 
[1 – not important at all; 4 – very important] 
2.514 2.526 z =  -0.106 Prob > |z|=0.916 
T p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 127. Wilxon Rank Sum Test Results Comparing Pro-Market and Redistributionist MSZP Treatment on Salience 
of Immigrants’ Integration in the Society. Question: And how important do you consider it is for all immigrants to 




Appendix IV. Earlier Versions of the Experiment 
 
 
While working on this dissertation, I have tried several alternative versions of the 
experimental treatment before accepting the final version described above. These choices 
were made for two following reasons. First, as my theory has evolved over time, I clarified 
the experiment to better reflect my hypotheses and identify the causal effects. Second, I 
modified the treatment in several subsequent modifications of my experiment to ensure it 
more directly addressed my hypotheses of interest and possible concerns regarding 
treatment formulation. 
 
1) The original version of the experiment for this paper followed more closely the 
framework proposed in Brader and Tucker (2008) and Lupu (2014) and focused on policy 
convergence of mainstream Hungarian parties (MSZP and Fidesz), instead of the policy 
shift of the left MSZP party only (final version of the experiment). I assigned these parties 
certain positions on the socioeconomic policy issues and tracked the subjects’ party 
choices following treatment exposure.  
In 2016 I ran two internet-based experimental survey in Hungary of a total size of 
1,000 participants (500 respondents for treatment and control groups respectively). The 
subjects were randomly recruited from a representative sample of Hungary’s population 
by a professional polling company Solid Data. The administered treatment intended to 
create among the respondents a perception of convergence of Hungary’s mainstream 
parties (right-wing Fidesz and left-wing MSzP) on the economic policy issues.  
Two subsequent types of treatment were tried in this experiment. First, the 
respondents were asked to view a positioning of Hungary’s mainstream parties on 
selected economic policies based on the information from the parties’ 2014 electoral 
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programs, and to compare those with the estimates of a non-partisan group “Political 
Analytics”. While the original picture showed that the positioning of the two parties on 
economic issues was different, the alleged estimates of the “Political Analysis” showed 
convergence of two parties on those issues. 
Next, the respondents were told that the experiment would study their exposure to 
the specific type of news. The treated group was administered a video resembling a 
Hungarian cable TV news broadcast. The broadcast showed a video footage of the 
interviews with people (of allegedly ‘manual working professions’) in the streets, who 
complained about both Fidesz and MSzP failing to deliver the good economic policies to 
“the working people”. In the video, the host also discussed the results of a recent study by 
a Hungarian research institute, which claimed to have demonstrated that both MSzP and 
Fidesz were implementing similar and pro-market economic policies while in power 
(opening up the markets to the multinational companies and decreasing social protection 
instead of protecting workers and the local producers from the negative impact of 
globalization). 
I have discovered that my treatment contributed to a shift of Hungary’s blue-collar 
respondents further to the right of political spectrum, as measured by their self-positioning 
on left-right self-identification scale. In line with my expectations, these findings 
suggested that the frustration with the mainstream parties in Hungary pushed the 
respondents in the blue-collar category further to the right of the political spectrum. 
However, this version of the treatment made it difficult to identify whether the parties’ 
failure to deliver or the socioeconomic policy shift accounted for the subsequent change 
in party preferences. 
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As my theory evolved over time, I refocused on the policy switch of one particular 
party – MSZP along the economic policy dimension and redesigned my experiment 
accordingly. 
 
2) While in the above experiment I have used video as my treatment material, in the 
subsequent versions of my experiment I used newspaper articles as a treatment, because 
written manipulation of the party policy positions provided a more direct control over the 
experimental treatment, which in turn facilitated the interpretation of results and causal 
mechanisms. 
In early 2018, on the basis of Solid Data I ran several pilot experiments designed to 
check the impact and strength of my treatment effects for different formulations of the 
MSZP policy positions. I tried the following version of treatment formulations with 
neutral option for the MSZP policy stance in control group: 
 
Please read the following details from a newspaper: 
 
1) Treatment: "As the current parliamentary parties prepare for the elections to 
be held in April 2018, each of them will rethink its platforms and strategy. 
Fidesz plans to keep its current political platform in the pre-election period. 
MSZP remains faithful to the tradition of supporting free trade and 
continuing Hungary's economic integration into the world markets. This 
strategy has been held by the party since the mid-1990s, when it abandoned 
its pro-labor policy positions. 
By contrast, Jobbik will focus on the protection of the Hungarian economy and 
offer to limit the presence of multinational companies in the country. The party 
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accuses these companies of fraud, which according to Jobbik’s claims, is 
depriving Hungarian people of their jobs.  
The LMP emphasizes the importance of environmental protection and the 
introduction of a greener policy." 
 
2) Control: "As the current parliamentary parties prepare for the elections to be 
held in April 2018, each of them will rethink its platforms and strategy. 
Fidesz plans to keep its current political platform in the pre-election period. 
MSZP will focus on increasing its regional support, focusing mainly on the 
transformation of its local constituencies. 
By contrast, Jobbik will focus on the protection of the Hungarian economy and 
offer to limit the presence of multinational companies in the country. The party 
accuses these companies of fraud, which according to Jobbik’s claims, is 
depriving Hungarian people of their jobs.  
The LMP emphasizes the importance of environmental protection and the 
introduction of a greener policy." 
 
However, this version of treatment made it hard for me to identify a specific 
mediational process through which the treatment influenced the dependent variables of 
interest. Specifically, this version of treatment led to a sharp decrease in support for the 
MSZP party in control group, against the expectations. Scholars I consulted with offered 
different explanations for these findings, few of which had directly to do with the tested 
hypotheses. One explanation claimed that the respondents in the second group punished 
MSZP because the left unlike other parties in the provided newspaper abstract offered no 
policy solutions, and instead took a rather selfish stance by focusing on rebuilding its 
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regional network. If this interpretation of the results was correct, this version of the 
treatment did not allow me to reject or to confirm my hypothesis. 
Therefore, I had to alter the treatment formulation to more directly target my 
research question.  
 
3) One more objection has been raised with regards to the treatment formulation 
used in the experiment described in this dissertation. In the current version of the 
experiment described in this dissertation, I have used the following pro-market treatment 
for MSZP economic policy positions: 
 
“MSZP will push for policies of economic openness and seek to satisfy 
international investors/capital in order to further integrate the Hungarian 
economy into global markets.” 
 
However, some scholars raised concerns that this treatment may be too obviously 
pushing subjects to defect from the MSZP party due to its strong emphasis on protection 
of the interests of the international investors. To address the criticism, I ran a small 
experiment on 500 participants dropping the wording about the investors from the MSZP 
policy description: 
 
“MSZP will push for policies of economic openness in order to further integrate 
the Hungarian economy into global markets.” 
 
I then measured the impact of the treatment on my dependent variables of interest. 
Despite the modified treatment, the impact was in line with my theoretical expectations, 
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which allowed me to counter possible concerns regarding the experimental treatment 
described in this dissertation. 
 
